



Evaluation Report

Mid-term evaluation of  
AGRA's 2017–2021 strategy  
implementation

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Authors: Rachel Percy, Ethel Sibanda, Daniel Ticehurst and Gareth Davies

Submitted by Itad

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This MTE has been carried out by Itad. The team leader was Dr Rachel Percy and team members were Ethel Sibanda, Daniel Ticehurst, Gareth Davies, Leonie Beckmann, Alexina Jackson, Jessica Rust-Smith and Ekaterina Shaleva. National consultants were Tony Dogbe (Ghana), Correta Gawani (Malawi), Yaya Bouaré (Mali) and Michael Kadigi (Tanzania). The project director was Rob Lloyd.

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## List of acronyms

AGRF	African Green Revolution Forum
AGRA	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
AMIS	AGRA management information system
AU	African Union
BMGF	Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
BMZ	Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany)
CAADP	Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme
CAC	Country advisory committee
CBA	Cost benefit analysis
CoP	Chief of Party
COP	Country operational plan
CS&D	Country Support and Delivery
DFID	UK Department of International Development
DNA	Direction Nationale de l'Agriculture (National Directorate of Agriculture) (Mali)
DP	Development partner
EAC	East African Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EM	Evaluation matrix
EQ	Evaluation question
ET	Evaluation team
FO	Farmer organisation
FUM	National Farmers Union (Malawi)
GIRSAL	Ghana Incentive-Based Risk-Sharing System for Agricultural Lending
GST	Geographical Services Team
HQ	Headquarters
IAT	Inclusive Agricultural Transformation
ICA	Institutional Capacity Assessment
ICT-SAT	Institutional Capacity Strengthening Project (Mali)
IER	Institut d'Economie Rural (Rural Economy Institute) (Mali)
IO	Intermediate outcome
IP	Implementing partner
IPPT	Indicator Performance Tracking Table
KfW	German Development Bank
KII	Key informant interview
LGA	Local government authority
LOI	Letter of intent
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MAP	Market Access Programme
MDAs	Ministries, departments and agencies
MEL	Monitoring, evaluation and learning
MIRA	Micro Reforms for African Agribusiness
MOU	Memorandum of understanding
MTE	Mid-term evaluation
NAIP	National agriculture investment plan
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OCA	Organisational Capacity Assessment
PAC	PIATA Advisory Committee
P&SC	Policy and State Capability
PDI	Programme Development and Innovation

PFJ	Planting for Food and Jobs (Ghana)
PIATA	Partnership for Inclusive Agricultural Transformation in Africa
PIRS	Performance Indicator Reference Sheets
PO	Primary outcome
PU	Partnerships Unit
QA	Quality assurance
QMR	Quarterly management report
RAG	Red amber green
RF	Results framework
RP	Resource partner
SCALGA	State Capability for Agriculture and Local Government Authorities (Tanzania)
SD	Systems Development
SLG	Steckler and Linnan Guide
SMEs	Small and medium enterprises
SWG	Sector working group
SWOT	Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
TA	Technical assistance
TCDC	Tanzania Cooperative Development Commission
ToC	Theory of change
TOR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USO	Unique Service Offering
VAT	Value added tax
VBA	Village-based adviser
YADIS	Youth Agripreneurship Development Programme

## Executive summary

### Context

A mid-term evaluation (MTE) of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) (<https://agra.org/>) 2017–2021 strategy and business plan was conducted to assess progress towards key results and targets. The evaluation was commissioned by the Partnership for an Inclusive Agriculture Transformation in Africa (PIATA), which includes the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), the Rockefeller Foundation, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).

AGRA’s overall goal in its 2017–2021 strategy is to ‘catalyse and sustain an Inclusive Agricultural Transformation in sub-Saharan Africa that is underpinned by increased incomes and improved food security of at least nine million smallholder farming households directly, and a further 21 million smallholder farmers indirectly’.<sup>1,2</sup> To deliver on this strategy, AGRA is working on three strategy intervention areas: 1) Policy and State Capability (P&SC), 2) Systems Development and 3) Partnerships. The 2017–2021 period had a projected budget of \$500 million, of which \$280 million has been committed – with half of this amount spent.

Countries in which AGRA is operating are Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. AGRA also aims to address several cross-cutting issues, including resilience, women’s empowerment, youth empowerment and capacity development. AGRA’s 2017–2021 strategy had a projected budget of \$500 million, of which \$280 million was committed at the start by BMGF, the Rockefeller Foundation and USAID. Over half has now been spent in supporting implementation across the 11 countries. The development of this strategy, along with a change management process, was informed by an independent institutional evaluation of AGRA published in 2016.<sup>3</sup>

### Purpose, objectives, approach and intended utility

The purpose of this MTE was to ‘assess what is, and is not, working well in implementation, evaluate progress towards objectives and outcomes, call attention to any unintended outcomes, and provide evidence-based findings and recommendations that AGRA—and its partners—can use to proactively improve activity effectiveness and better achieve its goals and objectives’. The MTE Terms of Reference (TOR)<sup>4</sup> further goes on to note that the MTE should look not only at programmatic results, but also at the approaches and practices underlying these. In consultation with AGRA, the evaluation team (ET) defined three evaluation objectives, which were to assess:

**Objective 1:** AGRA’s progress in delivering its 2017–2021 strategy;

**Objective 2:** How well organisational reforms AGRA initiated in support of its 2017–2021 strategy are progressing; and

<sup>1</sup> AGRA Strategy and Business Plan Overview 2017–2021, updated 2019, page 17

<sup>2</sup> AGRA defines agricultural transformation as ‘a process by which farmers shift from highly diversified, subsistence-oriented production towards more specialised production oriented towards the market or other systems of exchange, involving a greater reliance on input and output delivery systems and increased integration of agriculture with other sectors of the domestic and international economies’ (Country Operational Plans (COPs)).

<sup>3</sup> AGRA Institutional Evaluation, DAI, 15 February 2016. See Annex 2 for a summary of the key findings.

<sup>4</sup> See Annex 3.

**Objective 3:** The extent to which PIATA is leading partners to work differently in support of the shared RF.

The MTE had a duration of six months and started in late July. It had three phases: inception, data collection, and data synthesis and analysis. The formative process evaluation used a utilisation approach throughout. This involved engaging with AGRA staff and the resource partners (RPs) from the start to find out their concerns, hopes and expectations of the MTE and what they would find most useful in informing the remainder of the strategic period. It further involved on-going consultation, for example through gaining feedback on the inception report and emerging findings and co-creating recommendations with AGRA and the RPs. This approach was designed to enhance the likelihood of uptake of recommendations.

### Methodology<sup>5</sup>

Data was gathered from documents mainly sourced from AGRA that were reviewed and triangulated with primary data gathered through 167 structured interviews, direct observation and an online survey of a sample of AGRA's implementing partners. Interviews were conducted in an ethical manner, governed by Itad ethical principles (Annex 9 in the main report). Each interviewee was advised about the background and purpose of the interview (Annex 10 in the main report). The use of information was anonymised and based on informed consent. Interviewees were identified through purposive sampling, targeting key informants and AGRA staff who were experts in the subject matters under investigation. There were numerous findings across evaluation questions (EQs) so the ET employed a robust system to sift and only report findings meeting the ET's strength of evidence criteria. Hence, the report reflects only well-triangulated and consistent findings and not isolated unsubstantiated opinions. Similarly, only judgements based on a strong evidence base were used to inform conclusions and recommendations.<sup>6</sup> Findings were validated through country-level debriefs for the four countries visited (Ghana, Malawi, Mali and Tanzania) and an emerging findings workshop, conducted during the data synthesis and analysis phase with key AGRA head office, regional and country staff. This gave AGRA and the RPs the opportunity to present evidence to challenge, nuance and validate emerging findings. While the ET encountered several limitations to its effective completion of the MTE, including inconsistent and inadequate qualitative data and the short evaluation timeframe, these were mitigated or addressed as far as was possible through running evaluation processes in parallel, sense-checking and reviewing additional evidence, and conducting follow-up interviews. The ET remains confident in the strength and robustness of the findings and basis on which conclusions and recommendations were drawn.

### Main findings Objective 1: AGRA's progress in delivering its 2017–2021 strategy

#### Policy and Advocacy

AGRA has made considerable progress in the area of Policy and Advocacy, particularly given its short duration and the political economic challenges in the geographies in which it is operating. As a unique African body, AGRA is perceived to have more legitimacy to reach governments than other development partners, creating opportunities for effective advocacy. It has firmly established its Unique Service Offering as broker, catalyst and convenor. AGRA's work in Policy and Advocacy is prone to external threats relating to corruption and mismanagement of resources by governments as well as internal threats linked to the AGRA grant management process, which may potentially affect observed results.

#### State Capability

AGRA is responsive to government needs and windows of opportunity. It balances being responsive to government with maintaining a strategic direction insofar as its budget allows. AGRA is supporting

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<sup>5</sup> Annex 4 lists the evaluation questions and sub-questions and Annex 5 has the full evaluation framework.

<sup>6</sup> See Annexes 12 and 13.

national agriculture investment plans in all 11 countries and flagships<sup>7</sup> in 7 countries, though progress has generally been slow and design inadequate in some places. Inadequacies in design, risk management and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of AGRA's work on State Capability compromise its ability to deliver effectively. These, coupled with external threats relating to corruption and mismanagement of resources, potentially compromise the effectiveness and sustainability of its initiatives.

### Systems Development

AGRA's progress against the 2017–2021 strategy in the SD space has generally been slower than anticipated. The review of two consortia identified issues with the design of AGRA's SD interventions, including a lack of conceptual clarity; incomplete systems diagnostics at sub-national/consortia level; and inadequate sustainability, scale and inclusion strategies. Most of the farmer-level results achieved to date appear to be unsustainable as they result from either the direct delivery of products and services to farmers or models with questionable incentive structures.

### Partnerships

There is a lack of clarity regarding the Partnerships theme, both within AGRA (particularly at the country level) and among some stakeholders and RPs. Memoranda of understanding (MOUs) and letters of intent have been signed between AGRA and private sector partners through the Deal Room at the recent African Green Revolution Forum (AGRF), realising investment of over \$50 million. These cannot yet be termed 'strategic' private sector partnerships as they are still in their early stages.

## Main findings Objective 2: How well organisational reforms AGRA initiated in support of its 2017–2021 strategy are progressing

### How AGRA can optimise its delivery model to accelerate impact

Changes to the type of support associated with AGRA's delivery model are reflected in the Country Operational Plans (COPs), but shortfalls in the COPs create challenges to achieving inclusive agricultural transformation. Divisions at headquarters are working together in establishing links between them in support of the integrated delivery model, with variable success. The tools and approaches developed by AGRA are mostly adequate but vary in their coverage at strategic level and quality at country level. AGRA has successfully secured \$262.5 million for flagships in Ghana (\$260 million) and Tanzania (\$2.5 million). It has also mobilised funds through grants.

### AGRA's effectiveness in monitoring progress and inclusivity of work and in taking corrective measures if required

AGRA has an efficient management information system (AMIS) but the data it generates is not in a form that can usefully inform decision-making. While there are some opportunities for learning at grantee and country level, AGRA's monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) approach gives minimal scope for learning and knowledge-sharing at headquarters, Board and PIATA Advisory Committee (PAC) levels. The MEL process is constrained by there being too much and too frequent reporting at all levels and a lack of clarity on what information is needed to inform decision-making. Mechanisms exist for identifying and addressing gaps or threats to inclusive progress, but these are constrained by lack of evidence, particularly in relation to evidence and insights on inclusivity.

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<sup>7</sup> Read more on flagships [here](#)

## How well the decentralisation process is progressing and its impact on delivery

AGRA's performance on the decentralisation process at headquarters and country levels is mixed. Headquarters divisions are in the early stages of reconfiguring their objectives, services, guidance products and performance standards in support of regional and country teams. Financial arrangements sometimes contradict the spirit of decentralisation, with implications for relationships between countries and headquarters and compromising in-country performance. The current grant management process is not aligned with a decentralised AGRA and, combined with the types and scale of grants being provided, is creating negative impacts on delivery, and potentially on AGRA's reputation, despite good support of grantees by AGRA staff at all levels. Having country teams has provided AGRA with greater visibility at country level, and regional teams are supporting and complementing their capacity in their areas of expertise. However, more needs to be done to ensure effective delivery.

## The extent to which AGRA been able to develop the capabilities and culture required to enable the delivery model

AGRA has committed, professional and experienced staff, something that contributes to its reputation. However, this experience does not always stretch to the new functions that staff have in the three thematic areas and countries. Many AGRA country teams are understaffed and overworked – a fair proportion of staff reported that they did not feel valued or supported adequately by the organisation.

## Objective 3: The extent to which PIATA is leading partners to work differently in support of the shared results framework

The PIATA MOU and Charter indicate that PAC should have both advisory and accountability functions. This is confusing in that accountability of AGRA is to its Board. However, interviews with both PAC members and AGRA staff indicated that they were clear about the fit of PIATA with AGRA governance. RPs have a shared vision for AGRA. The PAC working groups have had an impact on AGRA's strategic thinking, though this is limited by the minimal sharing of challenges or lessons learnt by AGRA with PAC. Despite good collaboration in elaboration of the shared results framework (RF), it still has some shortfalls, and donor-specific reporting remains necessary alongside the harmonised reporting systems to the Board and to PIATA given the need for accountability. Involvement in PAC has led to some degree of RP collaboration beyond AGRA.

The relevance of the country advisory committees (CACs), other than for accountability to AGRA donors at the country level, is questionable. Nevertheless, country managers are agile in identifying the best use of a CAC in their countries alongside existing fora. While the PIATA Charter indicates that RPs will collaborate to mobilise additional resources to be used in furtherance of the shared vision and RF, the envisaged amount of resources has not yet been secured and there are challenges in securing additional funding at the country level.

## Conclusions

### Objective 1: AGRA's progress in delivering the 2017–2021 strategy

Given that AGRA is still carrying out organisational changes whilst also seeking to deliver against targets, and given that the MTE took place just 20 months into the strategy period, it is concluded that progress towards Strategy delivery is fair overall. Policy and advocacy work is progressing well, building on legacy projects. Progress in the state capability thematic area is promising but such work needs time. Work under the partnerships theme (focusing on the connections being made with agribusinesses e.g. through the Deal Room) is nascent and encouraging – it requires strong follow-through and greater understanding within AGRA between divisions regarding the potential of such deals. Systems development work is below target and the new integrated delivery model through consortia needs greater technical guidance.

## Objective 2: How well the organisational reforms to support strategy implementation are progressing

The revised delivery model is, in some ways, promoting a more integrated and supportive set of functional relationships among HQ divisions and their support to country teams. However, this does not always play out in practice across all divisions. With regards to MEL, there is limited evidence to suggest that AGRA is a learning organisation as its MEL system is driven by and is largely confined to quantitative indicators and current learning efforts not consistent across the organisation. There are pockets of unsystematised learning; where it is systemised, it is largely consigned to the annual outcome survey. AGRA is making good progress in decentralisation and this has provided the organisation with improved proximity to and greater understanding of countries and partners. Its full benefits for performance are yet to unfold, but there is room for improvement in how decisions are made regarding financing country plans and grants. The nature and scope of work defined across the three themes raise questions about assumptions AGRA has made regarding the necessary skills and capacities required to deliver the strategy. An effect of this lies in how, despite being overworked with limited time to reflect, staff are fearful of and intimidated by a distinctly hierarchical culture.

## Objective 3: The extent to which PIATA is leading partners to work differently in support of the shared RF

The shared RF has led to greater alignment in the support PIATA members provide to AGRA. PIATA has led PAC members too start collaborating on a range of issues beyond AGRA. The PACs guidance to AGRA is appreciated but could be improved by the reports to PIATA providing more qualitative analysis of quantitative data, and more reflection on progress and challenges. More work can be done to nurture the CACs to fulfil their purposes as outlined in the PIATA MOU and Charter. In sum, the fact that large donors have signed up to support agricultural transformation in a harmonised manner across eleven countries is a big step forward and could over time be an example for other donors to take a harmonised approach.

## Recommendations (co-created)

In line with the utilisation focused approach, the ET created space to jointly create recommendations with AGRA and its RPs. From the findings, the ET identified the five most recurring themes, against which it developed five top-line recommendations for joint elaboration and co-creation with AGRA:

- Strategy: Policy and State Capability,
- Strategy: Systems Development and Partnerships
- Decentralisation
- Monitoring Evaluation and Learning
- Grants

**Strategy:** At the strategy level (Recommendations 1 and 2 below), AGRA should review its objectives against its vision and goals and time and resources for 2017–2021 and look at what to realistically focus on.

1. **Policy and State Capability:** AGRA should consider streamlining efforts to focus on implementation of policies, addressing macro reforms and tackling system bottlenecks in priority areas, drawing on its Unique Service Offering, complementary work, partnerships and alliances. (Informed by two conclusions and ten findings across two objectives.)
2. **Systems Development and Partnerships:** AGRA should build staff capacity in systems development; measure, document and share lessons learnt about, and successes in, systems development and use this as a potential evidence for scaling; and focus on linkages with private sector off-takers and

processors within its integrated delivery. (Informed by two conclusions and nine findings across two objectives.)

3. **Decentralisation:** With decentralisation as a key deliverable for 2020, AGRA should increase the level of empowerment and accountability of country teams in terms of the country planning-budgeting-review cycle, developing regional strategies and improving the design of COPs, with appropriate levels of quality assurance. (Informed by two conclusions and seven findings from one objective.)
4. **Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning:** AGRA should review its MEL system to improve the measurement of strategic outcomes, better distinguish information/reporting requirements on a quarterly and annual basis and foster learning through the generation of qualitative data to complement existing qualitative data and support decision-making. (Informed by two conclusions and seven findings across two objectives.)
5. **Grants:** For non-competitive grants, AGRA should improve the quality of grant design and efficiency of grant management. (Informed by three conclusions and eight findings across all three objectives.)

### Independent recommendations by the Evaluation Team

In addition to the co-created recommendations, the ET made five independent recommendations.

#### 6. AGRA would benefit from reconsidering and strengthening its intervention logic

AGRA should strengthen its intervention logic and the assumptions underlying this across all the thematic areas. A clear and strong intervention logic and related assumptions would help AGRA better define what success looks like in the short, medium and long term. This includes providing greater clarity around concepts such as 'sustainability', 'inclusion' and 'transformational change', and assessing the extent to which these concepts are adequately captured in their intervention logic. Once clarity is attained regarding the intervention logic, AGRA can better identify and apply milestones periodically to see if they are on track, assess if associated assumptions hold and identify what is working well and what is not working well. (Informed by multiple findings across two objectives.)

#### 7. AGRA and its RPs should revisit their mutual accountability in relation to learning and cultivate a positive culture for this

AGRA and PIATA (the RPs) should together consider what mutual accountability means for them and ways in which space can be opened for AGRA and RPs to make mistakes, fail and learn and be open about this in terms of strategy implementation. This may involve a change in culture within AGRA, to be more critical of itself and less task-oriented and to better understand how success and innovation often stem from failure. A practical step towards this would be to ensure a balanced set of Key Performance Indicators for appraising staff performance that affords as much importance to learning as it does to compliance with rules and processes and achieving targets. A more fundamental step towards this would be for AGRA's leadership and culture to be one in which staff are supported and motivated and feel able to share the challenges they face in implementing their programmes. Addressing Recommendation 10 below will help clarify where the accountability of AGRA, its Board and the RPs begins and ends, keeping in mind the clear governance role of the Board and the advisory role of PIATA (the RPs). (Informed by two conclusions and ten findings across two objectives.)

#### 8. AGRA should take a strategic and tailored approach in terms of country and regional-level interventions during the remaining strategy period

One of the EQs was, 'Are there any practices/interventions that should be accelerated/scaled up or stopped or new practices/interventions introduced to enable the achievement of the strategy for inclusive agricultural transformation?' The ET suggests that these are best identified at country and regional levels. A review of where each country programme is now, what its strengths are, what its Unique Service Offering or niche is in that country and what is going well could inform planning for the remainder of the strategy period. The ET does not recommend major shifts in direction at this stage. This means that

decisions on whether to reduce some aspects of COPs and scale up other aspects is something that should be taken at the country level (with guidance from the regional teams and HQs).

AGRA should prioritise consolidating work in the 11 countries and only consider expanding to further countries during this strategy period where there is strategic opportunity to operate in the regional economic community space. (Informed by multiple findings across two objectives.)

#### **9. AGRA should revisit its integrated (systems development) delivery model**

During the remainder of this strategy period AGRA should, with the help of PIATA partners, revisit its integrated systems development delivery model. Changes may be needed in direction and approach, or indeed at a more fundamental level. Questions that need to be considered by AGRA, with the help of PIATA, include the following: If the integrated delivery model for systems development is aimed at proof of concept and piloting, then is AGRA best placed to do this? What have other PIATA partners already done in this space? Has learning from this been shared with AGRA? If AGRA has a role in testing proof of concept, is it going about this in the best way? It is possible that reflection by AGRA on its positioning in this space would help, as there are mixed understandings in AGRA about working with agribusinesses. (Informed by four conclusions and ten findings across two objectives.)

#### **10. The PAC should reflect on and update the PIATA MOU and Charter, the nature of reporting required and how best to nurture the CACs**

It is recommended that the MOU and Charter be updated to include both DFID (a voting member) and BMZ/KfW (currently a non-voting member). This would provide the opportunity to revisit the references to each of AGRA and PIATA in both the MOU and Charter, which are currently unclear in places, including in relation to the governance functions of each. To enable PAC to provide informed advice to AGRA, the contents of the six-monthly reports from AGRA to PIATA should provide greater qualitative analysis and reflection on quantitative content.

On revisiting the MOU and Charter, PAC could reassess the intended purpose and roles of the CACs. Most of the CACs are at their early stages and could be encouraged to work more on alignment and coordination where appropriate (particularly in contexts where there are existing agriculture sector working groups and donor groups). One clear opportunity of the CACs is to allow co-learning. Countries should be encouraged to continue tailoring how they use the CACs within the particular context and the focus of support to the agriculture sector in each country. (Informed by two conclusions and six findings across one objective.)

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Context

This mid-term evaluation (MTE) concerns the evaluation of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) (<https://agra.org/>) 2017–2021 strategy and business plan. AGRA’s overall goal in its 2017–2021 strategy is to ‘catalyse and sustain an inclusive agricultural transformation in Africa to increase incomes and improve food security of at least nine million smallholder farming households directly, and a further 21 million smallholder farmers indirectly’.<sup>8,9</sup>

AGRA’s five-year strategy and business plan has, at both the corporate and the country level, incorporated a results framework (RF) (see Annex 1) with four objectives:

- Objective 1: Increased staple crop productivity for smallholder farmers;
- Objective 2: Strengthened and expanded access to national and regional output markets;
- Objective 3: Increased capacity of smallholder farming households and agricultural systems to better prepare for and adapt to shocks and stresses; and
- Objective 4: Strengthened continental, regional and government multi-sectoral coordination and mutual accountability in the agriculture sector.

To deliver its strategy, AGRA is working on three strategy intervention areas: Policy and State Capability (P&SC), Systems Development (SD) and Partnerships. Countries in which AGRA is operating are Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. AGRA also aims to address several cross-cutting issues, including women’s empowerment and youth empowerment.<sup>10</sup>

AGRA’s 2017–2021 strategy had a projected budget of \$500 million, of which \$200 million was committed at the start by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) and \$50 million by the Rockefeller Foundation. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) later committed up to \$90 million, with USAID headquarters (HQ) providing \$25 million upfront. Over half has now been spent in supporting implementation across the 11 countries. The development of this strategy was informed by a change management process that was in turn initiated by AGRA in response to an independent institutional evaluation of AGRA published in 2016. Annex 2 elaborates both the key findings of this evaluation and AGRA’s response.

## 1.2 Purpose, timing, approach and intended utility of the MTE

As noted in the Terms of Reference (TOR) (pages 1–2) (Annex 3), the purpose of this MTE is to *‘assess what is/what it not working well in implementation, evaluate progress towards objectives and outcomes, call attention to any unintended outcomes and provide evidence-based findings and recommendations that AGRA and its partners can use to improve activity effectiveness and better achieve its goals and objectives’*. The TOR goes on to note that the MTE should look not only at programmatic results but also

<sup>8</sup> AGRA Strategy and Business Plan Overview 2017–2021, updated 2019, page 17

<sup>9</sup> AGRA defines agricultural transformation as ‘a process by which farmers shift from highly diversified, subsistence-oriented production towards more specialised production oriented towards the market or other systems of exchange, involving a greater reliance on input and output delivery systems and increased integration of agriculture with other sectors of the domestic and international economies’ (Country Operational Plans (COPs)).

<sup>10</sup> The RF in Annex 1 indicates five cross-cutting outcomes. Aside from women’s and youth empowerment, these are strengthened regional and national agricultural enabling policy environment; strengthened capacity for farmers and other focus agricultural value chain actors; and strengthened public and private partnerships in agriculture.

at the approaches and practices underlying these. The scope of the MTE involved evaluation of AGRA’s delivery against its strategy at country and to a lesser extent regional level; AGRA as an institution in terms of its structure, business model and capabilities; and the Partnership for Inclusive Agricultural Transformation in Africa (PIATA) as a platform to work differently across all partners in support of the shared vision and RF. In effect, this MTR is an assessment, at 20 months, of progress AGRA has made on the strategy, informed to a certain extent by performance material produced by AGRA. It follows, therefore, that it is also a test of what can be said about AGRA’s monitoring and knowledge management system.

The MTE started in late July and had three phases: inception, data collection and data synthesis and analysis. The intention was that the draft MTE report would be available to AGRA in time to inform the AGRA Board meeting in early December 2019. MTE findings and recommendations were to be used by AGRA and the PIATA resource partners (RPs) to take stock of progress in relation to implementation of AGRA’s 2017–2021 strategy, including its three thematic areas (P&SC, SD and Partnerships). Second, it was intended that the MTE would contribute to future planning by AGRA and its RPs, including consideration of any strategic shifts or adjustments in implementation to better achieve intended results.

The formative process evaluation used a utilisation focused approach. This meant that its content and process were implemented in ways that enhanced the likelihood of uptake of findings and recommendations. The evaluation team (ET) engaged with AGRA staff and PIATA RPs from the start, asking what they would find most useful to inform the remainder of the strategic period. The ET kept open communication with both AGRA and the RPs throughout, providing draft inception, progress and evaluation reports for review and comment. Findings were validated in the four countries visited and then through an emerging findings workshop held in late October at AGRA, engaging all relevant AGRA staff from the head office, regions and four countries visited (Ghana, Malawi, Mali and Tanzania). Recommendations were co-created with AGRA staff and PIATA Advisory Committee (PAC) members in late November. The ET then made its own overarching independent recommendations.

### 1.3 Evaluation questions and matrix

There were nine evaluation questions (EQs), as listed below.

Aspects of inclusivity (the cross-cutting themes of women’s and youth empowerment) were considered across all the EQs and sub-questions as far as possible but were also referenced in some of the EQs and sub-questions as appropriate.

- EQ1. What progress has AGRA made against its five-year strategy to achieve inclusive agricultural transformation?
- EQ2. How can AGRA optimise its delivery model to accelerate impact?
- EQ3. How effectively does AGRA monitor progress and inclusivity of its work and take corrective measures if required?
- EQ4. What has been the effect of the new partnership engagement and funding model – working through a shared RF versus individual donor initiatives?
- EQ5. To what extent are PIATA’s positive impacts likely to continue after the end of the project?
- EQ6. How effective has AGRA been in establishing a Unique Service Offering in partnerships with governments?
- EQ7. How effective has AGRA been in forming strategic partnerships at the continental, regional and country level?
- EQ8. How well is the decentralisation process progressing and what has been its impact on delivery?
- EQ9. To what extent has AGRA created a shared identity and culture in support of the new culture? Where has progress been made?

Annex 4 provides the sub-questions for each of the EQs. Annex 5 presents the full evaluation matrix.

Discussions with AGRA and RPs, particularly those around their expectations of the MTE, helped clarify three objectives for the evaluation. The EQs and their sub-questions provide a route to learn about all three objectives. Structuring our synthesis and reporting around these three objectives allowed the ET to collect data based on three modules (organisational, country and regional/continental) and to review AGRA's three thematic areas (P&SC, SD and Partnerships). The objectives aimed to assess the following:

**Objective 1:** AGRA's progress in delivering its 2017–2021 strategy (EQ1, EQ5, EQ6 and EQ7);

**Objective 2:** How well the organisational reforms AGRA initiated in support of its 2017–2021 strategy are progressing (EQ2, EQ3, EQ8 and EQ9);

**Objective 3:** The extent to which PIATA is leading partners to work differently in support of the shared RF (EQ4).

## 1.4 Methodology

The evaluation was operationalised through four interrelated modules: 1) country, 2) regional and continental, 3) organisational and 4) analysis and synthesis. Modules 1–3 assessed the nuances of AGRA programming and approaches at all levels, from farmer to continental, as well as how they all came together in its new integrated approach. It also looked at how effectively these interventions had been monitored. The analysis and synthesis module (4) drew on evidence from modules 1–3 and formed the basis for evidence-based conclusions and recommendations.

Box 1 provides an overview of the purpose of each data collection module.

### Box 1: Purpose of each module

The **country module** provided a view on what progress AGRA was making in implementing its strategy across its 11 priority countries, specifically in P&SC and SD. Given that AGRA was only 20 months into the strategy, and recognising that the strategy itself was evolving as it was being rolled out, it assessed the extent to which AGRA and country programmes were alert to emerging evidence and the implications for adaptation, rather than how well they were adapting. In response to requests by AGRA staff, it reviewed progress and effectiveness of recent country reforms, such as decentralisation, and the organisational capabilities and culture change required to successfully implement the new strategy. AGRA's staff also expressed keen interest in knowing whether they were implementing the right interventions to elicit the desired change. This speaks more to the Steckler and Linnan Guide (SLG) aspects of **dose, reach and receptivity**. The SLG identifies five dimensions of implementation: Fidelity (is the intervention being delivered as planned – why/why not?); Adaptation (have changes been made to implementation to fit the context and increase chances of success – why/why not?); Dose (completeness or adequacy of intervention and satisfaction by recipients); Receptivity (to what extent are the participants engaged and receptive to the intervention?); and Reach (proportion of target audience is being engaged as expected?)

The **regional and continental module** focused on understanding the partnerships AGRA was building at these levels, the degree of alignment being achieved by partners and mutual accountability between AGRA and its partners. This module provided evidence for EQ7.

The **organisational module** focused on three areas: 1) how well the organisational changes AGRA had implemented since 2015/16 had been embedded in practice; 2) whether AGRA and its RPs' culture had evolved to accommodate the changes, including internal capacities to effect changes; and 3) the impact this had had on delivery, including assessing the functioning of PIATA and its impact on AGRA.

Desk review and key informant interviews (KIIs) were methods common to modules 1–3. Annexes 6 and 7 provide the list of documents reviewed and list of interviews, respectively. A total of 167 KIIs were conducted, including 14 AGRA staff in HQ (including 7 heads of units), 11 country managers, 3 regional

managers, 5 Board members, 6 PAC members and 9 Bellwethers.<sup>11</sup> Other interviewees were grantees, government officials, private sector players, etc. during country visits, and the MTE RPs. In addition, an online survey of grantees informed the organisational module (Annex 8). This was sent to 186 grantees across the 11 countries in which AGRA is operating. This generated 74 responses. Interviews were conducted in an ethical manner, governed by Itad ethical principles, rooted in internationally recognised ethical standards (Annexes 9 and 10). Each interviewee was advised about the background and purpose of the interview. The use of information was anonymised and based on informed consent. Interviewees were identified through purposive sampling, targeting key informants and AGRA staff who were experts in subject matters under investigation. Sampling also targeted different types of stakeholders engaging with AGRA in different capacities. Interview checklists were tested in real time, given time limitations (during initial interviews), and subsequently refined where needed or where new areas came up that required exploration. The survey was tested internally before use. In terms of privacy and confidentiality, data collected was not shared beyond the ET and confidentiality was ensured through the contacting arrangement between Itad and BMGF

Within the country module, criteria were developed for the selection of countries to visit for case studies. These criteria related to the amount invested in each country, when the operational plans had started in each country, team size and variation in emphases on thematic areas per country. Subsequently, the ET made visits to Ghana, Malawi, Mali and Tanzania. Each visit focused on different thematic areas of AGRA's work and involved meeting with the AGRA country team, regional heads and team members where present, and a range of other key stakeholders. These included government, non-governmental organisation (NGO) and private sector grantees and partners.

Data collection activities for the different modules were largely carried out in parallel, owing to the tight timeframe for data collection. Purposive sampling was deployed to identify interviewees, both generally and in relation to case studies conducted during country visits. Sampling of interviewees at HQ and during the country visits was aided through 1) the orientation the ET benefited from through a visit to AGRA right at the start of the inception phase, which increased its understanding of whom it would be good to interview about what; 2) subsequent leads from interviews related to the organisational module, and also through discussions with country managers of the four countries to be visited prior to travelling; 3) insights from the national consultants; and 4) the thematic area focus of each case study. Sampling based on roles and inputs different interviewees could make did not allow for proactive selection of male and female respondents, though in practice the ET had a mix of female and male respondents and spoke to both men and women farmers during field visits. The ET were able to work freely without interference and did not face limitations in availability of interviewees, aside from a few 'no-shows' for interviews or stand-ins by other staff where particular people were not available.

The ET was also able to observe the African Green Revolution Forum (AGRF) in Ghana in September, and to interview a number of AGRA staff and Board members as well as some stakeholders external to AGRA while there. Annex 11 provides information on methods and tools used for data collection.<sup>12</sup>

Data from desk reviews and interviews was collated in structured review templates from which it was possible to aggregate, synthesise and analyse findings for the EQs and sub-questions from across the country-level respondents and others. Data gathered from document reviews was triangulated with primary data gathered through interviews, direct observation and the online survey, and rated according to the ET's strength of evidence matrix using a RAG (red-amber-green) rating. Findings with a weak evidence base were excluded from the evaluation. Similarly, only judgements based on a strong evidence base were used to inform conclusions and recommendations. Findings were validated through country-level debriefs for the four countries visited and also through an emerging findings workshop during the data synthesis and analysis phase with key AGRA head office, regional and country staff. This gave

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<sup>11</sup> Key Informants who are recognised leads of sub-sectors in agriculture or who have insights on a specific policy agenda.

<sup>12</sup> Further information about data collection and tools is available in the inception report.

partners the opportunity to present evidence to challenge, nuance and validate emerging findings. Ethical approval at country level was not required as the evaluation did not collect or analyse any personal or sensitive data. Five of the ten recommendations were co-created with AGRA management and staff. Annex 12 describes the co-creation process and Annex 13 provides the evidence trail – that is, it shows which findings informed which conclusions and in turn which findings and conclusions informed each recommendation. To this end, findings have been numbered chronologically from 1 to 32 at the end of each main finding in the Main Findings boxes throughout Section 2, and conclusions have been numbered from C1 to C10.

### 1.5 Limitations and their mitigation:

Owing to time limitations, the evaluation could not look at all areas of intervention in equal depth (e.g. limited focus on inclusive finance, particular systems components, regional food trade). The ET was necessarily selective, focusing on areas deemed to provide the most useful learning and insights for the remainder of the strategic period. As such, case studies had a limited focus, which could not be extrapolated across countries, given the varying contexts. To counter the time limitations, the ET 1) kept open good lines of communication with AGRA and the RPs throughout the MTE phases; 2) carried out data collection activities in parallel; and 3) selected case study countries and topics that could generate the most learning.

A second limitation to the ET was that the RF (see Annex 1) does not explain how activities and outputs are expected to lead to outcomes. This is a key feature of a logic model or theory of change (ToC) and is also relevant given that the TOR calls for a process evaluation. Without the logic, evaluating why progress towards outcomes was or was not being achieved and whether the strategy was sound was a challenge. Although the 2018 Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) Plan contains a ToC – developed after the RF – it is not clear how and to what extent the 25 interventions (i.e. outputs) and 30 assumptions are reflected in AGRA's planning and monitoring system – that is, in addition to the indicators that span the outcomes. The ET addressed this issue through ensuring that interviews at HQ and at the country level explored the ToC of the respondents in terms of their thinking about how the activities they were supporting would lead to the expected outcomes.

A limitation concerning the data presented in this report (which is, in itself, a finding) relates to the inadequacy and inconsistency of aggregate data on key outputs at the HQ level. The ET faced challenges in finding meaningful output-level data at HQ level. Where quantitative data was available, it was at times inconsistent across different reports within the same reporting period (HQ compilations for the MTE, Board reports, PIATA reports). Verifying figures through aggregation of data reported at the country level was challenging owing to inconsistencies in output reporting per intermediate outcomes (IOs) as well as absence of mid-term targets in some countries against which to benchmark progress. This was further confounded by inadequate meaningful qualitative reporting to understand the detail behind the numbers aggregated at HQ level.

Overall, these limitations were mitigated as far as possible and did not hinder the ET's ability to present strong findings for AGRA as a whole that can inform the way forward.

### 1.6 Overview of the report structure

Section 2 presents findings, organised under each of the three objectives. Key findings are presented in bold and the evidence for these is provided directly afterwards. Key findings for objectives are summarised at the start of the objective sub-section. Conclusions and recommendations are in Sections 3 and 4. These are followed by a number of annexes.

## 2. Findings

This section presents findings against each objective in turn. Section 2.1 looks at findings on AGRA's progress (Objective 1), Section 2.2 at AGRA's processes in relation to organisational reform (Objective 2) and Section 2.3 at findings on PIATA. Following on from the discussion of limitations in Section 1.5, it should be reiterated here that the nature of secondary data available from AGRA did not provide suitable evidence for many of the EQs. The absence of standardised and consistent reporting across countries presented challenges for the ET to conduct meaningful analysis of secondary country-/regional-level data. Reported findings were therefore based on HQ level self-reported aggregate data that was substantiated through direct observation or triangulated through consistent primary data sources such as KIIs.

### 2.1 Objective 1: AGRA's progress in delivering its 2017–2021 strategy

In 2015 and 2016, AGRA initiated a complex and far-reaching change management process of strategic and organisational transformation to enhance its service offering and ensure relevance and impact for the agriculture sector. In a relatively short period of time (2015–2018), AGRA completely redesigned its institutional strategy, launched new bodies of work with government and partners, established strong relationships with senior government officials, revamped continental advocacy efforts through work with the African Union (AU) and the Seize the Moment Campaign and elevated and amplified continental advocacy and coordination through the AGRF. In addition, AGRA established decentralised offices in 11 countries, hired over 130 new staff and began to deliver on a new grant-making model around decentralisation. Major operations such as decentralisation and recruitment in line with the new strategy have taken up time that would otherwise have been designated solely to strategy delivery. It is against this backdrop of major organisational reforms that AGRA has been implementing its new strategy.

AGRA's overall goal in its 2017–2021 strategy is to catalyse and sustain an inclusive agricultural transformation in Africa to increase incomes and improve food security for at least 9 million smallholder farming households directly, and a further 21 million smallholder farmers indirectly. In order to achieve this, AGRA works across three distinct but interrelated themes: Policy and State Capability (P&SC), Systems Development (SD) and Partnerships. This section reviews AGRA's progress against its strategy across the three themes, drawing evidence in response to EQs 1, 5, 6 and 7. For ease of reading, findings on Policy and Advocacy are separated out from findings on State Capability. See Annex 4 for the EQs and sub-EQs.

#### 2.1.1 Policy and Advocacy

AGRA's P&SC strategy recognises the centrality of government in driving transformation and seeks to strengthen country planning, coordination and implementation while supporting an enabling environment for an effective private sector and regulatory environment.<sup>13</sup> AGRA's work on P&SC is divided into three interrelated themes: Policy and Advocacy, State Capability and Regional Food Trade. The evaluation focused on the first two, with findings for Policy and Advocacy presented in this section and those on State Capability in the next section.

<sup>13</sup> AGRA's strategy document on P&SC

**Main findings**

1. AGRA has made considerable progress in the area of Policy and Advocacy, particularly given the short duration and political economic challenges in the geographies in which it is operating. (1)
2. AGRA, as a unique African body, is perceived to have more legitimacy to reach governments than other development partners, creating opportunities for effective advocacy. It has firmly established its Unique Service Offering as broker, catalyst and convenor. (2)
3. Observed results and future progress in the Policy and Advocacy space could be affected by internal challenges related to late start-up, short duration of grants, inadequate programme quality assurance and limited staff capacities. (3)

**AGRA has made considerable progress in the area of Policy and Advocacy, particularly given the short duration and political economic challenges in the geographies in which it is operating.<sup>14</sup>**

In under two years, AGRA has contributed to 68 on-going policy reforms to unlock systems bottlenecks, including two at the regional level of the East African Community (EAC). Of the 66 national-level on-going reforms, 19 are in markets and post-harvest, 18 in seed systems, 16 in fertiliser systems, 10 in investment and finance, 2 in mechanisation and 1 in irrigation. Annex 14 provides a summary of the specific areas in which AGRA is working. As of July 2019, AGRA had recorded 12 policy successes in 7 countries (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria and Tanzania), largely coinciding with AGRA's focus countries for its work in Policy and Advocacy as well as intervention countries for the Micro (Policy and Regulatory) Reforms for African Agribusiness (MIRA) project (with the exception of Kenya and Malawi). Table 1 summarises policy successes.

Table 1: AGRA policy wins<sup>15</sup>

Country	Policy success
Burkina Faso	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Agriculture investment code legislated</li> </ul>
Ethiopia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ VAT on agriculture machinery and spare parts removed</li> <li>▪ Agriculture taxation removed</li> </ul>
Ghana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ ECOWAS seed and fertiliser policy domestication completed</li> </ul>
Kenya	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Warehouse Receipt Systems Act passed May 2019</li> </ul>
Malawi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Control of Goods Act passed November 2018</li> <li>▪ Draft National Seed Policy submitted to Council of Ministers for approval</li> </ul>
Nigeria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ National Agricultural Seed Council Act passed June 2019</li> </ul>
Tanzania	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Fertiliser delivery rules passed</li> <li>▪ New fertiliser registration regulations passed</li> <li>▪ Grain Export Ban lifted</li> <li>▪ Publicly Protected Varieties Policy enacted</li> </ul>

Box 2 presents a case study of Ghana (which cannot be extrapolated across all countries) that shows how AGRA's work in Policy and Advocacy is interlinked with AGRA's overall strategy and clear linkages with work in State Capability, SD and Partnerships at the macro levels.

<sup>14</sup> Desk review of periodic reports, country documentation and interviews with AGRA staff and partners, including government

<sup>15</sup> M&E QMR July

**Box 2: Ghana case study**

AGRA identified a gap in the national insurance policy, which had been enacted but lacked provision for agricultural insurance. In response to this, AGRA facilitated policy and legislative reform to enable the development of an Agricultural Insurance Policy and Amendment of Act 724 for the Provision of Agricultural Insurance in Ghana. This is being complemented by efforts in the inclusive finance space, which AGRA facilitated through a grant with Ghana Incentive-Based Risk-Sharing System for Agricultural Lending (GIRSAL), a private sector company working to provide guarantees to commercial banks to lend to agriculture. Another catalytic intervention is enhancing the marketability of products through a grant to assist in controlling aflatoxins. The National Policy and Action Plan for Aflatoxin Control in Food and Feed has been drafted and was validated by stakeholders on 14 and 15 October 2019.

Although considerable progress has been made, most policy grants focus on micro reforms, which are in themselves important but limited in the extent to which they can catalyse agricultural transformation at the national level. AGRA understands this and is looking to build on the legacy of programmes on micro reforms to tackle macro-level policy issues. Evidence from findings<sup>16</sup> shows a lack of systematic identification of key gaps and bottlenecks in systems, which should ideally drive grant-making in the policy area. However, reasonable progress was observed in the seed systems space (e.g. Ghana, Malawi and Nigeria). Overall, the work that AGRA has done in contribution to policy wins is sustainable – for example policies that have been enacted. Any future efforts to oversee successful interpretation and implementation will not start from scratch.

**AGRA, as a unique African body, is perceived to have more legitimacy to reach governments than other development partners, creating opportunities for effective advocacy.<sup>17</sup> It has firmly established its Unique Service Offering as broker, catalyst and convenor.**

Country-level interviews and key informants including Board members revealed a common view of AGRA as a convenor and broker between government and donors, and between government, NGOs and the private sector, though some interviewees acknowledged that the perception of AGRA was still in transition from that of a donor (prior to the 2017–2021 strategy) to that of a convenor and broker. For example, one source commented that, in Ghana, AGRA acts as an intermediary between donors and the government, having the trust and confidence of donors, and a country advisory committee (CAC) member in Ghana noted that AGRA *‘can bring donors and governments together, and they have played an important facilitating role to think about priorities and what action is key’*. A development partner (DP) in Ghana and government officials in Malawi held the same opinion. Several interviewees, including a Board member and several grantees, noted that AGRA’s strength was that it not only brokered but also delivered projects and activities on the ground, with the latter role enhancing the former.

AGRA is perceived as different to other bodies working in the African agricultural space in that it takes a neutral stance. This reputation is greatly enhanced by its connection with, and support to, AGRF. It is not seen as having its own agenda but rather as a trusted body, with a role to support governments in their commitments to the agriculture sector. Because of its neutral position, it has *‘the ear of government’* – that is, highly regarded political access, the sort donors are not in a position to have.

*‘The core strength of AGRA is in facilitating policy dialogue and having access to key decision-makers in the ministries of agriculture and being a credible counterpart and adviser.’* Donor

*‘AGRA is uniquely positioned because it is an independent NGO and there is no other continental organisation (with equivalent capacity) to help move forward the whole*

<sup>16</sup> Observations by the ET as well as desk review of the July 2019 monitoring and evaluation (M&E) quarterly management report (QMR)

<sup>17</sup> Interview findings from country-level resource partners, government representatives and AGRA grantees

*continent towards the green revolution (as in inclusive agricultural transformation).'*

Board member

Evidence attests to AGRA's unique relationship with and influence on national governments and how this has contributed towards tackling agricultural policy, laws, regulations and administrative practices that deter progress in agricultural transformation. For example, in Malawi, AGRA has influenced results on issues that previously proved intractable to other actors. Through AGRA's advocacy efforts, established organisations, such as the National Farmers Union (FUM), admitted that, but for AGRA, they would not have set eyes on the draft seed bill.

*'AGRA wanted our efforts to be aligned. So, we co-created an idea on how to tackle issues re. the seed bill. Bringing in issues from the private sector. It was not an easy process. We have worked with government for a number of years as our role is to be a policy platform. But there can be a lot of mistrust. We are viewed that we just want to disrupt the process. But AGRA helped us co-create roles for government and us and that helped trust-building. In the past we had trouble getting the drafts [draft bills]. But over time trust has built and we are singing from the same hymn sheet.'* FUM

Senior government officials attested to the positive contribution of AGRA in facilitating movement of the same bill through to enactment. AGRA's Unique Service Offering (USO) gives it political mileage and positions it well for potentially lasting influence and sustainable relationships with national governments.

**Observed results and future progress in the Policy and Advocacy space could be affected by internal challenges related to late start-up, short duration of grants, inadequate programme quality assurance and limited staff capacities.**

Internal threats observed by the ET as well as evidenced in desk review literature and interviews with AGRA staff and grantees relate to the nature of policy work *vis-à-vis* the duration of grants (low fidelity). The average grant duration of two years may not be adequate. Policy work is rarely linear; rather, it is characterised by convoluted pathways to change, which often take time to mature to full implementation. Short grants are particularly not ideal for relationship-building. Once relationships and advocacy initiatives are set in motion, it takes some time to regain momentum if funding cuts or termination of grants disrupt progress.

Another factor curtailing progress is inadequate staff capacity in this area of work, which is relatively new to some AGRA teams (Kenya, Mali and Tanzania). (Section 2.2.4 looks at staff capabilities.) Another internal risk relates to inadequacies in quality assurance (QA) mechanisms within AGRA. AGRA is reaching government officials but the quality of the interactions is not clear; nor is it clear whether there are strategies to enhance scope by targeting 'champions' or key influencers and whether they are reached with the right messages/tactic. Where this is happening, as in Ghana and Malawi, it is not monitored and reported systematically at the aggregate level, possibly because there is no requirement to do so by HQ. This compromises AGRA's ability to effectively track progress or learn or share lessons in this space.

AGRA's work is also threatened by external factors such as corruption, political unrest and bureaucracy.<sup>18</sup> Some of the most intractable challenges in the agriculture sector are politically motivated, often beyond the sole influence and scope of AGRA. Indeed, some of these challenges account for the dissonance between government and DPs, which leads to conditionalities on the ways the latter operate. A few examples include the resolution by DPs not to fund government directly in Malawi and initial hesitation to fund Ghana's Planting for Food and Jobs (PFJ) flagship in the absence of a national agriculture investment

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<sup>18</sup> Desk review, interviews with case study country staff and partners and ET's observations

plan (NAIP)<sup>19</sup> or clear implementation road map. In both countries, AGRA's leadership has demonstrated political savviness to navigate these issues through achieving balance between supporting government and demanding accountability – that is, by playing the role of critical friend. The ability to play the role of critical friend comes with trust, which is not developed overnight. Evidence from Ghana, which has been operating in the policy space for relatively longer (since 2013), shows AGRA holding government to account as well as pushing back on some requests that are not aligned with its strategy. This unique but pertinent role is often not visible to the public eye yet is arguably one of AGRA's USOs to government.

Other macro-level threats include political instability (closure of the Rwanda border and subsequent effects on trade volumes in Uganda), political unrest in Ethiopia and Malawi, and changes in government (which in the case of Tanzania has led to the Ministry of Agriculture having three ministers in the space of just one year). Within the context of short grants, AGRA's ability to align with political calendars is also compromised. National processes such as presidential or parliamentary elections can result in long hold-ups of policy advancements; politicians do not always move at the same pace as programmers.

Further, risks relate to the inter-ministerial nature of inclusive agricultural transformation. Evidence<sup>20</sup> attests to limited interaction of AGRA beyond ministries of agriculture. Interviewees<sup>21</sup> noted how AGRA had limited, if any, visibility beyond the agriculture sector and that there was a need for greater visibility, for example with ministries of finance, trade and local government. Some of the present initiatives involving local governments, for example in Ghana, are set to increase such visibility at the ground level. Further effort from the country right through to the AGRF level is also set to increase interaction beyond the agriculture sector. Both internal and external risks faced by AGRA compromise the sustainability of its results in Policy and Advocacy.

### 2.1.2 State Capability

AGRA's work in State Capability aims to support ministries of agriculture to identify, analyse, prioritise and design strategies, NAIPs and flagships to mobilise more partners and resources and target impactful investments.<sup>22</sup> AGRA supports government through grants and provides technical assistance (TA) either through staff time or through outsourcing consultants to work on discrete pieces of work, particularly where specialist expertise is required.

#### Main findings

1. AGRA is responsive to government needs and windows of opportunity. (4)
2. AGRA balances being responsive to government with maintaining a strategic direction insofar as its budget allows. (5)
3. In relation to State Capability, AGRA is supporting NAIPs in all 11 countries and flagships in 7 countries, though progress has generally been slow and design inadequate in some places. (6)
4. The area of State Capability is prone to similar threats to Policy and Advocacy plus additional ones relating to immaturity of grants. (7)

#### **AGRA is responsive to government needs and windows of opportunity.<sup>23</sup>**

AGRA is responsive to government needs and windows of opportunity. AGRA's corporate and country-level operational plans make it clear that AGRA's aim is to support governments in reaching towards inclusive agricultural transformation. At the country level, AGRA has been, and is, responsive to

<sup>19</sup> Read more about NAIPs [here](#)

<sup>20</sup> Country manager interviews (with the exception of Ghana, Tanzania and Burkina Faso) and the ET's observations

<sup>21</sup> A donor in Ghana and a Board member

<sup>22</sup> AGRA strategy 2017–2021

<sup>23</sup> Desk review and interviews with country managers and in-country CAC members and other donors

governments' needs to respond to the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) through NAIPs and flagships. Government respondents in the countries visited greatly welcomed AGRA's support. The country visits by AGRA's top leadership, in particular to government ministers, are well received by government and AGRA's Board. Across countries visited (Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Tanzania), AGRA's responsiveness to government needs was appreciated (even though at the same time respondents recognised that AGRA could help only with small amounts of funding). For example, one government body in Ghana noted that, *'I like the niche things they do in terms of identifying issues. They are small grants but they unlock things.'* In Ghana too, a government body noted that, *'They gave us financial support to help us develop policy instruments and their staff attend our meetings.'*

In Malawi, development finance is relatively high compared with in the rest of the countries AGRA is operating in. As a result, AGRA's strategy for Malawi has been mainly gap-filling, particularly through leveraging DP funding. This niche role that AGRA plays is well understood and received by DPs, government and grantees. Despite AGRA giving limited direct financial support, government in particular appreciates AGRA's responsiveness to its needs through other channels such as leveraging DP funding, TA through secondment and support through staff time. Malawi was sampled as one of the more challenging contexts, but evidence from the case study visit shows how AGRA has streamlined its approach, identified its niche – gap-filling – and is effectively influencing government and enhancing coordination of DPs despite myriad challenges.

One reason Ghana was chosen as a case study country was that it was seen as a leading example of how AGRA could respond to government needs. Experience in Ghana could inform both the evaluation and, in line with the utilisation approach of the MTE, the other countries and AGRA as a whole. Box 3 presents a number of quotes from government interviewees that encapsulate some of the achievements to date in the country.

**Box 3: Voices from the Ghanaian government**

*'AGRA pioneered for us to get the seed production bill, they did all the arrangements, and another bill that is now before us, related to tree crops (the Planting for Export and Rural Development flagship).'*

*'AGRA helped us put together the plan for the PFJ flagship. AGRA helped with the farmer database. AGRA was working in maize and soybean value chains and that fit with the minister's interest.'*

*'When the programme started in 2017, we saw that controlling army worm was very strategic. AGRA really helped us with that, they took an integrated approach for the management of army worm and were part of the technical team along with USAID.'*

*'AGRA looks at which areas of the programme they can support, they come in to identify anything that is lacking.'*

*'AGRA really understands government priorities and has the ability to respond. Their mechanisms or donors may not allow them to shift critically... AGRA needs to be dynamic in understanding the priorities of government.'*

In both Ghana and Malawi, the ET observed common traits that arguably contribute to some of the positive results in Policy and Advocacy. Both countries have established a clear niche that is well communicated and recognised by AGRA and partners and both have strong and politically savvy leadership with a good understanding of context and are supported by a dedicated and committed team. AGRA's support for NAIPs and flagships is sustainable inasmuch as it is embedded within the structures and systems of national governments. However, external threats such as corruption and mismanagement of funds highly compromise the sustainability of such initiatives.

**AGRA balances being responsive to government with maintaining a strategic direction insofar as its budget allows.**

As AGRA's strategic direction was designed to be responsive to government then these are aligned. Where there are issues of principle, for example where AGRA does not support fertiliser subsidy schemes,

AGRA is pragmatic and still works with the government on the bills and flagships related to these, but at the same time is actively working to nuance the situation. For instance, in both Ghana and Malawi, both countries with fertiliser subsidy schemes, AGRA is working with others to support soil mapping and the development of area-specific fertilisers, as well as the strengthening of fertiliser associations and the potential for domestic production of area-specific fertilisers by, or in collaboration with, the private sector. Interviews in Ghana, Malawi and Mali all indicated that AGRA did push back if asked for financial support by government departments on issues not within its mandate or not appropriate for it to provide. Several country managers explained how responsiveness to seemingly small and strategic government requests quite often helped strengthen relations. While being responsive to *ad hoc*, seemingly non-strategic, government requests may help AGRA gain political mileage, such investments may not be sustainable or impactful in themselves. The challenge is to get the balance right.

**In relation to State Capability, AGRA is supporting NAIPs in all 11 countries and flagships in 7 countries, though progress has generally been slow and design inadequate in some places.<sup>24</sup>**

The area of State Capability is fairly new to AGRA, unlike Policy and Advocacy, where AGRA is building on momentum of legacy programmes such as MIRA. Subsequently, internal expertise and knowledge in the area is also relatively lower.<sup>25</sup> AGRA's work in State Capability is mainly centred around three IO areas linked to Outcome 8: improved, planning, coordination, execution and performance of governments (IO 8.1); increased funding from public and private partners (IO 8.2); and mutual accountability (IO 8.3).<sup>26</sup> AGRA's two main indicators linked to Outcome 8 are number of flagships supported and amount of TA attached to ministries, both quantitative. There is no qualitative dimension regarding the conditions that both flagships and TA support should meet in order to adequately support State Capability in a way that leads to inclusive agricultural transformation. Progress in relation to supporting governments in the development of NAIPs and flagships is discussed below.

AGRA is collaborating with seven African governments (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania) to support the development of flagship programmes to drive agricultural transformation. At the time of the evaluation, one (Ghana) out of seven planned flagships was at the implementation stage. This is not to imply stagnation of other flagships AGRA is supporting within the country, such as Rearing for Food and Jobs. The ET observed that, by focusing solely on numbers (of flagships implemented) as an indicator, AGRA HQ misses the valuable qualitative work country teams are doing to advance progress on the flagships in the pipeline. For example, interviews with the country team and government representatives in Malawi pointed to the much-appreciated on-going support by AGRA in the drafting and planning for the flagship on Effective Engagement and Participation and Empowerment of Women and Youth in Agriculture.

AGRA has made considerable progress supporting the PFJ flagship in Ghana. In this country alone, it has mobilised \$260 million against a target of \$100 million to date through improved coordination.<sup>27</sup> However, in interviews with DPs, AGRA staff, grantees and government, the ET observed how the PFJ case tested the assumption that involvement in a flagship contributed to inclusive agricultural transformation. It is still very early to make substantive judgements, but systemic bottlenecks and external threats related to late distribution of inputs, poor quality of inputs and weak extension systems compromise effectiveness and sustainability of operations.

The Ghana case also demonstrates how, in the context of corruption and misuse of government funds, AGRA's involvement may be misconstrued as complicit, potentially putting AGRA's reputation at risk. The ET found no evidence of a robust articulation of the assumptions underlying success and risks, or a risk analysis and mitigation strategy for AGRA's involvement in/support for flagships. This hugely compromises

<sup>24</sup> Evidence from desk reviews of periodic reports including the M&E QMR July 2019 and interviews with grantees and AGRA staff

<sup>25</sup> See also Section 2.2.4

<sup>26</sup> AGRA TOC and RF

<sup>27</sup> 2019 Mid-Year Report to PIATA

the sustainability of these initiatives. That said, AGRA Ghana has demonstrated leadership by holding government to account for the mismanagement of funds, a role that quite often is not publicised because of associated political sensitivities. Through interviews and interaction with the AGRA Ghana team, the ET gathered insights and lessons that could benefit the rest of the countries supporting flagships but that had been neither documented nor shared widely.

The ET looked into two examples of AGRA's support to State Capability in depth during country visits: the State Capability for Agriculture and Local Government Authorities (SCALGA) project in Tanzania and the Institutional Capacity Strengthening Project (ICT-SAT) grant in Mali. In the case of SCALGA, challenges included (but were not limited to) inadequate analysis of problems and unclear elaboration of goals, objectives, primary outcomes, IOs, outputs and activities, with the risks identified being disconnected from these. In the case of ICT-SAT, there was limited analysis of the systemic issues underlying the problems to be addressed and the proposal was not translated into an action plan and budget. However, both also had achievements, though these were not elaborated beyond numbers. For instance, in Tanzania, the SCALGA grant is providing support to multi-sectoral coordination and accountability among 30 local government areas (LGAs) in 12 regions. This represents a more than 100% increase (against 2018/19) in budget disbursement from the Treasury for the targeted LGAs compared with those not supported by SCALGA. In Mali, the ICS-SAT grant led to, among other outputs, validation of a value chain study across six commodities, which also contributed to ministry capacity through involving staff in all stages from developing the methodology to writing up and presenting.

**The area of State Capability is prone to similar internal threats (short duration of grants, inadequate programme QA and limited staff capacities) to Policy and Advocacy plus additional ones relating to immaturity of grants.**

The area of State Capability has the least mature grants, with most grants starting in 2018. This, coupled with late disbursements to governments, accounts for the slow pace of implementation against mid-term targets (low fidelity).<sup>28</sup> Confounding the situation are late staffing (Tanzania and Ethiopia) and low staff capability within AGRA HQ (Objective 2 findings). Budget cuts and meagre budgets, relative to the tasks at hand,<sup>29</sup> and absence of clear grant selection criteria for non-competitive grants compromise flexibility and responsiveness to windows of opportunity. Uganda, Nigeria, Rwanda, Kenya, Malawi and Burkina Faso reported cuts from the originally approved budgets. For example, on average State Capability grants are 2.4 years long, which is often not long enough to achieve planned goals including establishment and implementation of flagships, given inherent bureaucracies in government administration. For instance, only one out of the seven target countries has a flagship up and running. It is in recognition of this that several countries reported intent to request no-cost extensions to their existing grants. There are also threats to responsiveness associated with dependence on finances leveraged from DPs, which themselves may be 'competing' with AGRA or opposed to its approach to working with governments (Malawi). Evidence from interviews with country managers in all 11 countries, ET observations and grant status reports shows uneven approval and allocation of grants to support P&SC between countries, with countries such as Ghana generally receiving more grants than countries such as Kenya, Mali and Uganda. Much as funding allocation depends on country priorities/focus, this means some countries are better placed to be responsive to windows of opportunities than others.

### 2.1.3 Systems Development

The objective of SD in AGRA is 'building downstream delivery systems closer to smallholders while providing support to local private sector to scale technologies and services'<sup>30</sup>.

<sup>28</sup> Interviews with country teams and June M&E QMR

<sup>29</sup> Reported by country managers and confirmed by HQ stemming from AGRA's inability to meet its financial targets for strategy implementation.

<sup>30</sup> AGRA Strategy and Business Plan Overview 2017–2021, page 19

**Main findings**

1. AGRA's progress against the 2017-2021 strategy in the SD space has generally been slower than anticipated. (8)
2. Based on two consortia reviewed, issues were identified with the design of AGRA's SD interventions, including a lack of conceptual clarity; incomplete systems diagnostics at sub-national/consortia level; and inadequate sustainability, scale and inclusion strategies. (9)
3. Most of the farmer-level results achieved to date appear to be unsustainable as they result from either the direct delivery of products and services to farmers or models with questionable incentive structures. (10)

**AGRA's progress against the 2017-2021 strategy in the SD space has generally been slower than anticipated.**

Evidence from the desk review and country-level interviews with AGRA and implementing partners (IPs) points to slow progress in the SD space. At a headline level, only 33% of the total direct farmer reach has been achieved. Although some results have exceeded 2019 targets, results are generally below target, particularly regarding output markets (the demand side).<sup>31</sup> This is unsurprising as most countries have effectively gone through just one agricultural season since the onset of the 2017–2021 strategy, and reaching large numbers of farmers through a genuinely sustainable SD approach takes time. However, many of the other system-level indicators are also off-target particularly for output market interventions.

Under Objective 1, which relates to increased staple crop productivity for smallholder farmers, mixed results are observed. Outputs under the IO on agricultural input systems are generally below target. For example, in relation to seed varieties and other technologies commercialised, AGRA has reached only 2/7 (seed) and 14/27 (fertiliser) of the 2019 targets, respectively. Similarly, under the IO on productivity-enhancing technology, AGRA has exceeded mid-term targets for four extension service activities (demonstration plots, field days, radio programmes and seed fairs), and the number of village-based advisers (VBAs) trained and operational is on target (8,930/8,963), but AGRA is significantly below target in terms of small packs, and overall AGRA has only reached 2 million out of 4.6 million (44%) of the 2019 target for the 'number of farmers and value chain actors participating in AGRA supported extension services'.

Objective 2 of the RF focuses on strengthened and expanded access to output markets. Most outputs on reduced post-harvest losses and increased agricultural employment are below target. AGRA has exceeded the 2019 target for number of storage facilities developed or refurbished (276/381) but reached only 40% of the targeted storage space. The number of new people employed by small and medium enterprises (SMEs) receiving AGRA support along the focus value chains is also consistently below target.

A similar trend is observed under Objective 3 of the RF, which focuses on increasing smallholders' capacity to adapt to shocks and stresses. All figures on farmer access to structured markets are below target, sometimes significantly so (e.g. the number of farmers accessing market information is only 22,176/850,225). Some positive results are observed under the IO on 'strengthened and expanded business development, financial and risk management services': 53 financial institutions providing financial services for farmers and agriculture SMEs versus a target of 23, although the number of financial products developed is below target and only \$20 million/\$139 million in loans has been leveraged. Overall, AGRA has reached only 427,578/1,786,573 (24%) in relation to the 'number of farmers selling produce through structured trading facilities or arrangements'.<sup>32</sup> On the cross-cutting primary outcomes

<sup>31</sup> Desk reviews, data provided by AGRA post-emerging findings workshop, interviews with country staff and partners, ET's observations. Annex 15 provides output data on programme development and innovation as of October 2019.

<sup>32</sup> These AGRA-wide findings match the findings from the two consortia examined in more detail by the ET (see below). In Koulikoro, the demand-side interventions were found to be lagging significantly behind. The proposal identified 10 large agro-processors in and around Bamako that would serve as an anchor for the model but the ET found no evidence that they had been effectively engaged. Farmers interviewed by the ET

(POs) relating to gender and youth, both indicators are below target (81% for gender; 77% for youth) and only 31% of farmers 'reached with promoted interventions' are female.

**Based on two consortia reviewed, issues were identified with the design of AGRA's SD interventions including a lack of conceptual clarity; incomplete systems diagnostics at sub-national/consortia level; and inadequate sustainability, scale and inclusion strategies.**

In both Tanzania and Mali, a common view among in-country staff is that there is a lack of clarity within AGRA regarding key concepts such as 'systems development' and 'transformational change' and inadequate practical guidance to IPs on how to operationalise these concepts. Outside of AGRA, there is a large body of practical frameworks, tools and guidance on SD – the ET found some evidence of familiarity with these tools and frameworks among regional staff but usage did not appear to be widespread among country staff responsible for SD work or among the IPs interviewed (with the exception of one IP in Tanzania).

In both of the consortia examined by the ET in Mali and Tanzania, there was limited evidence of a comprehensive and systematic **diagnostic process**. For example, the Koulikoro proposal contains no comprehensive mapping of market players and their roles. Some key actors, such as farmer organisations (FOs) and cooperatives, large agro-dealers, seed and input companies (other than the two seed company grantees), and relevant ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs), are missing from the analysis. There is also no analysis of the performance of different functions or of why the system is not working effectively (rooted in an analysis of the capacity, incentives and relationships of system actors). For example, there is no analysis of why the system is not by itself able to produce a sufficient quantity and quality of seed for smallholders, and what the underlying systemic constraints are. The diagnostic process in the Ilhemi proposal is slightly more comprehensive but also incomplete. For example, the performance of extension agents is identified as a key constraint, but there is no mention of the MDAs responsible for the training and supervision of extension agents, let alone an analysis of the underlying organisational capacity and incentive constraints. Similarly, while FOs are identified as key actors and areas of underperformance are diagnosed, there is no mention of organisations such as the Tanzania Cooperative Development Commission (TCDC), which is ultimately responsible for registering, supervising and training FOs. In both proposals, gender and inclusion analysis was also limited, with no exploration of specific barriers or constraints affecting female smallholder farmers in particular, or the capacity and incentives of market players to provide more inclusive services, for example.

AGRA's SD **intervention strategies** are set out in the consortia grant proposals (and accompanying summary notes). Neither of the two proposals reviewed demonstrated a well-thought-out intervention strategy. For example, in the case of Koulikoro, the vision for how the system will work post-intervention proposes replicating the model in cotton, with 10 large anchor processors and off-takers entering forward contracts with FOs, on the basis of which banks, micro-finance institutions, and seed and fertiliser companies also enter into contracts. However, this depends on the existence of a monopsony buyer of cotton that is able to set the cotton prices in advance and offer forward contracts, which does not exist for the commodities targeted under the Koulikoro consortium. The vision presented in the proposal is therefore not realistic or evidenced for the crops in question (which the Mali country team acknowledged during the feedback session). There is also no ex-ante sustainability analysis or sustainable vision for key functions targeted by the consortium and no activity plan that clearly links the diagnosis to the vision (i.e. how AGRA will shift the capacity and incentives of market players in order to achieve a sustained improvement in the performance of the system, at scale). In the case of seed, for example, the proposal simply states that grants will be given to one producer of breeder seed and two producers of foundation seed to produce seed for farmers in the cluster, with no consideration of how breeder and foundation

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reported being selected individually for training (rather than in their cooperative groups); they were planning to sell maize individually, with no aggregation and no collective selling. Farmers also reported not having received any training on negotiation or market linkages, and several were worried about market access with no buyers or contracts in place (one month from harvest).

seed will continue to be produced in sufficient quantities post-grant. AGRA is therefore treating the symptoms – low production of seed – without really addressing the underlying constraints or identifying sustainable and scalable solutions.

Very similar issues were identified in the case of Ilhemi. For example, the strategy for promoting the adoption of agricultural enhancing technology talks about providing training and advice to smallholder farmers but does not identify which system actors are expected to play this role on an on-going basis and how AGRA will overcome the poor performance of the extension system identified in the diagnostics. There is also no sense of how this will be done at scale, in part because key systemic actors that offer a potential leverage point are not identified. Another limiting factor is that consortia are defined around sub-national clusters and are therefore not set up to strategically engage actors with national reach that can offer scale. In practice, national-level actors appear to be engaged only in the context of the particular sub-national region (e.g. Silverlands in Tanzania, where AGRA was facilitating linkages within the Ilhemi cluster but not engaging with Silverlands at a national level (see Section 2.1.4)); or not at all (e.g. large off-takers and buyers in Bamako, which IPs confirmed had not been engaged at all, despite being a key part of the intervention strategy).

Some of the issues identified above appear to stem from the delivery model used by AGRA for its SD work: **the consortium model**. The Ilhemi consortium is made up of two national NGOs, one public seed research organisation and a regional not-for-profit company. The Koulikoro consortium is made up of four national NGOs, two national seed companies and one public seed research organisation. IPs in both consortia reported that they were largely responsible for turning the high-level AGRA objectives into a concrete strategy and set of activities – despite the fact that only one IP (in Tanzania) displayed much knowledge or experience of SD. Although IPs reported that AGRA staff had worked with them to refine the proposal, they said they had been largely left to develop their own approaches, tools, training materials, etc. The quality of the proposals, and delivery, therefore does not represent what one would expect from an organisation (AGRA) that claims to be a thought-leader in agricultural transformation across Africa. For example, neither proposal displays a knowledge of innovative agro-dealer or extension models and examples of what works from across Africa, and in Ilhemi, for example, training is being delivered to agro-dealers and FOs by IPs with no specialist agro-dealer or FO experience.<sup>33</sup>

Once the winning proposal is selected, AGRA issues separate grant agreements and budgets to each consortium member. This appears to defeat the purpose of the model, which is designed to ensure close coordination across the market system/value chain. It then becomes the responsibility of the AGRA staff member located in the region to coordinate the activities of individual members of the consortium, which the staff member in Tanzania reported to be a full-time job, leaving little time to engage technically. It also results in a very high reporting burden, although in Mali at least efforts have been made to restructure the grant agreements to consolidate reporting.

A final issue is the composition of the consortium, which in Mali includes private seed companies in the consortium as IPs. This confuses *development actors* – actors outside the system that use donor funds to temporarily effect change in the market system – with *system actors* – actors that play a permanent role in the market system. The core business of a seed company is to produce seed, not to develop or conduct market systems diagnostics, develop intervention strategies, convene stakeholder meetings, conduct M&E and so forth – this is a distraction from their core business and they do not have the requisite capacities to do so (see also Section 2.1.4).<sup>34</sup>

<sup>33</sup> This may explain why the agro-dealers and FOs interviewed in Ilhemi were generally positive about the training received but said it was too generic (e.g. general book-keeping training) and not sufficiently tailored to their business or organisation.

<sup>34</sup> The Koulikoro consortium includes two seed companies that, as part of the consortium, are expected to coordinate sales and geographic target areas between themselves. In effect, the consortium has therefore facilitated an anti-competitive outcome between what should be two competing seed companies. Also, despite repeated requests, no due diligence reports for Faso Kaba (the initial lead IP) were provided to the ET. According to interviews with Faso Kaba, at the time of the grant they were a company of two staff with a turnover of \$10,000, yet they were given a grant of \$208,000. This appears to represent a major fiduciary and delivery risk.

**Most of the farmer-level results achieved to date appear to be unsustainable as they result from either the direct delivery of products and services to farmers or models with questionable incentive structures.**

It is too early to make a full assessment but, based on findings from both consortia, sustainability of impact is likely to be low. In the Koulikoro consortium most of the farmer-level impact comes from the distribution of free mini seed packs, paid for by grants provided by AGRA to seed companies, and through training delivered by volunteer VBAs recruited and trained by AGRA (AGRA also covers their travel expenses). In the case of Ilhemi, most impact stems from the delivery of training to smallholders by government extension workers (who are given supplementary training and travel expenses by AGRA) and VBAs.

Neither consortium has a clear strategy or set of activities designed to address the underlying causes of underperformance of government extension workers, and when the consortium ends their performance is therefore likely to revert to the status quo. VBAs have no obvious incentive to continue to provide extension services to farmers. AGRA staff in Tanzania hope that, by linking VBAs with agro-dealers and off-takers, they will be paid commission by these organisations, while in Mali the strategy appears to be to turn VBAs into agro-dealers, but this gives VBAs an incentive to act as agro-dealers (or agents for agro-dealers or off-takers), not to continue to provide extension services to smallholders. For example, one VBA-turned-agro-dealer interviewed in Mali said he would no longer be visiting farmers to deliver training (*'They can come to my shop'*). In any case, the proportion of VBAs who successfully become (and survive as) agro-dealers is likely to be limited, especially as the selection criteria used to select VBAs are not the same that one would ideally use to select potential agro-dealers.<sup>35</sup> Interviews with other VBAs also cast doubt on the sustainability of the model. Of the two VBAs interviewed in Tanzania, both said they were only continuing as VBAs in the expectation of future support from AGRA (e.g. further training, or capital for their business). Also note that the selection and training of VBAs is organised, delivered and paid for by AGRA, meaning there is no sustainable source of new VBAs.<sup>36</sup> Beyond VBAs, both consortia also pay for and deliver a significant number of activities directly to farmers – by definition unsustainable – such as the printing and distribution of 15,000 pamphlets in Ilhemi and the production of radio programmes. Some outcomes are likely to persist – for example some of the linkages between agro-processors and buyers that have been facilitated in Ilhemi.

#### 2.1.4 Partnerships

The objective of AGRA's Partnerships intervention area is 'facilitating alignment between government priorities and private sector interests and improving integration and coordination to lead to investments beneficial to smallholder farmers'. Activity focus areas include mobilising inclusive investments in agriculture; creating a private sector-led leadership agenda; and building partnerships with leading private sector champions to leverage the entire ecosystem and build partnerships around knowledge- and intelligence-sharing.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>35</sup> As reported by one IP responsible for agro-dealer development, the IP gets better results and uptake from people it selects itself versus when it is asked to turn VBAs into agro-dealers. The VBAs often have lower levels of literacy and numeracy, making it much harder to deliver things like book-keeping training; and they often do not have a bank account, making it harder for them to access finance. They also display less 'entrepreneurialism', perhaps in part because they first *volunteer* to be VBAs.

<sup>36</sup> In comments provided by AGRA, the ET was told both that the VBA model was not intended to be sustainable and that the sustainability strategy was actually for government to take on the VBA model. However, none of the country staff or IPs interviewed in country by the ET mentioned this as the strategy, and given the problems AGRA itself identified with government extension services it is not clear how this strategy would succeed without significant support to the responsible MDAs.

<sup>37</sup> AGRA Strategy and Business Plan Overview, page 20

**Main findings**

1. There is a lack of clarity regarding the Partnerships theme, both within AGRA (particularly at the country level) and among some stakeholders and RPs. (11)
2. Memoranda of understanding and letters of intent have been signed between AGRA and private sector partners, realising investment of over \$50 million. These cannot yet be termed 'strategic' private sector partnerships as they are still in their early stages. (12)

**There is a lack of clarity regarding the Partnerships theme, both within AGRA (particularly at the country level) and among some stakeholders and RPs.<sup>38</sup>**

In several case study countries, country-level staff reported being confused by the Partnerships theme as a separate theme outside and in addition to P&SC and SD. They regarded the principles of 'partnership' as inherent to the delivery of the first two themes, so were unclear as to what sat in the Partnership theme (over and above what was already included in the first two themes). Portfolio analysis provided by AGRA to the ET for most of the countries shows a range of stakeholders as IPs, including (drawing from the Ghana portfolio analysis as an example) public institutions, private partners/SMEs, private bodies, international organisations, regional organisations and international NGOs.<sup>39</sup> Given the wider understanding of partnerships among many staff, internal understanding of the purpose of the Partnerships Unit (PU) and its vision as a means of leveraging private sector engagement was nascent.<sup>40</sup>

Considering partnerships in countries, the consortium model, as seen in Tanzania and Mali, involves AGRA grantees establishing partnerships with private and public sector actors within specific geographic clusters and specific value chains. However, outside of these, AGRA has not entered into any formal partnerships (i.e. with clear strategic objectives and a clearly defined package of support). There could be said to be a missing middle between local-level partnerships with small actors (or local branches of bigger actors) formed through geographically focused consortia and regional/continental partnerships brokered by the partnership team in Nairobi.

Because consortia are typically sub-national, players with national reach are engaged on a piecemeal basis, often in multiple consortia, rather than through a single more strategic partnership at the national level. Where private sector players are included in consortia, they are treated as IPs the same way NGOs are treated – instead of as businesses, with their own commercial interests and unique set of capabilities (as noted in Section 2.1.3). This is in contrast with best practice in market development programming, for example, which emphasises the need to engage with businesses as businesses, speak their language and expect them to do and measure only what it is in their commercial interests to do. Several partners engaged through the consortium model reported in interviews that AGRA was a bureaucratic partner and that the burden of reporting was very heavy, especially for those featuring in multiple consortia.

**Memoranda of understanding and letters of intent have been signed between AGRA and private sector partners, realising investment of over \$50 million. These cannot yet be termed 'strategic' private sector partnerships as they are still in their early stages.<sup>41</sup>**

EQ7 asked, 'How effective has AGRA been informing **strategic** partnerships at the continental, regional and country level?' At the continental and regional level, the PU is largely responsible for delivering

<sup>38</sup> Interviews with AGRA staff at HQs and with country managers and during country visits

<sup>39</sup> Ghana Portfolio and Partner Mapping, May 2019

<sup>40</sup> This posed a challenge to the ET in terms of determining what should be assessed under EQ7 versus other EQs (particularly EQ2, which looks at the consortium model, EQ4, which looks at partnerships with donors, and EQ6, which looks at partnership with government). As a result, this section of the report focuses only on private sector partnerships, with an emphasis on those at regional and continental level. It looks at the PU and its role in leveraging private sector engagement in line with the objective of the partnership thematic area noted above. Partnerships with national governments and those with private sector at the sub-national level are addressed in the sections on State Capability and SD, respectively (2.1.2 and 2.1.3).

<sup>41</sup> Documents shared by the PU and interviews with the PU, plus observations in Mali and Tanzania

private sector partnerships. The AGRF, and its Deal Room, is a major asset in helping AGRA build strategic partnerships at the continental and regional level. The PU has prioritised 30 continental and regional private sector companies for strategic partnerships.<sup>42</sup> Of these, AGRA has signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with five and letters of intent (LOIs) or multi-country engagement with eight.<sup>43</sup> However, since then the PU has been seeking to limit the signing of MOUs and LOIs to only when partners are ready, willing and able to establish joint activities. As of September 2019, LOIs had been signed between AGRA and 15 partners.<sup>44</sup> The January to June 2019 report from AGRA to PIATA notes that the 20 partnership agreements in all (5 MOUs and 15 LOIs) had led to \$50,291,913 being raised as additional investment in the agriculture sector (page 13). Examples shared with the ET by AGRA on reviewing this report indicate early stage results evidenced through LOIs.<sup>45</sup>

The Deal Room at the 2018 AGRF<sup>46</sup> saw 16 SMEs participating, with 10 investors and an average deal size of \$2 million. The transaction ratio was 20% with a 100% commitment to return. The 2019 Deal Room greatly expanded on that of 2018 and saw more than \$200 million in commitments from private and public sector stakeholders that will be used to develop and strengthen supply chains.<sup>47</sup>

A joint initiative, the Youth Agripreneurship Development Programme (YADIS), has recently been established between Nestlé and AGRA. AGRA's vice president for Country Support and Delivery (CS&D) stated in a June 2019 press release that, *'The partnership will encourage, strengthen extension services, increase technology adoption, improve supply chain management and promote agricultural entrepreneurship and the use of structured markets.'* The AGRA contribution to the initiative will be part of PIATA, with \$245,000 funded by USAID to the Ghana component and \$1 million in kind leverage from Nestlé. This will also be implemented in close collaboration with Ghana's Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Given the stage of the programme, no results are available as yet.<sup>48</sup>

It is early days to assess progress on partnerships established in the Deal Room. Indeed, as is clear from both the 2019 presentation on the Deal Room design and related interviews, the Deal Room should be considered just the start of an investment journey process, which could take around 12 months in total. Feedback from SME attendees in the Deal Room 2019 partners' presentation showed strong appreciation and receptivity of the opportunity provided by the Deal Room to connect with a wide range of investors and other entrepreneurs.

*'The Deal Room allowed me to connect with both investors and my fellow entrepreneurs on a more intimate level. I really connected with people in a way that I've never done at a conference.'* SME

*'The Agribusiness Deal Room was the highlight of the AGRF 2019 (this being our first). It did not just provide us the best opportunity to meet face-to-face with representatives of capital providers, but also to meet with representatives of big multinational off takers who are extremely key in the long-term future of an agribusiness like Rubicon.'* SME

<sup>42</sup> Board presentation dated December 2018

<sup>43</sup> December 2018 presentation to the Board

<sup>44</sup> September 2019 AGRA partnerships, Strategic alliances mobilize inclusive agricultural investments to scale AGRA's impact presentation

<sup>45</sup> One example given is of Corteva and Seed Co providing seed samples to farmers in Nigeria and participating in farmer training over two seasons. A second example is from Mozambique where Bayer has worked with the consortium to train VBAs in fall army worm control and to provide spraying as a service for a fee. The ET has not been able to validate these findings, but they are included as examples of early stage results of partnerships.

<sup>46</sup> Board presentation dated December 2018

<sup>47</sup> Agribusiness Deal Room to 2020, AGRF, 3–6 September 2019 presentation

<sup>48</sup> However, at the time of submission of the draft report, AGRA advised that 400 farmers had been trained and 144,00 metric tonnes of cassava certified seed provided. Aggregation of 68,000 metric tonnes of cassava is also referred to, though it is not clear how that has been possible in the time available. While these results are noted here, the ET has not verified them.

At the regional level, the PU targets some regional companies in Nairobi (e.g. Dangote), although the priority appears to be continental partnerships. Regional teams are limited in the extent to which they can pursue partnerships with regional private sector actors. They do not yet have regional-level strategies, nor do they have a budget for working on regional-level partnerships (see Section 2.2.3). For example, the Mali team is pursuing a promising partnership with Toguna, a large fertiliser and agro-input company based in Bamako with a presence in Burkina Faso and across West Africa but the regional team is unable to pursue a pan-regional partnership with Toguna.

In at least one instance, based on case study country findings, the engagement being pursued by AGRA does not appear to be particularly strategic or transformational. For example, Silverlands (one of the 30 listed in the December 2018 Board presentation) is reported as being ‘engaged in country consortia’ but, based on the Tanzania case study findings, this engagement extends only to linking Silverlands with some farmer groups in one of the sub-national consortia. While this may be a valuable activity, it does not seem to constitute a strategic partnership with Silverlands that can fully leverage the reach and potential impact of the partner. In Mali, the country team attended USAID-led workshops, with others, to shape its strategic plan for Mali; however, again, this cannot be claimed to constitute a ‘strategic partnership’ as claimed by AGRA.

## 2.2 Objective 2: How well the organisational reforms AGRA initiated in support of its 2017–2021 Strategy are progressing

As part of the new 2017–2021 strategy, AGRA set in motion major organisational reforms to facilitate and sustain the new direction it was taking. This included establishing an integrated delivery model and decentralisation of country and regional offices. Consequently, these changes required realignment of its delivery model, MEL and culture and capabilities. This section reviews how well these organisational reforms are progressing.

### 2.2.1 How AGRA can optimise its delivery model to accelerate impact (EQ2)

The answer to this overall question is a recommendation, thus premature at this stage of the report. The question is also predicated on the assumption that there is evidence of impact, as defined by AGRA’s RF, with which to accelerate. ET findings from EQ1 (Section 2.1) question this assertion. However, the ET was able to explore the four sub-questions under this EQ (see Annexes 4 and 5) and where findings were strong conclusions are drawn and recommendations made.

#### Main findings

1. Changes to the type of support associated with AGRA’s delivery model are reflected in the country operational plans, but shortfalls in the COPs create challenges to achieving inclusive agricultural transformation. (13)
2. Divisions at HQ are working together in establishing links between them in support of the integrated delivery model, with variable success. (14)
3. The tools and approaches developed by AGRA are mostly adequate but vary in their coverage at strategic level and quality at country level. (15)
4. AGRA has successfully secured \$262.5 million for flagships. It has also mobilised funds through grants. (16)

**Changes to the type of support associated with AGRA’s delivery model are reflected in the COPs, but shortfalls in the COPs create challenges to achieving inclusive agricultural transformation.<sup>49</sup> (EQ2.1)**

<sup>49</sup> AGRA’s 2017–2021 Strategy, COPs (nine) – both original and updated, the 2019 Internal Audit, KIs with staff at HQ (14) and country teams in the 4 countries visited

Changes to the type of support associated with AGRA's delivery model, from large grants to SD and AGRA staff time on policy, to smaller grants targeting different grantees and TA across the three themes, are reflected in the COPs. Hence, AGRA's delivery model has changed and is made up of a mix of 'retail' grants,<sup>50</sup> coupled with outsourced TA in support of national governments (as a complement to AGRA staff time), in delivering an integrated combination of support. Building a new organisational structure, repositioning support functions at HQ, establishing country teams and rolling out revised internal processes in the midst of implementing a strategy is no easy task. Having to translate the new strategy and revise the delivery model accordingly into the first suite of COPs and, in turn, into grant design (including shaping consortia), while at the same time recruiting country teams with support from transition or interim teams, has been challenging, as Annex 2 shows.

There is an understanding of AGRA's strategy among senior management and the implications of this in terms of shaping AGRA's delivery model, yet this understanding varies within divisions and in their functional relationships with each other.

The initial purpose of the COPs was to translate the overall strategy into country strategies in 2018. These were updated in 2019. They are, in effect, country strategies, not operational plans, thus insufficiently detailed to monitor and assess the country teams' performance. All COPs reflect responses to the three themes, with the strongest one being SD. This provides a clear articulation of 1) priority commodities, 2) stakeholders, 3) entry points into the value chains and 4) location of interventions. These indicate a well-informed and solid basis on which to formulate a more local and detailed analysis in designing grants.

However, desk review of COPs indicates that they do not adequately 1) analyse the P&SC constraints; 2) explain the relationship between the Policy and Advocacy and the State Capability work; 3) define the rationale of the Partnerships theme and the contribution these partners make to the other two themes; 4) provide enough operational detail to guide development of grant design; and 5) demonstrate a sufficient tailoring of indicators drawn from the RF with which to monitor the country team's performance in delivering support. Hence, the 2019 Internal Audit notes that there are, '*Unclear country specific operational road maps (Issue 3.1) – to establish line of sight metrics.*'

**Divisions at HQ are working together in establishing links between them in support of the integrated delivery model, with variable success.<sup>51</sup> (EQ2.1)**

There is good fit between Programme Development and Innovation (PDI) and the Policy Unit, largely thanks to AGRA's prior and existing skill and experience in policy and regulatory work. The fit of PDI with the State Capability Unit is less clear, given the latter's relative infancy.

There is evidence of more joint planning and integrated thinking and support among the HQ divisions, facilitated by the CS&D Division. Further, divisions are actively seeking to link the work of PDI and P&SC, with clearer evidence around the policy space compared with in the recent past. Such coordination is most evident between the PDI, State Capability and Partnerships teams in coalescing support around the design of flagship projects in Ghana, Mali and Tanzania. However, there remain significant differences within AGRA in how the PDI and Policy and State Capability divisions understand the PU's objectives and approach to working with the private sector.

**The tools and approaches developed by AGRA are mostly adequate but vary in their coverage at strategic level and quality at country level.<sup>52</sup> (EQ2.2, EQ2.3)**

<sup>50</sup> AGRA and its partners and donors distinguish between retail grants and wholesale grants. The larger grants given in the past by AGRA, often with less frequent reporting requirements and relatively more flexibility, are referred to as wholesale grants, whereas the move in AGRA to giving more, smaller, grants to a larger number of grantees with more frequent reporting requirements reflects a shift to giving retail grants.

<sup>51</sup> Sources are the same as for the first finding in the box related also to EQ2.1.

<sup>52</sup> COPs, QMRs, 2017 guidance for proposals, MEL plan, 2018 AMIS training material, grant summary reports prepared by the M&E and Knowledge Management Unit, guidance notes on State Capability and SD, KIIs at HQ and group interviews with farmers in Mali and Tanzania; evidence regarding the lack of a system-wide analysis of value chains to inform grant proposals was drawn from documentation (concept notes, external

Overall, while tools such as the COPs, quarterly management reports (QMRs) and the AGRA management information system (AMIS) and those on State Capability and SD are designed well, each has limitations, and guidance for grant proposals inadequate. PDI and State Capability have well-documented approaches but each has areas for improvement. In terms of tools, the COPs and QMRs are well designed in that they are standardised for use across all countries and within HQ and are simple to follow. Content of both the COPs and the QMRs tends to be strongest in relation to SD as compared with P&SC and Partnerships, but that is to be expected given AGRA's history of focus on systems. The COPs do not, however, contain specific enough objectives for the year with which to assess AGRA's subsequent performance. There is no explicit reference to outputs in either the COPs or the QMRs; rather, emphasis is placed on description of the context, which would be expected in a country strategy more so than in a COP. The COPs provide limited operational detail, and links between the themes are unclear. Further, the COPs do not include any explanation as to how their implementation will be monitored or reported on (a point reinforced at validation meetings with the Mali and Tanzania country teams).

Having plans that are more operational would enable teams in 1) setting annual objectives, based on lessons learnt from the previous year, that reflect a more practical definition of what the team is setting out to achieve across the three themes by adapting indicators in the RF; 2) explaining how the team will manage operational linkages/co-dependencies between the themes; 3) making explicit the underlying assumptions they are making in achieving their objectives; 4) setting out a budget among each of the three themes informed by those revised for their respective portfolio for grants; and 5) defining what support they need from HQ and when it is needed.

AMIS is well aligned with the RF and has been promulgated very efficiently through dedicated support to and training of grantees and staff at all levels. Country teams report on how it has improved reporting efficiency. That said, its effectiveness is limited in the view of the ET:

- The Indicator Performance Tracking Tables (IPTTs) are limited in supporting consistent reporting of numeric values of what AGRA delivers (output indicators), or consistent reporting between countries against output indicators, as evidenced by the ET's difficulties in collating evidence in response to EQ1 i.e. outputs achieved to date. There is inadequate information on targets and lack of a systematic way to update information in real time. Some of this may owe to AMIS being a relatively new system, which is still being improved upon based on experience. AGRA is yet to optimise AMIS's data analysis functions.
- The data it generates breaks down the results across discrete sub-systems thus providing a fractured picture of system development across value chains.<sup>53</sup>
- It exclusively generates moving values of quantitative indicators that understate AGRA's performance and provide a narrow assessment of progress across all the themes, notably P&SC, owing to the lack of accompanying qualitative data.

Other tools, such as on State Capability and SD, have been successfully introduced, but many of these are insufficiently detailed, and country teams have limited time to interpret and deploy them properly.

The ET found few tools on supporting SMEs (including farmer groups) beyond, for example, book-keeping, yet a range of tools or guidelines could be useful, such as on 1) training in building capacities of farmer groups in collecting, transporting, handling, storing and selling harvests and quality control for doing this; and, from a farmer organisational perspective, 2) capacity-building of farmer groups.<sup>54</sup>

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review, proposals) and interviews with consortia members, SMEs and farmer groups relating to the Koulikoro and Ihemi/Ludewa consortia in Mali and Tanzania, respectively.

<sup>53</sup> The discrete sub-systems mirror the units in PDI and are reflected across the first five Primary Outcomes in the RF. They are collected and reported on separately, with limited insights from a farmer perspective as to how the overall system is changing/transforming.

<sup>54</sup> The development and growth of such groups define one of the most significant drivers of agricultural transformation – that is, as opposed to proxy metrics of farmer performance such as yields, financial or physical.

Finally, in relation to tools, the guidance for grant proposal writing has much room for improvement. It asks some of the right questions, but not all; links to other themes are not asked for, including in the M&E section, which misses opportunities to spot opportunities for integration. Some questions are too generic, notably on systemic constraints, inclusion, M&E and indicators; others are not well constructed and/or ambiguous, such as those related to inclusion and value for money. The guidance on M&E for those preparing grant proposals simply states that applicants should *'provide a brief description of the project monitoring and evaluation plans to be used in the implementation of the project'*.<sup>55</sup>

PDI has developed good approaches among sub-systems and the diagnostic work among these sub-systems at national level is good. That said, links between PDI and P&SC and the approach they take together to system change lack a vision of overall system change across value chains. AGRA does not adequately communicate its vision for systemic change in grant design at local level, nor does it provide adequate guidance to establish links between SD and P&SC in grant designs. For example, the ET, on reviewing grant proposals, found no clear description of system development mapping and diagnosis and no vision of systemic change. This lack of detail was confirmed through review of supporting documents normally prepared to accompany grant proposal submission.<sup>56</sup> This could be because of an absence of strategy developed before the proposal by AGRA and the IPs subsequent to approval of their proposal.

The definition of, and approach to, State Capability is clear and well documented, as are the purpose and functions of the State Capability Unit. One main tool being used is the Institutional Capacity Assessment (ICA). Although not yet verified for any country, this is comprehensive and is carried out across several ministries among the 11 countries with a role to play in agriculture. However, evidence from the country visits is that grants have already been awarded, for example in Mali in April 2018 and Tanzania in July 2019. In the case of Mali, the design process started with discussions between AGRA HQ and the minister of agriculture and was carried out with little analysis of the problem. This resulted in the definition of support exclusively to the Direction Nationale de l'Agriculture (DNA, or the National Directorate of Agriculture), the ambition and scope of which was unrealistic. In this case, other ministries that had participated in the ICA were overlooked. This could result in, among other things, AGRA inadvertently compromising its relationships with other government institutions participating in the ICA process. While AGRA stated that it used other sources of diagnostics, the comprehensive ICAs, in looking at different ministries, could usefully inform identification of potential areas of support for State Capability.

In the absence of ICAs and their diagnoses of State Capability, the design of grants for State Capability can be inadequate. Where there is approval of policies in a political sense resulting from AGRA's support to State Capability, a positive result, AGRA lacks capacity to spot and subsequently support the next steps (gazetting, raising awareness) between approval and implementation in some countries.

The strategy for inclusion has only recently been approved, ably supported by the PAC's working group on gender and youth. Thus, it is premature to assess how and how well it has been rolled out among the divisions and across the countries.

#### **AGRA has successfully secured \$262.5 million for flagships. It has also mobilised funds through grants.** (EQ2.4)

AGRA's early commitment to Ghana's PFJ flagship of the National Agriculture Strategy successfully led to a group of donors including the World Bank and the Canadian government investing \$260 million in the flagship. On a smaller scale, AGRA catalysed further investment of \$2.5 million by the private sector in Tanzania to support implementation of the Agriculture Sector Development Strategy II.

The ET understands that approved grants have in cases triggered matching funding. Information provided by AGRA in November 2019 indicates that 15 grants, worth in total \$8,225,866, have secured matched

<sup>55</sup> Proposal submission guidelines 2017

<sup>56</sup> Proposal Development Questions document, Grant Memo document and External Review

funding of \$10,687,955. Note that funding leveraged through the PIATA arrangement is discussed under Objective 3.

### 2.2.2 AGRAs effectiveness in monitoring progress and inclusivity of work and in taking corrective measures if required (EQ3)

Evaluating this EQ and its three sub-questions necessarily:

- Assumes that indicators for the primary, cross-cutting and intermediate outcomes in AGRA's shared RF define an appropriate and relevant basis on which to effectively monitor progress and inclusivity just after the first year of implementation – that is, one season;
- Must reflect and acknowledge implementation status of the 2018 MEL plan at HQ, regional, country and grant levels and the process of rolling these out;
- Includes a review of how, and how efficiently, outputs of the monitoring system are developed at different levels and by whom.

#### Main findings

1. AGRA has an efficient management information system (AMIS) but the data it generates is not in a form that can usefully inform decision-making. (17)
2. While there are some opportunities for learning at grantee and country level, the monitoring system gives minimal scope for learning/sharing at HQ, Board and PAC levels. (18)
3. The MEL process is constrained by there being too much and too frequent reporting at all levels and a lack of clarity on what information is needed to inform decision-making. (19)
4. Mechanisms exist for identifying and addressing gaps or threats to inclusive progress, but these are constrained by lack of evidence, particularly in relation to evidence and insights on inclusivity. (20)


**AGRA has an efficient management information system (AMIS) but the data it generates is not in a form that can usefully inform decision-making.<sup>57</sup> (EQ3.2)**

AGRA's monitoring system is broken down across three levels: grant, country and HQ. All levels report progress against IOs on a quarterly basis. These culminate in two corporate six-monthly reports: the President's Reports to the Board and the PIATA chief of party's (CoP's) reports to PAC (Figure 1).

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<sup>57</sup> Sources for EQ3.2 are many of those for EQ2 plus quarterly consortia reports, grant status updates and reports, QMRs for countries and technical divisions, President's Reports to the Board, CoP reports to PIATA, KIIs with regional teams, country teams, consortia members, PAC members, the gender strategy, the MEL plan, Board minutes and internal audit.

Figure 1: AGRA's monitoring system



It is important to note differences and similarities in these reports: 1) there is no mention of outputs in any report;<sup>58</sup> and 2) the corporate-level reports focus on a descriptive account of progress with limited evidence synthesis. As further discussed below, this limits their utility for the intended audiences.

The 2018 MEL plan is yet to be fully rolled out: the learning approach, its associated questions and the assumptions defined in the ToC are yet to be systematically incorporated into grantee and so country-based monitoring systems. AGRA's ambitions in relation to the RF are limited in terms of how they have been systematically translated into the COPs and, in turn, the design of grants. AMIS efficiently generates quantitative data against RF indicators across the IOs.<sup>59</sup> This is facilitated via the IPTTs, which are generated at source by the grantees' quarterly reporting process. In response to the RF, data contained in periodic performance reports at all levels (from grantee and country quarterly through to corporate six-monthly reports) provides an adequate description and account of progress with an emphasis on 'output-type' indicators among the IOs, though the outputs are not high level.<sup>60</sup>

One indicator relating to the RF found in all the country dashboards is a composite measure of reach: the number of directly and indirectly reached farmers. Yet AGRA's strategic positioning deliberately identifies support to those who provide services directly to farmers (i.e. SMEs and sub-national government institutions) not the end users. Hence, it would be expected that, in addition to presenting numbers of farmers reached with specific services, AMIS would be oriented to communicate numbers of those who provide services (SMEs, government, etc.) to both categories of farmers (directly and indirectly reached). Trying to hit the farmer reach target often means compromising the SD approach via a push to directly work with farmers, as seen in Mali and Tanzania.

As noted at the start of this section, leadership decision-making at AGRA HQ is constrained by the type of evidence and insights produced by the monitoring system. Grantee reports, QMRs prepared by HQ divisions and reports to the Board and the PIATA PAC do contain narratives, yet are for the most part quantitative, with limited or no qualitative analysis or reference to lessons learnt based on data derived from the grantee quarterly reports and/or the grant summary reports.<sup>61</sup> AMIS is not currently designed to

<sup>58</sup> Neither the grant summary sheets nor the divisional QMRs make explicit reference to outputs from the Performance Indicator Reference Sheets (PIRS).

<sup>59</sup> There is, however, limited evidence as to whether country teams and grantees have tailored the actual indicators, not just their values, to reflect their specific information needs or, indeed, whether this is permitted.

<sup>60</sup> 18 indicators for outcome results areas are actually 'output' indicators based on systematic review of PIRS documents. Indicators numbered 11, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24, 33, 35, 41, 43, 44, 59, 61, 66, 69, 70, 71 and 74 are all listed as 'output' indicators.

<sup>61</sup> Learning is expected to be facilitated more through the annual outcome surveys than through the regular monitoring system.

capture and report qualitative information that helps explain the quality of interventions such as TA, NAIPs, flagships and farmer-level activities, for example training and extension support. It is, thus, unclear how such reports can inform decision-making. For example, the President's Report to the 45th Ordinary Meeting of the Board on 3 April 2019 emphasised intention – for example 8 million farmers reached with expected yield gains. There is limited analysis of progress to date to help understand what was achieved and how well, based on what evidence. For instance, the report makes no commentary on the adequacy, quality and effectiveness of the specific support AGRA gave in advocating in shaping the Seeds (Certification and Standards) Regulations that came into force through Gazette on 18 December 2018; Developing the Agriculture Sector Development and Growth Strategy and its investment plan in Kenya and support to Tanzania in developing the Agriculture Sector Development Program II <sup>62</sup>.

This limits the extent to which it can be said decisions made by leadership (in this case the Board) are adequately formed based on evidence.

*'The Board keeps on asking management for adequate M&E reporting... We get descriptive reports. The Board has not received [in the view of the KII respondent] an M&E report technically speaking. We get the M&E reports, but they are not structured properly... [so] we don't know if they [AGRA] are on track.'* Board Member

**While there are some opportunities for learning (and subsequent adaptation of implementation) at grantee and country level, the monitoring system gives minimal scope for learning/sharing at HQ, Board and PAC levels.**<sup>63</sup> (EQ3.2)

According to the 2018 MEL plan (yet to be fully rolled out), the MEL approach intends to focus on learning and continuous improvement in order to achieve the greatest possible impact on agricultural transformation. It also seeks to be well integrated in the AGRA knowledge management system in order to use learning from data and insights from M&E to inform decision-making on strategy and implementation.

*'AGRA will use learning from data and insights from M&E to inform decision-making on strategy and implementation. A set of learning questions will be developed per country/key thematic area to guide and probe M&E data for learning that should be used for programmatic decision-making.'* AGRA MEL Plan

Grantees do produce sets of challenges and lessons. However, evidence on the building of their capacity to do this is not apparent, as judged by the quality of responses. A similar comment can be made about country QMRs; for example, the quality and insights of lessons learnt from Mali and Tanzania are limited. Moreover, it is not clear what evidence from implementation informs the lessons included in the QMRs. The focus of the system to date has been on generating and reporting on numbers, and this has crowded out time and capacity among regional M&E and programme officers in country teams to reflect and learn. That said, Tanzania's Joint Results Review Committee is an example of good practice in helping consortia grantees share learning, as is the approach taken by the regional M&E officer for West Africa.

Attention to the performance of grantees is good during the first six months, as is subsequent analysis of non-performing grants. In these cases, meetings are held with grantees to discuss progress to date, milestones achieved and remedial actions to ensure improvement on targets and uptake of funds.<sup>64</sup> In this regard, the M&E Unit has developed a tool called the Performance Consortia Assessment Report with

<sup>62</sup> Referred to on pages 1-2 of the 45<sup>th</sup> ordinary meeting of the Board on 3.04.19

<sup>63</sup> Sources from within those listed for Finding 1

<sup>64</sup> KIIs with M&E staff and programme officers in Nairobi, Mali and Tanzania

which to assess the functioning of consortia, with an emphasis on the lead grantee. These reports are useful in generating evidence on lessons learnt and key challenges facing consortia, and have resulted in, for example:

- A restructuring of grantee indicators to front-load them to speed up delivery in Mozambique, Tanzania, Mali, Nigeria, Ghana, Burkina and Ethiopia;
- An awarding of gap-filling grants to various consortia in Tanzania and Mozambique;
- The development of action plans for improving performance among non-performing grantees; and
- A restructuring of the Koulikoro consortia in Mali.

The online survey of grantees presented in Annex 8 also revealed how regular consortium meetings had helped overcome challenges and enable sharing of lessons for some respondents.

Overall, however, the active monitoring function's objective, and the reports it generates, is driven by indicators for accountability purposes rather than questions decision-makers need answering. This inhibits opportunities for AGRA to learn about and so improve its performance.

**The MEL process is constrained by there being too much and too frequent reporting at all levels and a lack of clarity on what information is needed to inform decision-making.**<sup>65</sup> (EQ3.2)

The ET notes how AGRA has recently made some decisions in allowing more time for analysis and reporting, and for good reasons. We found the monitoring, analysis and learning process involves too much and too frequent (i.e. quarterly) reporting at all levels – from grantees, country teams and divisions, including a separate M&E QMR – and a lack of clarity on what information is needed to inform what decisions who needs to make at each level.<sup>66</sup> This process of reflection and analysis is significantly compromised by the fact that all grantee reports are due in theory by the 15th of the month of the following quarter and the QMR a week after that.

*'The M&E team actually doesn't have time to synthesise and really see what are the results. So, there is a timing issue... what we found before is that sometimes a country manager was scrambling to put together reports and say we don't have data.'* (KII)

*'The work is overwhelming. There is no time to go beyond this to think and act on more significant areas of enquiry (e.g. the effectiveness of the Community-Based Agents model, changes in the system of those who sell to and buy from farmers and the quality of these services with feedback from the farmers).'* (KII)

With this in mind, coupled with the recent and rapid change of HQ staff, it may be that programmes could be well documented at HQ yet still limited in translation and adaption by country teams. There is evidence of country teams creating their own learning, but this is not adequately documented to enable cross-organisational learning.

Grantee members on consortia are obliged to produce individual quarterly reports bilaterally to AGRA on their own RF and expenditures (as discussed in Section 2.1.3). Following approval, the lead consortium member then consolidates an overall report.<sup>67</sup> For SD, this means breaking up the progress made among the sub-systems associated with the value chain. While interviews with consortia members and the SMEs they support identified how relationships across sub-systems were emerging (e.g. among input suppliers such as agro-dealers and VBAs), this reporting arrangement limits opportunities to document such changes in the overall system.

<sup>65</sup> Sources similar to those for Findings 1 and 2

<sup>66</sup> Feedback from AGRA HQ explained that the main purpose of grantee reports was a condition for AGRA to pay them.

<sup>67</sup> KII with M&E regional officers for East and West Africa and lead grantees on the Koulikoro and Ihem/Ludewa Consortia

However, this does not mean that lessons are not being learnt. For example, the Koulikoro Consortium in Mali has recently:

- Restructured the grants through repositioning national partners (e.g. the Institut d’Economie Rural – IER, or Rural Economy Institute) to provide support across the three consortia to allow a more strategic relationship and to reduce administrative burdens (for IER and AGRA); and
- Reduced the number of grantees, each with a separate grant, producing separate reports (four per quarter). This was a very heavy burden for the consortium and for AGRA M&E staff in QA and synthesis. This has also improved as a result of grant restructuring.

**Mechanisms exist for identifying and addressing gaps or threats to inclusive progress, but these are constrained by lack of evidence particularly in relation to evidence and insights on inclusivity<sup>68</sup> (EQ3.1, EQ3.3)**

Identifying gaps and threats is part of the M&E Unit’s support in analysing differences between COPs and the portfolio and those related to the planned and actual performance of grantees. The COPs define the aspirations for the five years, with targets set out among the IOs and primary outcomes. They are updated each year, although the basis on which this occurs is unclear. QMRs exist but no country level annual reports were shared with the ET.

The M&E Unit is charged with identifying gaps in a country’s targets using the quarterly reviews of progress against the rolling five-year COP. But the ability to reflect on a country’s annual progress and plans for the coming year depends as much on availability of evidence as on the capacity of the individual M&E officer. The discussion and summary action items regarding AGRAs first quarterly QMR review acknowledged, on page 4, that *‘Aggregating system results does not provide visibility for which countries are making progress. Results should be broken down by country.’<sup>69</sup>*

There are some attempts to identify gaps and threats to inclusive progress, as evidenced by disaggregating indicators reported by grantees. These numbers matter but, on being reported against, the reader is not presented with an account of how they come to be (their selection and their distinct needs) or how they work with each other (e.g. men and women farmers within a household, among VBAs and between SMEs), both of which are quite possibly more important than the numbers.

There is a limited analysis in the COPs and grant designs on gaps and threats to inclusive progress, and there is little or no attempt to monitor their movement and status during implementation.

Information found in the 2018 MEL plan’s learning questions and assumptions, the minutes of two Grant Management Committee meetings in 2019, two President’s Reports to the Board (2018 and 2019), divisional reports from PDI and P&SC in 2019, six country QMRs and four grantee reports reveals limited insights on inclusive progress. For example, only once, in 50 comments made across 2 meetings, was there a comment by the Grant Management Committee on inclusion, and there is limited reference to it among the MEL plan’s learning questions and assumptions.

The guidelines for proposals request a gender analysis and the targeting of interventions towards women and youth yet it does not ask for a gender-differentiated problem analysis. The request for M&E is minimal and does not mention inclusion. The responses on targeting are quite general, for example: *‘Youth and women will participate as producers, service providers, agro-dealers, as well as buyers and processors of the commodities being promoted by the project.’<sup>70</sup>*

<sup>68</sup> Sources similar to those for other findings, plus those listed in the text

<sup>69</sup> AGRA QMR Q1 FY 2019 Discussion and summary action items

<sup>70</sup> Koulikoro Consortium proposal

However, where specific gaps and threats are clearly identified, there is evidence of subsequent action. For example, findings of the recently concluded audit of the Grants Unit led to a review of the grants management process, which has improved performance:

*'The actions are already delivering good results including Turn Around Time reduction, strengthening of Grantee Capacity, enhancing ownership and accountability for the Grants and increasing the efficiency of the Grants review and approval process.'* AGRA<sup>71</sup>

### 2.2.3 How well is the decentralisation process progressing and what has been its impact on delivery? (EQ8)

Annex 2 outlines the reforms AGRA had made towards decentralisation, responding to the independent institutional evaluation of AGRA. AGRA's approach to decentralisation is not standard. It means different things for different countries in terms of phasing of implementation and the composition-cum-capabilities of the team and arrangements put in place. This EQ, concerning how decentralisation is progressing and its impact on delivery, was added to the TOR at the request of AGRA during the inception phase. As pointed out earlier, at the start of the Section 2.1 on Objective 1 findings, this MTE took place just 20 months into strategy implementation and, during this period, AGRA has been seeking not only to deliver as planned (see Objective 1) but also to make substantial organisational changes, including recruiting and putting in place country and regional teams, and reorienting HQ staff towards supporting these teams in implementing the 2017–2021 strategy.

The two sub-questions under EQ8 were EQ8.1: How effective is the relationship between HQ level and the divisions, and between HQ and regional heads and country teams? and EQ8.2: What has been the effect of having country and regional teams on delivery?

#### Main findings

1. AGRA's performance on the decentralisation process at HQ and country levels is mixed. HQ divisions are in the early stages of reconfiguring their objectives, services, guidance products and performance standards in support of regional and country teams. (21)
2. Financial arrangements sometimes contradict the spirit of decentralisation, with implications for relationships between countries and HQ and compromising in-country performance. (22)
3. The current grant management process is not aligned with a decentralised AGRA and, combined with the types and scale of grants being provided, is creating negative impacts on delivery, and potentially on AGRA's reputation, despite good support of grantees by AGRA staff at all levels. (23)
4. Having country teams has provided AGRA with greater visibility at country level, and regional teams are supporting and complementing their capacity in their areas of expertise. However, more needs to be done to ensure effective delivery. (24)

**AGRA's performance on the decentralisation process at HQ and country levels is mixed. HQ divisions are in the early stages of reconfiguring their objectives, services, guidance products and performance standards in support of regional and country teams.**<sup>72</sup> (EQ8.1)

There is good evidence on how relationships between HQ's technical division are developing and becoming more coherent in light of their support shifting from implementation to supporting country teams. Examples include good communication between the PDI and P&SC divisions at HQ in terms of how they coordinate support to country-level work, and an integrated approach within PDI, again in terms of

<sup>71</sup> Report to Board, 3 September 2019

<sup>72</sup> Documents from the Strategy Unit as referenced in Section 2.1, reports to the Board, the internal audit and KIIs at HQ and with country teams and regional heads

supporting country-level work. Separating out accountability of HQ divisions for their own performance from country team performance needs clarity. For example, QMRs from HQ divisions in some cases cover performance of the country teams in delivering on their thematic area, yet say little regarding their performance in supporting country teams.

There are differences in, and a lack of connection between, how and why AGRA engages with the private sector between the PU in CS&D at regional and continental level and PDI and P&SC at country level. This is compromising AGRA's ability to work with the private sector in an integrated way at different levels (as discussed in Sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 under Objective 1).

In terms of communication between HQ and regional/country-level staff, both document review and interviewees indicated that communication was mostly top down. The frontline staff involved in the day-to-day strategy implementation tasks are not sufficiently involved in the decision-making process that affects the strategy implementation process, as indicated in the following:

*'There are a lack of formal channels through which staff can provide feedback on the strategy implementation process, challenges faced, areas for improvement and comments or criticism on the strategy implementation process. This is likely to hinder honest upward conversations about challenges, barriers and underlying causes that could impede successful strategy implementation.'* AGRA<sup>73</sup>

#### **Financial arrangements sometimes contradict the spirit of decentralisation, with implications for relationships between countries and HQ and compromising in-country performance.**<sup>74</sup> (EQ8.1)

Interviews with grantees and country-level staff and some donor partners revealed strong views on how financial arrangements could contradict the spirit of decentralisation. The ET did not gather detailed budget information from all countries, but it became apparent that many of the 11 countries had not received the funding they had anticipated to implement their original COP. Further, while the COPs were all of equal quality, some countries had received less funding than others from HQ, which had restricted their ability to implement the original, and even updated, COP. Budgets sent to the countries were based on total resources available and secured. There was little understanding at country level of the basis on which HQ allocates a budget to each country, resulting from the difference between the planned amount (\$500 million) and the actual amount secured (\$330 million). This has, in turn, created pressure on the secured, un-earmarked resources available and the need to balance current spending with AGRA's needs and commitments for the remaining strategy period. One country was allocated a 10th of the budget it needed; two other country managers felt they had had to *'beg for scraps'*; several others had restricted implementation of their COP to limited outcomes in the RF so as not to spread their limited resources too thinly. It is acknowledged that the country budgets relate to the extent to which grants for those countries are approved (see next finding). However, where in-country partners (government and donors included) are aware of the COPs and their budgets, and then the funding is not available, these compromises in-country performance and can potentially damage AGRA's reputation:

*'The main thing would be AGRA has resources. Everyone thinks we have money. But we are looking for that money, we don't see the money. I brought a minister to AGRF, he sees money everywhere at AGRF. We put money to these budgets, and the budgets are approved... but it doesn't exist. To get it you have to write a grant and there is a back and forth with the Grants Committee and then the Committee just says no.'* (KII)

<sup>73</sup> Internal Audit Report 2019

<sup>74</sup> Interviews with country managers, document review

**The current grant management process is not aligned with a decentralised AGRA and, combined with the types and scale of grants being provided, is creating negative impacts on delivery, and potentially on AGRA's reputation, despite good support of grantees by AGRA staff from all levels. (EQ8.1)**

Although the emergence of the Charter Committee at regional level is a move in the right direction, the current grant management process is at odds with a decentralised AGRA. There is an absence of clear criteria for appraising grants beyond the capacity of the lead grantee adjudged by the Organisational Capacity Assessment (OCA) and inadequate communication of reasons for rejection and changes/reductions made to grants.<sup>75</sup> This has implications for relationships between countries and HQ, compromises in-country performance and so, again, potentially damages AGRA's reputation. Interviews with country managers from nearly all countries, and interviews with grantees in the four countries visited, consistently revealed the following problems, many of which were confirmed by the online survey of grantees (see Annex 8):

- The time it takes for grants to be approved is long (online survey results indicated an average of seven months), quite often with much 'back and forth' between the Grants Review Committee and the applicants. This is time-consuming and off-putting for those applying.
- The time it takes to receive the funding after the grant is awarded is long (online survey results indicated an average of three months, with three of the forty respondents stating that it took more than ten months between the grant being awarded and being disbursed), and this sometimes means that the first rainy season is missed. If the grant is just for two years and the country has only one rainy season a year, little can be achieved over just the one remaining year.
- The grant provided often covers too short a time period and/or is of limited value to have any impact, or the grantees are asked to share it with others. For example, a grant in Ghana related to seed and fertiliser quality control and assurance was a third of what was required and insufficient to achieve any transformation. A grant in Malawi for \$335,000 over two years was shared between three organisations and insufficient to achieve the grantee's aims in the time available.
- While the Grants Review Committee is under no obligation, grant applications that have been supported and monitored and checked by AGRA M&E staff and technical staff and seen to be strong are sometimes rejected by the Grants Review Committee with no explanation given to the applicant.

On the other hand, interviews with grantees in the four countries visited, and the online survey (Annex 8), indicated that grantees were appreciative of the support they had received from AGRA during the concept note and proposal writing phase as well as during subsequent implementation.

- 20/32 respondents assessed the grant design process as 8 or 9 out of 10 based on access to clear guidelines for the application process and a highly consultative process.
- 20/31 respondents gave the same rating (of 8 or 9 out of 10) in their assessment of AGRA support in always being available to clarify issues and help align the grant with AGRA's goals and objectives during grant design, training in AMIS and the provision of technical support to help overcome challenges.

**Having country teams has provided AGRA with greater visibility at country level, and regional teams are supporting and complementing their capacity in their areas of expertise. However, more needs to be done to ensure effective delivery (EQ8.2)**

At the country level, the recruitment, deployment and establishment of country teams in a short period of time has been good, and this has enhanced proximity to and relationships with partners, though this varies between countries. Strategy delivery is enhanced through better understanding of context and improved knowledge of partners gained through having country teams. Development and communication

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<sup>75</sup> This was a consistent finding across different countries and sources, but the ET did not have opportunity to gather or review specific details such as names of grants rejected or to review the type of feedback given by AGRA

of COPs has led to greater visibility of AGRA and what it does. The COPs also provide a nuanced understanding of context and the three themes. As noted elsewhere, there is still some distance to go, given that country teams are seeking to follow new processes that AGRA is still establishing, at the same time as creating relationships in country and supporting grant applications, building up an adequately detailed portfolio of in-country work in line with the COPs.

The presence of highly regarded regional teams has served as a useful complement to, and bolstered the capacity of, in-country teams. However, as yet there are no formal regional plans in place. The roles of regional heads are not completely clear, for example with regard to the extent of decision-making power they have and the potential support they could give to regional inclusive agricultural transformation. (Section 2.1.4 provides an example on the potential for regional teams to pursue regional-level partnerships with agribusiness.)

Lines of accountability are clearer now than when organisational changes first took effect, but could be clearer still – for example accountability of country managers to the CS&D division versus the regional heads, and accountability of regional team members to the regional head versus their technical leads at AGRA HQ. Matrix reporting (e.g. M&E reports in addition to QMRs and the biannual PIATA performance reports), and matrix management, is an area that still requires to be looked into.

#### 2.2.4 To what extent has AGRA been able to develop the capabilities and culture required to enable the delivery model? (EQ9)

This question had just one sub-question (EQ9.1): To what extent has AGRA created a shared identity and culture in support of the new strategy? Where has progress been made?

##### Main findings

1. AGRA has committed, professional and experienced staff, something that contributes to its reputation. However, this experience does not always stretch to the new functions that staff have in the three thematic areas and countries. (25)
2. Many AGRA country teams are understaffed and overworked – there are reports that they do not feel valued or supported adequately by the organisations. (26)

**AGRA has committed, professional and experienced staff, something that contributes to its reputation. However, this experience does not always stretch to the new functions that staff have in the three thematic areas and countries.<sup>76</sup> (EQ9.1)**

While staff at all levels are committed and experienced, they do not all have the necessary capacity to implement the three thematic areas. SD has shifted from focusing on designing and implementing interventions on specific sub-systems of a value chain to all stages of the value chain. This is a challenging undertaking requiring a systems approach with skills and experiences that are not apparent either in PDI or at country level among most programme officers and consortia members.

The Policy Unit's team is stretched, for two reasons: the need to be responsive to new initiatives identified by governments and by PDI; and the need to follow through on existing successful policy wins. The scope of skills and experiences required to implement the State Capability Unit's functions is wide-ranging – for example designing NAIPs and flagships, building state capability to set up national-level M&E systems and facilitating sector-wide coordination. That these work areas may be implemented through TA in country assumes P&SC has adequate capacity to design interventions across countries and regional and country teams can oversee the performance of consultants to implement grants. Currently, there is an insufficient skill set among regional and country teams for this, and only three staff at AGRA HQ to support this area. Similarly, there are currently only two staff at AGRA HQ to support the entire vision for the PU.

<sup>76</sup> KII with HQ and regional and country-level staff including country managers and document review (consortia grant memos and proposals)

The capacities and capabilities of country teams vary and the work they currently need to focus on does not always align with their expertise (e.g. where staff with SD skills need to focus on P&SC owing to the emphasis of the grants in certain countries, and there are no staff at regional and country levels with the necessary skills and experience in State Capability). It is not prudent to safely assume that deploying local, well-respected experts who are credible with government necessarily translates to attaining the results AGRA set to achieve through TA. In one country, grants fall almost entirely within the State Capability area, yet there are no staff on the team with prior expertise in supporting this, although there are skills in SD (seeds, fertilisers and product markets).

**Many AGRA country teams are understaffed and overworked – there are reports that they do not feel valued or supported adequately by the organisation. (EQ9.1)**

In terms of a shared identity and culture, interviews both at HQ and during the country case study visits indicated a shared understanding of at least two of the three thematic areas (P&SC and SD) and how, in practice, these interconnect for strategy implementation. However, there are widespread reports that AGRA staff are unhappy and do not feel valued or adequately supported by the organisations. This is exacerbated by perceived tensions between country teams and HQ, as indicated in the following:

*'I noticed there was a kind of hierarchy system. Implicitly or explicitly, where people at country level felt people from HQ are more important than them or people from HQ feel they are more superior to people at original level country teams.'* AGRA staff member

Interviews with most (but not all) of the 11 country managers, and country teams in the four countries visited, revealed that staff often felt that their opinions and work were not valued, particularly when grant proposals were rejected without satisfactory explanation and their perceived authority was weakened by high-profile visits from HQ. This is demotivating and has in some cases led to a culture of fear that hinders innovation and learning. Partners in the four countries visited also echoed concerns about HQ visits, which seemingly undermine country teams.

### 2.3 Objective 3: The extent to which PIATA is leading partners to work differently in support of the shared results framework

Just one EQ falls under Objective 3, EQ4: What has been the effect of the new partnership engagement and funding model – working through a shared results framework versus individual donor initiatives?<sup>77</sup>

AGRA's 2017-2021 Strategy is being implemented with assistance from RPs through PIATA – a new construct through which the RPs commit jointly to supporting the implementation of the shared RF. Objective 3 explores this construct – PIATA, and the difference it has made both for AGRA and beyond AGRA, and at the global and country level.

#### Main findings

1. The PIATA MOU and Charter indicate that PAC should have both advisory and accountability functions. This is confusing in that accountability of AGRA is to its Board. However, interviews with both PAC members and AGRA staff indicated that they were clear about the fit of PIATA with AGRA governance. (27)
2. RPs have a shared vision for AGRA. The PAC working groups have had an impact on AGRA's strategic thinking, though this is limited by the minimal sharing of challenges or lessons learnt by AGRA with the PAC. (28)

<sup>77</sup> Sources of information for this EQ were varied and allowed for triangulation of findings. They included minutes of PAC and selected CAC meetings, the PIATA MOU and Charter, the results framework itself, reports from AGRA to PIATA and to the Board, interviews with PAC members, CAC members and other donors in the four countries visited and interviews with country managers, country teams and AGRA staff at the HQs. See Annex 16 for the revised numbering and organisation of sub-questions related to Objective 3

3. Despite good collaboration in elaboration of the shared RF, it still has some shortfalls, and donor-specific reporting remains necessary alongside the harmonised reporting systems to the Board and to PIATA. (29)
4. Involvement in PAC has led to some degree of RP collaboration beyond AGRA. (30)
5. The relevance of the CACs, other than for accountability to AGRA donors at the country level, is questionable. Nevertheless, country managers are agile in identifying the best use of a CAC in their countries alongside existing fora. (31)
6. While the PIATA Charter indicates that RPs will collaborate to mobilise additional resources to be used in furtherance of the shared vision and RF, the envisaged amount of resources has not yet been secured and there are challenges in securing additional funding at the country level. (32)

**The PIATA MOU and Charter indicate that PAC should have both advisory and accountability functions. This is confusing in that accountability of AGRA is to its Board. However, interviews with both PAC members and AGRA staff indicated that they were clear about the fit of PIATA with AGRA governance.**<sup>78</sup>

The PIATA MOU states that the PAC *'will monitor overall progress towards meeting the RF'* (page 6, also repeated in the PIATA Charter on page 19) and the table on pages 6–7 of the PIATA Charter also implies a monitoring role for PIATA. Given also that AGRA reports not only to its Board every six months but also to PIATA, there is an overall implication that AGRA perceives (and PIATA expects) that AGRA should be accountable to PIATA as well as use PAC as an advisory body. This may be why the recent internal audit of AGRA indicated an area of improvement (issue 3.13) related to the limited understanding of and distinction between PIATA and AGRA's overall strategy. An AGRA staff member noted that:

*'PAC says: 'We will hold you to account number one and then we will advise you.' So maybe they should have called it [PAC] some other name... the challenge that I see is reconciling the [advisory] spirit of PAC with the accountability function.'* AGRA staff member

Both the AGRA internal audit and interviews with PAC members indicated some lack of clarity on the difference between AGRA and PIATA. Early discussions with some RPs and AGRA staff indicated some lack of understanding of what PIATA was in relation to AGRA. This has been exacerbated by the USAID and BMGF grants to AGRA being termed 'PIATA' within these two organisations, and by some of the language in the PIATA MOU and Charter that seems to mix up the two, making it unclear whether AGRA or PIATA is being referred to. This lack of clarity carried through to the drafting of the TOR for this MTE, which was called a mid-term review of PIATA (rather than AGRA); this took some time and discussion to unpick.

Nevertheless, interviews with PAC members and AGRA staff revealed a clearer understanding of how PIATA relates to AGRA's governance structure and contributes to AGRA's implementation of its 2017–2021 strategy. Resource partners noted that, while the AGRA Board is about strategy, PAC is about AGRA's progress on strategy implementation, and, while donors have governance over the grants they give, they do not have governance over AGRA; AGRA's Board has that.

**RPs have a shared vision for AGRA. The PAC working groups have had an impact on AGRA's strategic thinking though this is limited by the minimal sharing of challenges or lessons learnt by AGRA with PAC.**<sup>79</sup> (EQ4.1)

RPs are aligned through the PIATA construct and have a shared vision for AGRA gained through collaboration in the elaboration of the RF with AGRA. The RF itself is discussed in the next finding, but the process of its elaboration led to good alignment of the thinking of PAC members (hence PIATA and the RPs) among themselves and between them and AGRA. One Resource Partner commented that:

<sup>78</sup> Review of PIATA MOU and Charter and interviews with AGRA staff and PAC members

<sup>79</sup> Reviews of PAC meeting minutes, AGRA reports to the Board and to PIATA, interviews with AGRA, PAC members and Board members

*'The journey to get to the RF had its own rewards. We RPs are now very much aligned ourselves... We have a shared understanding as a result of going through this fairly intense process. So, AGRA doesn't have to put up with different partners that are wanting to push in different directions.'* Resource Partner

The ET found evidence that PAC and its working groups were having an impact on AGRA's strategic thinking and were contributing towards PAC members being viewed as strategic partners by AGRA. Examples include evidence from interviews that:

- AGRA had refrained from working with one particular IP because the experiences PAC members had had with that partner had been less than positive.
- PAC had stimulated a constructive discussion regarding the pros and cons of AGRA taking a consortium approach to implement its integrated delivery model.
- PAC had provided guidance, in part through task forces, to AGRA on gender, inclusive finance and state capability, all of which had assisted AGRA in its strategic thinking.

One constraint that PIATA has with regard to affecting AGRA's strategic thinking and progress on driving more integrated and inclusive programming is the lack of sharing by AGRA of challenges being faced (on which the PAC/PIATA could advise), as discussed in Section 2.2.2. Several PAC members noted that a more open exchange on where AGRA stood would be useful:

*'Frank and open discussion of things that may not be perfect, including implementation problems, would be useful... Mistakes are always made in the complex space of agriculture, so it would be good if AGRA could say where they are not fully delivering on things.'* PAC member

PAC members also reported being constrained by the nature of the reporting of AGRA to PIATA, which, while including quantitative data, does not greatly discuss qualitative aspects, for example the hows and whys, nor challenges or lessons learnt:

*'The team in AGRA hasn't been bold enough to point out where they are making progress and where they are not making any [for which remedial actions are needed]. My expectations from the narrative are that it will indicate where AGRA has made progress and where there is a red flag. This can be highlighted for PIATA's advice.'* PAC member

The same point is reinforced under Sections 1.5 and 2 of this report, where the evaluation was equally constrained by the nature and inadequacies of AGRA's reporting system.

**Despite good collaboration in elaboration of the shared RF, it still has some shortfalls,<sup>80</sup> and donor-specific reporting remains necessary alongside the harmonised reporting systems to the Board and to PIATA.<sup>81</sup>**

The architecture of the RF – the four objectives and the primary, cross-cutting and intermediate outcomes – was developed in 2016 as set out in the AGRA strategy and business plan 2017–2021, with the ToC developed afterwards. Interviews with AGRA staff and PAC members indicated that, while donors thought the original AGRA RF was rather generic and had too many indicators, the long consultative and iterative

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<sup>80</sup> Some of which are presented earlier in relation to Objective 2, EQ3.

<sup>81</sup> Reviews of PAC minutes and reports to PAC and Board and interviews with PAC members, Board members and AGRA staff

process of working with the donors on elaborating and refining the RF did not greatly reduce either the scope or the number of indicators in the RF. This was as a result of each donor's wishes to have their own specific areas of support reflected in the RF with the appropriate indicators in place. So, while the existing RF does reflect AGRA's vision and what the donors want to support, it remains broad and ambitious (especially for such a short timeframe of just five years). RPs observe this,<sup>82</sup> but at the same time recognise that they have contributed to this through ensuring their areas of interest are reflected. Two donors were of the view that AGRA should have pushed back more regarding elements donors wanted to see included but they acknowledged that this was difficult given that AGRA was dependent on their funding. It was acknowledged that AGRA did push back on a few areas that the donors would have liked to see in the RF, for example nutrition, which AGRA argued was not part of its mandate.

Some of the elements of the RF that were brought to the fore through PIATA's engagement in its elaboration were not so evident in the earlier version and are relatively newer elements – for example the focus on regional food trade, resilience and state capability.

There was a view shared by some AGRA staff, PAC members and Board members that the RF should not be 'fixed in stone' and that AGRA should feel free to revisit it and adjust it based on what is working well and what is working less well. Any shortfall in the planned for \$500 million will in any case necessitate some prioritisation in focus.

Finally, the fact that some RPs are content to have harmonised reporting (the six-monthly reports from AGRA to PIATA) based on work done under funding from others as well as themselves is a significant step forward. Nevertheless, bilateral donors supporting particular aspects of the RF still require separate reports against those aspects (for their own accountability purposes), which leads to duplication of effort in AGRA.

#### **Involvement in PAC has led to some degree of RP collaboration beyond AGRA.**

There is greater awareness of each other's planned activities to support agricultural transformation and some degree of collaboration beyond AGRA. Two unintended effects of PIATA were noted.<sup>83</sup>

*'To fully realize the potential benefits that can be achieved under PIATA, Resource Partners intend to seek to coordinate their own investments outside of their investment in PIATA, as appropriate and to the extent permitted by law and regulation.'* PIATA Charter<sup>84</sup>

Both document review (PAC minutes) and interviews (with PAC members and also a few AGRA staff and Board members) indicate that PAC meetings allow the donors involved to share information about their intended support to different aspects of inclusive agricultural transformation in Africa. Further, there is evidence that PIATA (through the PAC's, and its task forces', connections) is leading to collaboration between members beyond their partnership with AGRA, as in the following examples:

- Regional trade: The regional trade work that the UK Department for International Development (DFID) is supporting is of interest to other donors also. PIATA has led to stronger links between DFID and BMGF with the view being expressed that, *'We wouldn't have spoken with DFID before (in relation to regional trade) if it wasn't for PIATA... We would not normally be meeting with DFID twice a year.'*
- Policy and state capability: USAID and BMGF are in the process of establishing better coordination around policy systems, evidence and capacity-building, instigated by their working together on the PAC Policy and State Capability task force. This task force work has also led to the PAC members discussing together their support to the AU regarding their use and the impact of the biennial review processes under CAADP.

<sup>82</sup> As did the 2016 DAI Independent Institutional Evaluation of AGRA.

<sup>83</sup> Review of PAC meeting minutes, interviews with PAC members, AGRA staff and external staff, observation

<sup>84</sup> Page 15 of PIATA Charter

- Sharing new approaches and/or project proposals for comment: Feedback on the draft report also indicated that donor coordination precipitated by the PAC and/or its task teams/working groups included some exchanges among the AGRA RPs in terms of sharing new approaches or project proposals in draft for comment.

From the above, it does appear that RPs are looking to coordinate at least their approaches and plans, beyond PIATA. Commenting on the changed behaviour of RPs beyond AGRA, an AGRA staff member noted, *'We are starting to see people think about doing things the AGRA way outside of AGRA's programmes.'*

The ET observed two unintended consequences of PIATA, one on the donors themselves and one on partners. The first unintended consequence is that each RP has the opportunity to learn about how the other donors plan, implement, monitor and evaluate their work. A specific example came about because of the MTE itself, with DFID suggesting that the evaluation report go through independent QA. This led to DFID sharing its independent QA template with all the other donors. It also led to the donors considering their own QA processes (if/where they exist) and an agreement that, in this case, the DFID QA process would be followed on behalf of all the donors (as well as AGRA and the ET), with all having the opportunity to review the QA output and advise the ET on how and in which instances to respond.

The second unintended consequence, learned about through interviews with the RPs and with partners, is the effect of PIATA on partners. Some large NGO and private sector partners that have traditionally accessed funding from the foundations (BMGF, Rockefeller Foundation) are understanding that these foundations have committed their funding wholly to AGRA through PIATA and that if they want to apply for funding they have to go through AGRA's grant application process. However, the funding they may (or may not) succeed in securing from AGRA is relatively less than when accessed directly from the foundation. Further, there could be delays in securing the fund, and the reporting requirements are relatively more onerous than when securing funds directly from the foundations. This is tied in with the view that AGRA is moving towards more retail grants and more direct implementation on the ground, as noted in Objective 1 and 2 findings.

**The relevance of the CACs, other than for accountability to AGRA donors at the country level, is questionable. Nevertheless, country managers are agile in identifying the best use of a CAC in their countries alongside existing fora.<sup>85</sup>**

This finding relates to EQ4.3: To what extent has involvement in (the PAC) and CAC influenced the thinking/actions of resource partners, especially with regard to reducing fragmentation of donor activities?

Both the PIATA MOU and its Charter clearly explain the intended functions and membership of the CACs.<sup>86</sup> In practice, most countries have just started instituting CAC meetings, with many countries having held just a few (up to three) CAC meetings to date. Following the guidelines in the MOU and Charter, country managers have taken the initiative to invite not only PIATA members but also other donors that are working in the same ecosystem, including the World Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development and some bilaterals beyond DFID and the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development and the German Development Bank (BMZ/KfW). Where country programmes have been slow to start, country managers have been hesitant in starting up the CACs, as

<sup>85</sup> Interviews with country managers at AGRF and in countries visited, CAC members and others in countries visited and PAC members and Board members, among others

<sup>86</sup> PIATA MOU page 8: 'The CAC will be the primary level of partnership governance to advance PIATA engagement within the respective CAC's country and ensure alignment with the country's government and other partner working in the country. The CAC will aim to work closely with existing country coordination mechanisms and to enhance coordination with government and development partners. Individual members of the CAC, including AGRA country leads and Resource Partner representatives, will -- as representatives of their organizations -- participate in established country-level Agriculture Sector and Donor Working Groups. The CAC will thus seek to align PIATA-specific priorities with the broader country agricultural development agenda.'

they want to have something to be able to share about AGRA's support to inclusive agricultural transformation in that country.

Interviews with country managers and with CAC members and other donors in the countries visited indicated that most perceived the CAC to be a forum for AGRA accountability to donors. Some asked questions as to the complementarity and value added, given that donors attend other pre-existing structures that serve a similar purpose. However, country managers have been agile in identifying a space for the CAC within the context of existing agriculture sector and donor working groups. To this end, some country managers have used the CAC as a forum for participants to share their investment plans in the agriculture sector in that country, so that 1) AGRA does not duplicate what is already being planned for and 2) AGRA can see where it may be able to leverage funding.

**While the PIATA Charter indicates that RPs will collaborate to mobilise additional resources to be used in furtherance of the shared vision and RF, the envisaged amount of resources has not yet been secured and there are challenges in securing additional funding at the country level<sup>87</sup> (EQ4.5)**

The December 2018 AGRA Report to the Board notes that AGRA's strategy assumed availability of the full \$500 million budget with expenditure per year front-loaded between 2017 and 2018, to drive for early results within the strategy timeframe. However, overall budgeting has had to be pegged to actual resources available. The report notes that, in 2017 and 2018 respectively, AGRA had projected expenditure of \$46.9 million and \$98 million under the new strategy budget, but it secured only \$39 million and \$55 million.<sup>88</sup>

One issue related to this is that USAID's commitment to PIATA was to be secured in a large part by AGRA country teams from USAID country missions. Of the \$90 million committed by USAID to PIATA, USAID HQ provided \$25 million. Some country missions have secured, or are in the process of securing, buy-in from USAID, which will reduce this gap. However, USAID country missions have their own operational plans and budgets and are most likely to contribute to AGRA's COP's where these are aligned with USAID's own support to the agriculture sector in each country. In Malawi, USAID did commit to providing \$1.2 million (to be matched by AGRA) but now it is developing a new country strategy and programme so it needs to see whether what it plans is in line with AGRA's strengths.<sup>89</sup> USAID acknowledges that it could have done more in 2017 when AGRA's strategy took off to raise awareness of PIATA and USAID's expectations of the USAID country missions in the 11 countries. It has, however, since been proactively raising the awareness of its missions and encouraging them to contribute.

Leverage of funding at country level has proven challenging overall, however. DFID, like USAID, has its own plans and budgets for bilateral aid support at country level, and does not have the same commitment as DFID HQ to PIATA hence no obligation to contribute funds. This is an area AGRA HQ reported to be proactively working on:

*'90% of the resources we've raised to date have been at the level of HQ... Right now we are seeing how we can work more strongly with country teams, in terms of all the positioning, the engagement models, developing the pitch and trying to get the deal sealed. It's something that, for the last two years or the last year and a half has been a key focus for us.'* AGRA staff member

<sup>87</sup> PIATA Charter, AGRA President's Report 2018, interviews with PAC members, CAC members and AGRA staff

<sup>88</sup> Feedback to the ET on the first draft of this report indicated that to date the PIATA partners are cumulatively contributing up to \$371 million towards AGRA's strategy. This figure includes the full \$90 million anticipated from USAID. An additional \$7.2 million from non-PIATA partners brings the total to \$378 million.

<sup>89</sup> As of mid-November, AGRA indicated to the ET that the buy-in had been secured, with an initial obligation of \$400,000 being processed.

PAC members and AGRA staff alike noted that, in these circumstances, AGRA needs to prioritise its work on those aspects of its work under the three thematic areas that are most promising. One member noted:

*'PIATA has had a positive impact in promoting a strong technical and political role for AGRA moving forward. But as AGRA tries to evolve it must decide, with the Board, where it wants to be and actively work towards that. The organisation has a reputation and legacy from its earlier days that follows it around, and it has to be deliberate in remaking that. And last, PIATA [AGRA] has to know what its narrative should be at the end of the five years and then work towards that narrative from now.'* PAC member

## 3. Conclusions

Conclusions are organised around the three objectives of the evaluation and concluding statements for each thematic area in Objective 1, and for Objectives 2 and 3 as a whole, are in bold. There are 10 conclusions (each numbered at the end of each conclusion in bold from C1 to C10). Annex 13 indicates which findings informed each conclusion and in turn recommendation.

### 3.1 Objective 1: AGRA's progress in delivering its 2017–2021 strategy

Findings are organised around AGRA's three themes with conclusions related to each (separating out Policy and Advocacy and State Capability) below.

**Policy and Advocacy: AGRA has made potentially lasting and sustainable progress as a catalyst, broker and a convener, and is likely to meet its strategic objectives in Policy and Advocacy (C1).** AGRA has made considerable progress in the area of Policy and Advocacy, likely because of spill-over effects of legacy programmes as well as longevity of relationship with governments in focus countries. It has effectively established its USO differently in different contexts: as a catalyst in advancing policies and regulations essential for enabling operating environments in the agriculture sector, as broker between government and DPs and as convener at the global level, particularly through AGRF. The relationships established with government, DPs and other players in the agriculture sector are largely sustainable inasmuch as they are likely to outlast the current strategic period. Similarly, the policy wins achieved so far are likely to be sustainable as long as no decisions are made to revoke or stall progress towards implementation. AGRA's USO, political mileage and relationships established through its work on Policy and advocacy gives it a solid foundation on which to build all of its other work. Where AGRA has established a niche and tailored its approach accordingly, it seems to fare very well, regardless of contextual challenges – for example through gap filling in Malawi and acting as a catalyst in Ghana. Strengthened qualitative measures of progress are needed to evidence change.

**State Capability: AGRA is likely to set in motion actions in relation to state capability that will catalyse agricultural transformation, but their potential for sustainability could be compromised by both internal and external threats (C2).** AGRA is responsive to government needs and windows of opportunity insofar as budgets allow. There is widespread receptiveness and appreciation of AGRA's responsiveness to government needs. However, there are discrepancies in the way grants/finances to support windows of opportunities are administered, limiting chances of effectiveness in some countries. In the context of corruption and misuse of government funds, AGRA's involvement may be misconstrued as complicit, potentially putting its reputation at risk. Inadequate risk analysis, quality control and monitoring systems further compromise the sustainability of AGRA's work in SC, in particular NAIPs, flagships and TA. Considering the amount of work required to enhance quality and sustainability and also given current pace of progress, it is unlikely that AGRA will reach its planned objectives in SC by the end of the current strategy. AGRA's responsiveness to and alignment to government needs through support of NAIPs and flagships is well received by national governments.

**Systems Development: AGRA's work on SD is behind target and the sustainability of its current achievements in the long term limited, mainly due to inadequacies in design and implementation. These include a lack of conceptual clarity; inadequate or incomplete systems diagnostics; and an inadequate articulation of the sustainability, scale, and inclusion strategies (C3).** In the systems development space progress has generally been slower than anticipated with AGRA achieving only 33% of the direct farmer reach target for 2019. Although some results have exceeded 2019 targets, results are generally below target, particularly regarding output markets (the demand-side). Although it is too early

to make a full assessment, and there are some positive signs of sustainability (for example in the market-linkages), most of the farmer-level results achieved to date appear to be unsustainable as they result from either the direct delivery of products and services to farmers or from models with questionable incentive structures. Based on the two consortia reviewed by the ET, a number of issues were identified with the design of AGRA's systems development interventions including: a lack of conceptual clarity; inadequate or incomplete systems diagnostics; and an inadequate articulation of the sustainability, scale, and inclusion strategies. These issues appear to be caused in part by the delivery model, whereby consortia made up largely of national NGOs operate with inadequate guidance and support from AGRA.

**Partnerships: AGRA's work under the partnerships theme (focusing on the connections being made with agribusinesses e.g. through the Deal Room) is nascent and encouraging – it requires strong follow-through and greater understanding within AGRA between divisions regarding the potential of such deals. Its objectives may be reached to some extent by the end of the Strategy period (C4).** There remains a lack of clarity within AGRA regarding the theme, particularly at the country level and among RPs and stakeholders. The understanding that the leadership and the PU itself have of its role is not reflected across the rest of the organisation. The AGRF Deal Room is proving to be an exciting facility to seek engagement with private sector agribusiness with deals worth over \$50 million already established. Partnerships are being established which are resulting in some large private sector players providing inputs and training to consortia and others being available as off-takers but this is all at an early stage at present so none of the partnerships can yet be termed strategic or transformational. Sustainability is unclear as yet – whilst farmers may be happy to use the free seed provided there is no indication as to whether they would buy it in future and in larger quantities. The objective of the Partnerships theme, to facilitate the alignment between government priorities and private sector interests and to improve integration and coordination leading to investments beneficial to smallholder farmers, may be reached to some extent by the end of the Strategy period, particularly if the partnerships result in national as well as consortia level opportunities.

### 3.2 Objective 2: How well the organisational reforms AGRA initiated in support of its 2017–2021 strategy are progressing

**The revised delivery model is, in some ways, promoting a more integrated and supportive set of functional relationships among HQ divisions and their support to country teams (C5).** However, this does not always play out, either in the analysis, quality and integration of the three themes in the COPs, which tend to be too high level, or in the quality and robustness of proposals produced by both state and non-state grantees.

**There is limited evidence to suggest that AGRA is a learning organisation (C6).** The MEL plan can be said to be only partially rolled out, and appears to deliberately hold responsibility for implementing the learning approach and the testing of its assumptions to the annual outcome panel surveys. As a partial consequence, the purpose and scope of AGRA's MEL system is driven by and largely confined to quantitative indicators. Outputs of the system are limited to many, frequent sets of reports that provide largely descriptive accounts of progress, stifling opportunities for real-time learning and adaptation.

**AGRA is making good progress in decentralisation though this is still underway and its results are at present mixed (C7).** AGRA's approach to decentralisation across the 11 countries has implications for both the object and the nature of its HQ operations, especially with the introduction of the CS&D division, as well as, more obviously, for teams present in and among its 11 countries. In both regards, its performance is mixed. It is without doubt that having country teams has provided the organisation with improved proximity to and greater understanding of countries and partners. However, it would be premature to assess the full range of benefits decentralisation has had for performance, and there is apparent room for improvement in how and how well decisions are made regarding the financing of country plans and grants. Both appear to have adverse implications for relationships between HQ and regional and country teams.

**Skills and capacities to implement the three thematic areas equally well still need to be considered as does the organisational culture (C8).** The nature and scope of work defined in and among the three themes, and their implementation across 11 countries, raise questions about assumptions AGRA has made and continues to make regarding the necessary skills and capacities among AGRA staff to deliver the strategy. An effect of this lies in how, despite being overworked with limited time to reflect, staff are fearful of and intimidated by a distinctly hierarchical culture.

### 3.3 Objective 3: The extent to which PIATA is leading partners to work differently in support of the shared results framework

**The shared RF has led to greater alignment in support by RPs to AGRA: RPs are supporting one common framework and are beginning to collaborate beyond AGRA. However, there remain challenges at the operational level, given the five-year period for its implementation (C9).** The shared RF, including the process followed to elaborate it, has led to greater alignment in the support provided by PIATA members to AGRA, particularly in relation to those that originally signed up to the PAC MOU and Charter – that is, the foundations (BMGF and Rockefeller Foundation) and USAID. Their support is clearer to AGRA and easier to manage than if it were individual project-based funding, though funding from DFID and BMZ/KfW still falls somewhat into the latter category. It sets a good example for harmonised donor support in other contexts.

The fact that PAC members are sharing information and have started collaborating on a range of issues beyond AGRA is promising. Such collaboration should continue and should apply to any new resource partners that choose to join PIATA.

While the RF serves well in indicating the shared agricultural transformation agenda, it presents operational challenges to country teams in terms of its breadth, particularly where funding is short. It is also ambitious, given it and the strategy's five-year timeframe.

**The PIATA MOU and Charter do not clearly distinguish between AGRA and PIATA and new members are not included. It is early days, but CACs are yet to become fully effective (C10).** The structures related to the new partnership arrangement (PIATA) – that is, PAC and the CACs – vary in their purpose and effectiveness. Given the language in the PAC MOU and Charter, and the fact that AGRA reports to PIATA every six months, it is understood that AGRA is to some extent accountable to PAC as well as the Board, while at the same time PAC serves as an advisory or steering body. The guidance that PAC gives is appreciated by AGRA and contributes to the latter's perception of PAC members as partners as well as donors. But PAC could advise better if AGRA shared issues and challenges with it.

The CACs are not yet effective in terms of changing the thinking/actions of RPs at country level (one of the EQs). They are presently perceived as being mainly for information-sharing and/or AGRA being accountable to PIATA RPs in country, although it is acknowledged that the CACs are still young.

## 4. Recommendations

### 4.1 Recommendations co-created by AGRA, resource partners and the evaluation team

In line with our utilisation-focused approach, the ET created space to jointly create recommendations with AGRA and its RPs. For practical purposes, the ET agreed with AGRA to limit focus to five top-line areas of recommendation. To this end, not all issues unpicked by the evaluation are carried through to this section on recommendations. However, this is not to imply that AGRA/RP should not attempt to address issues not referenced in this section.

To initiate this co-creation of recommendations, the ET first reviewed the range of findings of the evaluation and identified the top four most recurring themes, against which it developed five top-line recommendations and sub-points to trigger participants' thinking along emerging sub-themes. The subsequent co-creation process enabled AGRA management, staff and the ET to jointly create the recommendations within each of these five areas. It also allowed for RPs to comment on the jointly created recommendations. The ET followed this process to ensure AGRA's ownership and practical application of the recommendations. Annex 12 provides detail on the steps involved in co-creation. Annex 13 indicates which findings and conclusions each of the recommendations was based on.

#### The five top-line areas identified were:

- Policy and State Capability (Objective 1),
- Systems Development and Partnerships (Objective 1);
- Decentralisation (Objective 2);
- MEL (Objective 2);
- Grants (Objective 2).

This section elaborates the co-created recommendations related to each theme. Section 4.2 presents the ET's own overarching independent recommendations.

**Top-line recommendation regarding AGRA's thematic areas: At the strategy level, AGRA should review its objectives against its vision and goals and time and resources for 2017–2021 and look at what to realistically focus on.**

**1. Policy and State Capability: AGRA should consider streamlining efforts to focus on implementation of policies, addressing macro reforms and tackling system bottlenecks in priority areas, drawing on its USO, complementary work, partnerships and alliances. (Informed by two conclusions and ten findings across two objectives.)**

- As a neutral African body that has earned the respect of national governments over time, AGRA should capitalise on this unique positioning and its USO as a 'catalyst' and 'broker' to see policies through complete cycles. This could be done by focusing on at least one or two macro reforms per priority country and following through all processes ensuing from current policy wins, including translation of policy into legislation, uniform enforcement of regulations, awareness-raising and establishing feedback loops based on learning. It needs to consider what it can realistically achieve within and beyond the current strategic period and tailor its efforts accordingly, bearing in mind that sustaining and implementing complete policy cycles requires time and consistency. Grant-making and resources supporting implementation will therefore need to be adequate to maintain momentum. To guide its decisions on areas to focus and scale, AGRA may need to consider leveraging legacy programmes; building on complementary work in State Capability such as NAIPS and flagships or consortia; and

possibly working in select countries where focused response to ICA complements advocacy efforts. Systematic identification of key gaps and bottlenecks in systems could drive grant-making in the policy area.

- As implementation of macro reforms is beyond the sole scope of the P&SC team and AGRA, it needs to strengthen its own internal advocacy strategy as well as capitalise relationships with partners and other state and non-state institutions to coalesce around priority regulatory reforms. AGRA needs to extend advocacy efforts to all staff, tailoring interventions to advance advocacy efforts with national governments. In the short term, this may entail mapping of key players, champions and allies within and beyond government, and strategising who is best placed to reach them with what message, including evidence generated through supporting NAIPs and flagships. Similarly, AGRA needs to leverage the strengths of its alliances to generate evidence and garner collective support to influence full implementation of policies and tackling of systems bottlenecks.
- AGRA needs to consolidate the work it has started in enhancing state capability, in particular insofar as it complements the points above. In the short term, AGRA could consider converting the findings of the ICA to a fundable package in a number of (three to five) priority countries. A medium- to long-term area of focus is to drive investment in seven flagships and demonstrate, as in the case of PFJ, that flagships can be an effective mechanism to mobilise resources and delivery.

**2. Systems Development and Partnerships: AGRA should build capacity of staff in SD; measure, document and share lessons learnt about, and successes in, SD and use this as a potential evidence for scaling; and focus on linkages with private sector off-takers and processors within its integrated delivery. (Informed by two conclusions and nine findings across two objectives.)**

- AGRA needs to build capacity of staff in SD through researching, collating and sharing materials, for example training guides and toolkits on good practice in inclusive systems development (including how to address resilience), drawing on own experience and good quality external sources, including those from PIATA RPs. Particular effort should be given to providing greater clarity around key concepts such as ‘sustainability’ and ‘systems change’, and practical guidance on how to operationalise these concepts in the design and implementation of SD interventions. Exchange visits (within and between countries) should be considered as a means for staff to learn from best practices in SD and management. In the longer term, AGRA needs to invest more in system diagnostics at sub-national and/or consortia levels, drawing on good quality training materials and guides, including those that PIATA RPs may have developed over time.
- AGRA needs to measure, document and communicate lessons learnt about, and successes from, SD work as a potential basis for others to scale, such as through linking with the P&SC team to provide evidence to develop flagships, which can in turn crowd in investment and partnerships. Lessons/successes should include those that contrast integrated versus piecemeal investment in systems, and those that demonstrate empowerment of youth and women in consortia, or challenges to this. AGRA should also assess and reflect on the sustainability and scalability of the different models it is currently promoting, such as the VBA model, with the aim of identifying options for strengthening sustainability and scale before the end of the current SD consortia grants. To do this, AGRA should rebalance its SD work, which currently prioritises direct delivery of support over innovation, learning and systems development.
- AGRA should maintain strength of delivery on input systems. However, it needs to give attention to strengthening market systems – that is, private sector linkages, particularly in relation to off-takers and processors in consortia at national and regional levels – while also addressing other not so strong links, for example with finance.

Partnerships theme (stand-alone) (Objective 1): AGRA needs to build internal and external awareness of its partnership approach, gain further alignment on how AGRA engages with specific private sector actors, identify and focus on priority partnerships and strengthen country and regional engagement and delivery

for partnerships. Internal awareness of how the PU's engagement with global and regional agribusinesses can benefit operations at the country level would be particularly valuable,<sup>90</sup> as would ensuring that MOUs resulting from connections made in the Deal Room make a difference at the country level beyond consortia.

**3. Decentralisation: With decentralisation as a key deliverable for 2020, AGRA should increase the level of empowerment and accountability of country teams in terms of the country planning-budgeting-review cycle, developing regional and country strategies with appropriate levels of QA. (Informed by two conclusions and seven findings across two objectives.)**

- In line with the main objective at the strategy level (1 and 2 above), AGRA needs to review and adjust planned results at the country level – objectives, primary and IOs – and their associated indicators across all COPs to reflect current/predicted financial and human resources under its jurisdiction. These COPs need to demonstrate improvements in their 1) analysis of the P&SC constraints; 2) explanation of the relationships between the Policy and Advocacy and the State Capability work; 3) definition of the rationale of the Partnerships theme and the contribution these partners make to the other two themes; 4) provision of adequate operational detail to guide development of grant design; and 5) demonstrating a sufficient tailoring of indicators drawn from the RF with which to monitor the country team's performance in delivering support. Similarly, at the regional level, AGRA needs to define strategy, scope of work and budget for each regional team.
- To accompany this process, AGRA needs to conduct a skills inventory and competency network mapping exercise to optimally deploy/transfer talent and resources through identifying gaps and areas of surplus, and to use every opportunity to further decentralise and deploy/technical experts to regional teams, with an emphasis on State Capability.
- AGRA needs to reflect on the balance between centralised and decentralised functions. There is a need to improve the current country service model by making it more demand-driven and less top-down, as dictated by HQ divisions and regional teams. It needs to align and implement tools, approaches and systems accordingly, making clear the three dimensions of decentralisation: degree of control; clarity of function; and location and 'volume/amount' of what type of technical expertise is needed. On the other hand, it needs to set strong structures to support centralised functions such as management, knowledge-sharing and core technical support. AGRA needs to do more to strengthen quality assurance and support through improved content of tools, standardisation and communication with country and regional teams.

**4. MEL: AGRA should review its MEL system to improve the measurement of strategic outcomes, better distinguish information/reporting requirements on a quarterly and annual basis and foster learning through the generation of qualitative data to support decision-making. (Informed by two conclusions and seven findings across two objectives.)**

- In addition to the recommendations in the section on strategy, AGRA needs to reset targets and milestones and establish metrics and qualitative measures that define periodic success, first for its own (including grantees') ability to track progress, learn and adapt and to tailor results for accountability and decision-making by its RPs and Board.
- More specifically, AGRA needs to facilitate a participatory review of its RF to incorporate its evolving strategy. In agreement with RPs, AGRA needs to define more qualitative indicators and milestones across all areas of work (P&SC, quality of partnerships, quality of interventions in SD). It needs to consider composite indicators that incorporate qualitative dimensions over and above the exclusively quantitative measures currently employed. For example, reach should not be defined merely by

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<sup>90</sup> A tool to assist AGRA's staff in reflecting on partnerships and work with agribusiness was considered by the ET during the evaluation but there was insufficient time to share this with decision-makers in AGRA and explain how it could be used.

numbers accessing a single intervention, rather through a combination of interventions with greater potential to trigger transformative outcomes. AGRA needs to consider these stronger measures, which will take time and effort to achieve but undoubtedly increase quality of outcomes.

- AGRA needs to strengthen its approach to learning, knowledge-sharing and communication. It should consider a centralised learning approach that facilitates intra- and inter-organisational learning and knowledge-sharing on good practice, innovations and learning from failure. An effective way of doing this could be to better distinguish information/reporting requirements between those needed on a quarterly and annual basis, to foster learning through the generation of qualitative data and focus on a particular area of work for each QMR. It should also consider standardised in-built algorithms, dashboards and visuals in AMIS to assist staff and grantees to analyse data generated. This will assist in shifting the culture of using AMIS predominantly for upward accountability to one of interpreting data, generating knowledge and informing on-going programming. Further, AGRA and its RPs need to agree to reduce the frequency of reporting to create space to learn.

#### **5. Grants: For non-competitive grants, AGRA should improve the quality of grant design and efficiency of grant management. (Informed by three conclusions and eight findings across all three objectives.)**

- AGRA needs to enhance the proposal development guidelines, notably with regard to the rigour associated with the problem analysis; the adequacy of integration of inclusion and other cross-cutting issues into grant design (as opposed to treating them separately); the discretion for grantees to shape their results regarding systemic change and contributions towards transformation; and clarity on MEL requirements.
- AGRA also needs to strengthen the appraisal and approval process, by establishing independent and thematic technical evaluation panels post-concept note and pre-grants' committee; ensuring the grants' committee's composition is area specific; operationalising charters across all regions; and using evaluation criteria to guide grantees and structure Grant Review Committee conversations and minutes.
- AGRA should improve grant management by developing a calendar for the grant pipeline to ensure approval and disbursements are aligned with seasons; making grant supervision more effective; and reducing and/or rationalising the frequency of reporting and limiting the maximum number of grants/owners.

#### **4.2 Additional recommendations from the ET**

While Section 4.1 above reflects the independent recommendations of the ET (in that the ET identified the four top-line recommendations and the prompts for groupwork on these, and then co-created the recommendations with AGRA), this section provides some independent recommendations from the ET reflecting on the findings and the co-created recommendations. Annex 13 indicates which findings and conclusions each of the following five recommendations was based on.

#### **6. AGRA would benefit from reconsidering and strengthening its intervention logic. (Informed by multiple findings across two objectives.)**

AGRA should strengthen its intervention logic and the assumptions underlying this across all the thematic areas. A clear and strong intervention logic and related assumptions would help AGRA better define what success looks like in the short, medium and long term. AGRA needs to better articulate and measure its results chain and strengthen the link between inputs such as provision of TA to governments and involvement in NAIPS and flagships; and expected outcomes. This includes interrogating the assumptions and evidence that their inputs and outputs will result in expected outcomes and impacts such as inclusive agricultural transformation, given the risks and opportunities within their operating contexts. It also entails providing greater clarity around concepts such as 'sustainability', 'inclusion' and 'transformational change', and assessing the extent to which these concepts are adequately captured in intervention logic.

Once clarity is attained regarding the intervention logic, AGRA can better identify and apply milestones periodically to see if they are on track, assess if associated assumptions hold and identify what is working well and what is not working well. For instance, by embedding an officer within a government ministry to provide TA, AGRA needs to define expected outcomes for specified periods; it should interrogate the assumptions it makes regarding the relationship between that individual's inputs *vis-à-vis* expected results and be better placed to adapt its approach accordingly. Similarly, AGRA needs to strengthen its intervention logic and related assumption in its involvement in flagships. This is particularly so considering its dependence on the government's calendar, external risks linked to corruption and potential mismanagement of funds, and the assumptions it is making about the link between flagships and Inclusive Agricultural Transformation.

**7. AGRA and its RPs should revisit their mutual accountability in relation to learning and cultivate a positive culture for this. (Informed by two conclusions and ten findings across two objectives.)**

AGRA and PIATA (the RPs) should together consider what mutual accountability means for them and consider ways in which space can be opened for AGRA and RPs to make mistakes, fail and learn and be open about this in terms of strategy implementation. This may mean the RPs revisiting their requirements of AGRA in terms of reporting so there is more emphasis on sharing of challenges and lessons learnt and less emphasis on reaching targets. This implies that RPs will need the flexibility to allow for AGRA to start using composite indicators in reporting against the shared RF, as mentioned in the MEL recommendation (4, above). It may also involve a change in culture within AGRA, to be more critical of itself and less task-oriented and to better understand how success and innovation often stem from failure. A practical step towards this would be to ensure a balanced set of Key Performance Indicators for appraising staff performance that affords as much importance to learning as it does to compliance with rules, processes and achieving targets. A more fundamental step towards this would be for AGRA's leadership and culture to be one in which staff are supported and motivated and feel able to share challenges they face in implementing their programmes. Addressing Recommendation 10 below will help clarify where accountability of AGRA, its Board and the RPs begins and ends, keeping in mind the clear governance role of the Board and advisory role of PIATA (the RPs).

**8. AGRA should take a strategic and tailored approach in terms of country and regional interventions during the remaining strategy period. (Informed by multiple findings across two objectives.)**

One of the EQs was, 'Are there any practices/interventions that should be accelerated/scaled up or stopped or new practices/interventions introduced to enable the achievement of the strategy for inclusive agricultural transformation?' The ET suggests that these are best identified at country and regional levels. A review of where each country programme is now, what its strengths are, what its USO or niche is in that country and what is going well could inform planning for the remainder of the strategy period. The ET does not recommend major shifts in direction at this stage. While AGRA has been running since 2006, the current strategy only started in 2017, and AGRA is still carrying out the organisational changes needed to support it. Country and regional teams need time and space to focus on delivering against the strategy over the next 20 months and to learn from this experience, but in the context of taking a tailored approach as discussed above. This means that decisions on whether to reduce some aspects of COPs and scale up others is something that should be taken at the country level (with guidance from the regional teams and HQs).

Decentralisation to the regional teams should be completed as soon as possible in terms of what is intended for them in terms of TOR, scope and level of autonomy. AGRA should only consider expanding to further countries during this strategy period where there is a strategic opportunity to operate in the regional economic community space, for example in policy, regulatory and trade aspects affecting the agriculture sector and in developing partnerships with agribusinesses operating in the regional space.

**9. AGRA should revisit its integrated (systems development) delivery model. (Informed by four conclusions and ten findings across two objectives.)**

For the remainder of this strategy period, AGRA should, with the help of PIATA partners, revisit its integrated systems development delivery model. Changes may be needed in direction and approach, or indeed at a more fundamental level. Questions that AGRA needs to consider, with the help of PIATA, include the following: If the integrated delivery model for systems development is aimed at proof of concept and piloting, then is AGRA best placed to do this? What have its RPs already done in this space? Has learning from that been shared with AGRA? If AGRA has a role in testing proof of concept, is it going about this in the best way (i.e. giving small grants to NGOs of variable capacity, not yet drawing on best practice in systems development or building capacity in that across the countries, requiring some SMEs to operate in the same manner as NGOs, etc.)? It is possible that reflection by AGRA on its positioning in this space would help, as there are mixed understandings in AGRA about working with agribusinesses.<sup>91</sup>

**10. The PAC should reflect on and update the PIATA MOU and Charter, the nature of reporting required and how best to nurture the CACs. (Informed by two conclusions and six findings across one objective.)**

It is recommended that the MOU and Charter be updated to include both DFID (a voting member) and BMZ/KfW (currently a non-voting member). This would provide the opportunity to revisit the references to each of AGRA and PIATA in both the MOU and the Charter, which are currently unclear in places including in relation to the governance functions of each. To enable the PAC to provide informed advice to AGRA, the six-monthly reports from AGRA to PIATA should provide greater qualitative analysis and reflection on quantitative content, and should indicate ways in which AGRA has responded to earlier advice from the PAC.

It would be good if the PAC revisited the MOU and Charter to reassess the intended purpose and roles of the CACs and assess if these need updating, given the present status of the CACs. Most of the CACs are at their early stages and could be encouraged to work more on alignment and coordination where appropriate (in the context of there also being agriculture sector working groups and donor groups in most countries). How CACs can be supported in securing additional funding at the country level in furtherance of the shared vision and RF could be elaborated in the MOU and/or Charter. One clear opportunity for the CACs is to allow co-learning. For example, some of the PIATA RPs have extensive experience in supporting systems development, which could be of help to AGRA. Countries should be encouraged to continue tailoring how they use the CACs within their particular context and within the focus of support to the agriculture sector in that country.

Summing up, AGRA, as a unique African body, has established itself as an honest broker in the agriculture sector and trusted partner of governments and DPs on the continent. It has the ear and respect of governments, as it has effectively positioned itself as a neutral institution perceived as genuinely having the interests of government at heart. In different contexts, it has established its niche role as catalyst and gap-filling. It clearly occupies space that no other institution on the African continent does. The ET considers that, if AGRA is supported by the Board and PAC to implement the MTE recommendations above as well as the co-created ones, it will be in a strong position to contribute towards Inclusive Agricultural Transformation in Africa.


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<sup>91</sup> The ET has developed a tool that could be used to stimulate such reflection if considered useful. This can be shared if requested.



# Annexes

Annex 1: Results framework



## Annex 2: Key findings of the independent institutional evaluation of AGRA and AGRA's responses to the evaluation

### 1. Key findings of the 2015 independent institutional evaluation of AGRA

With a new AGRA leadership team in place to spearhead the strategy's implementation, as well as a transition of funding from, primarily BMGF financed, siloed programmatic grants, BMGF asked DAI to conduct an institutional evaluation of AGRA in 2015. The purpose of the evaluation was to analyse AGRA's achievements to date; determine whether AGRA's current business and operating models are effective to advance structural changes in the agriculture sector; and provide recommendations to facilitate decision making in the next phase of the partnership between BMGF and AGRA.

Its main findings tabled in the final report (Feb 2016) were:

- A lack of clarity surrounding AGRA's core value proposition and business model based on concerns over the organization's ability to manage the new programmatic integration while closing out siloed program grants and its ability to raise funds in a more complex, competitive funding environment. This was aggravated by fatigue among staff caused by too frequent, top-down strategy refreshes.
- Ambiguity over AGRA's identity, including its perception as an African institution, the characteristics of which differed depending upon each respondent's type of engagement with the institution.
- Concerns that AGRA's alignment with national government priorities and CAADP process engagement were less than optimal, with Government representatives communicating a desire for more engagement at the country level. There was, however, much goodwill toward the organization and appreciation for its role as an honest broker and for its political neutrality.
- Stakeholders noted that AGRA was making positive changes to yield a more effective operating model, but staff members still lack clarity over the rationale for these changes.
- Despite Individual program streams having generated impressive intermediate results, siloed funding drives siloed programs, and siloed programmes restrict integrated investment and delivery. The transformational objective remained aspirational and the results to date indicated that AGRA would need more than the next five years to achieve this goal. AGRA's donor expectations for transformational change in the short period of its existence were seen as unrealistic.
- AGRA's board emerged with a mix of positives (highly professional membership, gender distribution in line with industry standards) and areas that need improvement (reluctance to shift away from overly optimistic high-level goals, gaps in financial oversight and committee responsibility and engagement).
- While program-level M&E had improved considerably over AGRA's life, it had yet to connect to a higher-level institutional monitoring, evaluation, and learning platform, most likely due to repeated strategy shifts. In addition, although AGRA was viewed by its immediate partner universe quite positively, it had not disseminated its many successes to a wider, eager pool of interested stakeholders. Inadequate institutional communication had resulted in missed opportunities and lack of clarity about AGRA's direction.

### 2. AGRA's reforms and their implementation up to the end of 2017

In early 2015, AGRA presented a new integrated strategy (originally for 2015-2020) to its board for approval. The new strategy shifted the organization from layered programs that are managed separately, to integrated programming that combined key competencies into a more value chain-driven approach. The strategy was organized into three component areas:

- **Integration.** Proven solutions to increasing smallholder productivity to be applied in an integrated way to the point where the market can take over and sustain the transformation, at least doubling the yields of more than 9 million smallholder farmers.

- **Leverage.** AGRA to focus on leveraging large private and public investments with replicable models that sustain agricultural transformation and unlock value for farmers; work with countries to design private sector-based, sustainable input and output markets and policies; seek to broker private sector farmer partnerships in a public private partnership model that will encourage others to invest in farmer organizations, grain aggregation, post-harvest handling capacity, and access to finance and; aim to leverage investments that will increase the yields of millions more farmers by at least 50%
- **Innovation.** AGRA to develop capabilities to strengthen the foundation for African agricultural transformation by continuing to support innovation that would add to the range of proven solutions, capacities, and knowledge.

AGRA's final 2017-2021 strategy was signed off in 2015, including a results framework and an explanation of grant, outcome and impact monitoring. A main feature of this strategy was to establish a greater country presence across all 11 countries. The success of the new strategy was pegged on decentralizing AGRA from the Headquarters (HQ) in Nairobi to country operations. The 11 countries were organized around Geographies in 5 Geographic Service Teams (GSTs): GST 1 – Burkina/Mali; GST 2 – Nigeria/Ghana; GST 3 – Tanzania; GST 4 – Kenya/Uganda/Rwanda/Ethiopia and GST 5 - Mozambique/Malawi.

AGRA selected these countries based on AGRA's existing assets and value proposition (including existing network of local partners-grantees); government commitment to Agriculture and; potential for impact (including opportunities for private sector engagement). Delivering the strategy in these countries was based on designing support across three inter-related intervention areas or themes: Policy and State Capability; Systems Development; and Strategic Partnerships.

AGRA set out to strengthen a new organizational structure and operating model to service these new strategic priorities in three main ways:

1. Designing an optimal structure between country, regions, and headquarters (e.g. through taking a country-focused approach to get closer to the client and re-positioning technical functions in central teams to service AGRA's country-facing teams).
2. Incorporating new functions (e.g. through a diversified value proposition beyond grant-making i.e. convener, thought-leader, policy advocate, private sector partner, capability builder, and implementation support), looking to fill gaps where others were not investing, coordinating partners and strengthening data analytics and knowledge management.
3. Streamlining e.g. through a back-office that shifted all finance reporting into a single structure and shared services to cost-effectively and efficiently support delivery of the new strategy and well-organized distribution of responsibilities and empowered staff with clarified roles and hierarchy and optimal direct reports for managers.

In order to operationalize AGRA's strategy in the five GSTs, the AGRA Management set up a Change Management Taskforce which played the key role of ensuring a seamless transition from HQ to the GSTs. In addition, the Taskforce was to ensure that the people, processes, systems and infrastructure required in country were put in place for the effective implementation of the strategy. The Task force worked with different teams within AGRA to roll out the country plans over 4 – 6 months, working within existing AGRA structures. Mandated by executive management, with support from Mckinsey, the functions of the Task Force were to:

- Create and deploy task force, a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) team and transition teams.
- Complete country planning and commence country engagement through development of templates and reframing of country plans phased across the 11 countries starting in Sept 2016.
- Establish modalities for management of legacy grants through mapping legacy grants.
- Commence full roll-out in countries (AGRA's strategy).

- Systems and process roll-out through developing new processes.
- Training of staff.
- Communication planning through developing a communication plan.

Its work covered two phases. The first phase (June-December 2016) involved overseeing five workstreams:

1. Developing Country Operational Plans to produce an externally tested and operationalized set of country plans, including an overall portfolio view across all 11 countries.
2. Synthesising all workstreams into a fully integrated \$500M funding strategy for discussion with major donors, including potential new business lines AGRA can explore.
3. Designing a new organisational structure, capability, culture & change management plan to define the structure, size and required capabilities, tied to the requirements needed to execute the country strategy.
4. Revamping core processes (grant, performance and knowledge management, budgeting) to define a clear identification of the challenges in AGRA's process and newly designed processes to implement.
5. Capacity building of grantees, aligned to requirements from country plans, with an approach designed around findings from a rapid diagnostic in Tanzania.

The Second and final phase (starting in January 2017) involved closing out its efforts across the five workstreams:

- Country plans were operationalised that highlighted the on-going need for continual refinement of implementation trackers as new stakeholder mapping is completed, country engagement models were strengthened and intervention models tested as early investments were developed.
- New organisation design completed with no outstanding items.
- Revamp of core processes close out with a few outstanding items to conclude.
- Grantee Capacity Building with the Executive Committee validating the new capacity building process which will then be translated into a plan and operations.

Throughout this change management work, the Task Force and AGRA Management surfaced lessons:

1. It takes time to re-design organizational structures and working relations between new business units.
2. The change management program triggered emotional reactions including denial, negativity and outright rejection of the change in some instances.
3. On-going work by Operations and the Country delivery teams was needed to ensure effective decentralization with a primary focus on clarifying individual roles and responsibilities, recruiting where key gaps still existed and clarifying unit relationships and roles.
4. AGRA's history and culture continue to play a major role and should not be underestimated. The new *modus operandi* where power has shifted to countries needs to be continuously strengthened to attain the right balance of interaction through proper guidelines and joint planning.
5. The challenges of multi-teaming in the face of rapid change meant that the pace of roll-out, while rapid, was slower than anticipated.

## Annex 3: Terms of reference for PIATA mid-term review

May 6, 2019

### A. Background

1. The Partnership for Inclusive Agricultural Transformation in Africa (PIATA) is an alliance among the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), the Department for International Development (DFID), the Rockefeller Foundation (RF), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)—PIATA Resource Partners— and the Alliance for the Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA)—the PIATA implementing partner. BMZ also engages in this alliance as a resource partner and non-voting member. Collectively, these partners came together to leverage respective strengths, experiences, technologies, methodologies, and resources in the interest of advancing shared goals of agricultural transformation:

- Catalyzing an agricultural transformation in key agro-ecological zones in Sub-Saharan Africa;
- Unlocking the value of private and public sector investments to sustain an agricultural transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa;
- Developing capacities and capabilities that will strengthen and sustain the foundation for African agricultural transformation in PIATA priority countries—Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.

The full value of this strategic partnership is understood to be ability to deliver impact at scale through greater alignment, complementarity of work, and the collective voice and influence of the named partners.

2. In pursuit of these goals, partners agreed to contribute resources to AGRA based on a shared results framework targeting four key objectives:

- Objective 1: Increased staple crop productivity for smallholder farmers;
- Objective 2: Strengthened and expanded access to national and regional output markets;
- Objective 3: Increased capacity of smallholder farming households and agricultural systems to better prepare for and adapt to shocks and stresses;
- Objective 4: Strengthened continental, regional, and government multi-sectoral coordination and mutual accountability in the agriculture sector.

3. To execute on this, AGRA’s strategy—henceforth referred to as PIATA—has three thematic areas:

- State Capability & Policy Engagement: Working with government to strengthen execution capacity while enhancing the transparency, accountability systems, and policy environment for increased public and private sector investment in agriculture;
- Systems Development: Building downstream delivery systems closer to smallholder farmers while providing support to local private sector to scale technologies and services which deliver better productivity and incomes;
- Partnerships: Facilitating the alignment between government priorities and private sector interests—improving integration and coordination to catalyze investments beneficial to smallholder farmers.

### B. Purpose of the Evaluation

4. At its launch in September 2017, participants agreed PIATA will be evaluated by an independent third-party to be unanimously agreed to by the PIATA partners via two evaluations at approximately 20 and 40 months into implementation. These TORs cover the 20-month evaluation. It will assess what is / is not working well in implementation, evaluate progress toward objectives and outcomes, call attention to any unintended outcomes, and provide evidence-based findings and recommendations

that AGRA and its partners can use to improve activity effectiveness and better achieve the goals and objectives outlined above.

5. The evaluation will include not only an assessment of programmatic results, but also approaches and practices underlying these results. Specifically, the mid-term evaluation will assess: i) the programming and approaches of PIATA; ii) the PIATA Advisory Committee and partnership alliance; and iii) AGRA’s partnerships with other institutions critical to PIATA’s success. The evaluation will examine themes of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability / scale as it relates to these areas.

6. PIATA partners will use the mid-term evaluation to take stock of PIATA and progress in thematic areas (e.g. state capability & policy, systems development and partnerships.) It will inform future planning and may lead to strategic shifts and /or adjustments in implementation to better achieve intended results. The evaluation may also contribute to PIATA’s learning agenda.

### C. Guidance on Approach & Methodology

7. This mid-term evaluation will use a process evaluation approach, designed to analyze how activities operate and what factors (internal and external) appear to be most and least successful in forwarding the expected outcomes. Bids should propose an evaluation design with appropriate methodology for the process evaluation, including employing mixed methods—using quantitative and qualitative data to answer the evaluation questions. The evaluation will also note strengths, weaknesses, threats, and opportunities for improvement. Innovative methodologies and data collection methods are encouraged.

8. AGRA has a robust monitoring system. The evaluation is expected to use the contents of this system— including any baseline or survey data that is available at the time of the evaluation—, as well as standard reports, governance / strategy documents, and any other relevant materials. It is also expected that the evaluator will spend significant time interviewing AGRA staff, PIATA partners, and other relevant stakeholders. Case studies will be used, especially to illustrate the effectiveness of certain investment approaches and how vertical programs come together in country.

9. The evaluator will develop a systematic and thoughtful approach to getting a representative picture of AGRA sub-awards (e.g. across portfolios, regions, size, and maturity of investment, etc.) and AGRA beneficiaries (e.g. across types of farmers, institutions, gender, etc.) This could include examining a subset of awards—especially those in the areas of structured markets and seed—to assess whether the scopes and financial structure of those awards is either a) structured in a time-limited approach to support organizations to achieve non-assistance (i.e. that will enable the organization to become facilitator of its own future activities), or b) structured to facilitate development of a market such that future assistance from PIATA resource partners or others will not be required.

10. The evaluation will adhere to international best practice and standards of ethical conduct (Annex 9). To this end, the evaluation will take into account implications of gender roles, ethnicity, ability, age, sexual orientation, language, and other differences in its design and execution. The evaluation team is also required to verify the ethical approval requirements in each country where data collection will be undertaken, and make arrangements either to obtain the necessary ethical approval or to constrain the selection of interviewees and data collection to ensure they are permissible without ethical approval.

### D. Evaluation Questions

Question	Paying keen attention to...	Themes
<p><b>1. What progress has AGRA made against its five-year strategy (i.e. PIATA)?</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Outputs-to-date and progress toward intermediate or primary outcomes. This assessment shall be based on available monitoring information and surveys, and include case studies highlighting lessons learned, best practices, and activities / models to accelerate impact.</li> </ul>	<p>Relevance, Efficiency</p>

Question	Paying keen attention to...	Themes
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pace of work / whether AGRA is on-track to deliver its five-year strategy objectives.</li> <li>• Consistency of outputs and emerging outcomes (if any) relative to PIATA Results Framework and Theory of Change.</li> <li>• Opportunities / need to prioritize across or add new interventions areas.</li> </ul>	
<p><b>2. How can AGRA optimize its delivery model to accelerate impact?</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fit and appropriateness of AGRA delivery model with regards to PIATA strategy and country operational plans.</li> <li>• AGRA’s success in integrating tools, approaches, and programming across operational layers (from HQ to farm-level engagement.)</li> <li>• Gaps and/or key levers in advancing implementation of strategy and operational plans.</li> <li>• Lessons from grants to private sector consortia and governments.</li> <li>• Degree to which AGRA’s approach has catalyzed investments from others.</li> </ul>	<p>Relevance, Efficiency</p>
<p><b>3. How effectively does AGRA monitor progress of work and take corrective measures taken if required?</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How gaps or threats to progress are identified.</li> <li>• Use of data, strategic insights, and lessons learned in leadership decision-making.</li> <li>• Extent to which corrective measures effectively implemented.</li> </ul>	<p>Relevance, Effectiveness</p>
<p><b>4. What has been the effect of the new partnership engagement and funding model—working through a shared results framework versus individual donor initiatives?</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contributions to AGRA’s strategic thinking and progress in driving more integrated programming.</li> <li>• Cohesion of new model with AGRA’s existing governance structure.</li> <li>• Extent to which involvement in the PIATA Advisory Committee influenced the thinking / actions of resource partners, especially with regards to reducing fragmentation of donor activities.</li> <li>• Responsiveness of different actors within partnership when challenges are surfaced.</li> <li>• Experience of grantees and other non-PIATA partners vis-à-vis new partnership model.</li> <li>• Degree to which new model has set AGRA up for securing a diverse, sustainable funding stream.</li> </ul>	<p>Effectiveness, Scale, Sustainability</p>
<p><b>5. To what extent are PIATA’s positive impacts likely to continue after the end of the project?</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Any unintended negative consequences of PIATA.</li> <li>• Obstacles and / or opportunities for domestic or regional partners / actors to expand their role or take on the role that AGRA has advanced, especially in the policy space.</li> <li>• Opportunities for AGRA to improve the sustainability of its partners, including changes in AGRA’s approach to better create pathways for domestic or regional partners / actors to successfully become more self-reliant in the future.</li> <li>• External threats to existing and anticipated future positive impacts.</li> </ul>	<p>Sustainability, Scale</p>
<p><b>6. How effective has AGRA been in establishing a unique service-offering in partnerships with governments?</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Examples of AGRA influencing government policy and decision-making.</li> <li>• Governments’ and partners’ perceptions of AGRA as a thought leader and as addressing the most critical needs of government.</li> <li>• Fit and timeliness of AGRA business practices vis-à-vis government demand and windows of opportunity.</li> </ul>	<p>Relevance, Efficiency</p>

Question	Paying keen attention to...	Themes
<b>7. How effective has AGRA been as an alliance builder?</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New partnerships AGRA has built (in private, public, civil society or other sectors) since launch of PIATA.</li> <li>• Experience of partners working or seeking partnerships with AGRA.</li> <li>• Insights as to how AGRA can prioritize across partnership opportunities.</li> <li>• Degree to which AGRA is leveraging technical and / or financial resources of its partners.</li> </ul>	Sustainability, Scale
<b>8. How well is the decentralisation process progressing and what has been its impact on delivery?</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How effective is the relationship between HQ level and the divisions, and between HQ and regional heads and country teams?</li> <li>• What has been the effect of having country and regional teams on delivery?</li> </ul>	
<b>9. To what extent has AGRA been able to develop the capabilities and culture required to enable the integrated delivery model?</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent has AGRA created a shared identity and culture in support of the new strategy? Where has progress been made?</li> </ul>	

#### E. Stakeholder Engagement & Governance

11. This evaluation will be managed by a small working group of the PIATA resource partners. BMGF will manage the procurement of the evaluation and serve as the managing entity for the grant. In turn, BMGF convene and coordinate the small working group to serve as a steering committee for the evaluation.

12. The Programs Committee of AGRA's Board of Directors (the Board), which provides programmatic oversight to AGRA's work will be included in the formulation and management of the evaluation to ensure it meets their needs to inform effective oversight. Specifically, the Board will be invited to propose and contribute to the assessment of service providers, including submitting a scoring rubric for submissions. During the inception phase, the Board will be invited contribute to the refinement of the evaluation questions and evaluation protocol; however, draft and final survey instruments will not be shared as the Board members may be interviewed. The Board will also have opportunity to review and comment on evaluation reports as they are shared with the PIATA resource partners. The evaluation team will also organize a check-in with the Board before results are distributed to partners. Any changes made to the evaluation as a result of the Board's feedback will be recorded in an annex to the evaluation for the sake of transparency and to ensure the credibility of the evaluation as an independent assessment.

13. AGRA's staff, especially its MEL team, will be invited to comment on the top five submissions of this bid. During the inception phase of work, AGRA staff will contribute to the refinement of the evaluation questions. In principle, we expect: i) AGRA will have opportunity to comment on evaluation findings before major meetings of partners to discuss findings in order to provide context and validate accuracy; ii) AGRA will have opportunity to review and validate a draft of the final report with the evaluation team and, if needed, provide a management response to any evaluation findings. In terms of logistical support, it is anticipated AGRA will provide only light-touch support to the evaluation team (e.g. providing contact information for in-country appointments, letters of invitation, recommendations on travel arrangements.)

14. Before evaluation activities are underway, the evaluator will work with AGRA and the working group of PIATA resource partners to agree on specifics of how the various stakeholders will be engaged during the evaluation, while ensuring the independence and impartiality of the evaluation.

15. After a due process of review and consultation among the partners, a final report and supporting materials will be made available to the public—both for transparency and to provide value to the broader development community.

#### F. Expected Deliverables & Timeline

16. The evaluator will be expected to deliver the following:

- An Evaluation Protocol – This shall be prepared and submitted to BMGF by July 29, 2019, and shall include a final, refined set of evaluation questions based on consultations with the steering committee, description of evaluation design including the methodology, data collection and analysis plan, and operational work plan, including any proposed travel.
- A Progress Report – This shall be prepared and submitted to BMGF by August 28, 2019. This report is meant to provide an update of work-to-date, including any preliminary findings to the PIATA Advisory Committee prior to their meeting the first week of September. It should include both a PowerPoint and accompanying Word document.
- Draft Report – This shall be prepared and submitted to BMGF by October 4, 2019. The draft report shall require feedback in the form of comments, questions and inputs from the partners and AGRA.
- Final Report – This shall be no more than 40 pages (excluding annexes) and submitted to BMGF by November 30, 2019. It shall also include a short PowerPoint covering key elements of the evaluation. Any annexes, raw data, and / or materials supporting the findings of the evaluation shall also be included as part of the final report package.

17. The evaluation and selection process will adhere as closely as possible<sup>92</sup> to the following schedule. However, BMGF may modify this schedule in consultation with the evaluation steering committee:

- Request for concept notes sent to firms – May 6, 2019.
- Firms submit concept note responses – May 20, 2019 (8 AM Pacific Time).
- PIATA committee review and deliberations – May 20-24, 2019.
- Notification of selected proposal – May 24, 2019.
- Refinement of proposal – May 24 – June 21, 2019.
- Final proposal due – June 21, 2019.
- Grant Agreement signed – July 15, 2019.
- Start work – July 16, 2019.
- Evaluation protocol – July 29, 2019.
- Progress report – August 28, 2019.
- Draft report – October 4, 2019.
- Final report completed – November 30, 2019.

#### G. Duties & Qualifications of Consultant

18. The Evaluation Team will include, among others, an Evaluation Specialist, an Agriculture Economist, and experts in Sub-Saharan African Government & Policy Systems and African Agricultural Markets.

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<sup>92</sup> The working group drafting this TOR notes this is an ambitious timeline. We propose the work be guided by the principle of adhering to this timeline as much as possible without compromising the quality or integrity of the evaluation.

19. **Evaluation Team Lead:** A senior-level evaluator with a minimum of 10 years of experience managing and/or evaluating multifaceted international development teams, involving non-profit, private and public sector. The team lead will also have:

- a) Demonstrated capacity to conduct independent program evaluations;
- b) An understanding of PIATA partners' foreign assistance goals and objectives related to agricultural development and food security; and
- c) Experience analyzing issues and formulating concrete recommendations orally and in writing. Deep experience in Sub-Saharan Africa is required.

20. **Technical team members:** Must be experienced (5-10 years or more) in international agricultural development. Technical team members will have demonstrated the following:

- d) Experience conducting independent program evaluation;
- e) A thorough understanding of research methodology;
- f) Experience in effectively conducting outreach and dissemination to policymakers, development practitioners, and/or the private sector;
- g) Experience analyzing issues and formulating concrete recommendations orally and in writing. Broad experience in Sub-Saharan Africa is required.

21. **Disciplines of all members:** The team must include the following skillsets among its members:

- h) Quantitative and qualitative evaluation,
- i) Institutional development and change management,
- j) Gender analysis,
- k) African agricultural government and policy systems (including input regulatory systems),
- l) Agricultural staple value-chains and crop systems (i.e., maize, rice, tubers, grain legumes),
- m) Agriculture economics, including demand and supply economics,
- n) Adoption and scaling of agricultural technologies, including private sector/input distribution and marketing systems.

22. **Fit of evaluation design and outputs to evaluation purpose:**

- o) Appropriateness of design for the type of evaluation being commissioned
- p) Describes how proposed data collection and methods will address the evaluation questions
- q) Describes what data will be collected and how
- r) Appropriateness of country sampling plan and rationale
- s) Appropriateness of external stakeholders for inclusion in the evaluation (may be international, regional or national stakeholders)
- t) Any known limitations are discussed

23. **Organizational fit and proposed team experience and expertise:**

- a) Prior experience with type of evaluation being commissioned
- b) Prior work in sub-Saharan countries
- c) Prior experience evaluating similar programs

- d) Prior experience with methodology
- e) Prior experience evaluating programs within the sector
- f) Staff with sufficient experience have been assigned to roles as described in Section G
- g) Key personnel are assigned at adequate percentage of time

22. Proposed work plan

- a) Feasibility of plan (can be accomplished in the needed timeframe)
- b) Describes management approach, including principles of stakeholder engagement
- c) Coherence of plan (easy to grasp and engage with the details)

23. Cost proposal

- a) Amount and type of requested items in proposed budget is justified by the description of activities and method
- b) Overall reasonableness of proposed costs (including feasibility of completing the evaluation within budget)

## Annex 4: Full evaluation questions with sub-questions

### **EQ1: What progress has AGRA made against its five-year strategy to achieve inclusive agricultural transformation?**

- 1.1 What are the outputs-to-date and progress toward intermediate outcomes at country, regional and continental levels?
- 1.2 Based on current trajectories, is AGRA on track to deliver the objectives in its five-year strategy in relation to inclusive agricultural transformation?
- 1.3 Are there any practices/interventions that should be accelerated/scaled up or stopped or new practices/interventions introduced to enable the achievement of the strategy for inclusive agricultural transformation?
- 1.4 What are the main external threats to existing and anticipated progress?
- 1.5 How well is AGRA's new integrated delivery model working and what has its impact been on results?

### **EQ2: How can AGRA optimise its delivery model to accelerate impact?**

- 2.1 How fit and appropriate is AGRA's delivery model with regard to PIATA strategy and country operational plans?
- 2.2 How successful has AGRA been in integrating tools, approaches, and programming across operational layers (from HQ to farm-level engagement)?
- 2.3 What are the gaps and/or key levers in advancing implementation of strategy and operational plans?
- 2.4 To what extent has AGRA's approach catalysed investments from others?

### **EQ3: How effectively does AGRA monitor progress and inclusivity of work and take corrective measures if required?**

- 3.1 How are gaps or threats to inclusive progress identified?
- 3.2 To what extent has data, strategic insights and lessons learned informed leadership decision-making at country, regional and AGRA head office levels?
- 3.3 To what extent are corrective measures implemented effectively?

### **EQ4: What has been the effect of the new partnership engagement and funding model – working through a shared results framework versus individual donor initiatives?**

- 4.1 What has been the impact of PIATA on AGRA's strategic thinking and progress in driving more integrated and inclusive programming?
- 4.2 To what extent is the new model cohesive with the existing governance structure?
- 4.3 To what extent has involvement in the PIATA Advisory Committee and Country Advisory Committee (CAC) influenced the thinking/actions of resource partners, especially with regard to reducing fragmentation of donor activities.
- 4.4 What effect is PIATA having on donors' and AGRA's ways of working?
- 4.5 What has been the experience of grantees and other non-PIATA partners *vis-à-vis* the new partnership model?
- 4.6 To what extent has the new model set up AGRA for securing a diverse, sustainable funding stream?

### **EQ5: To what extent are PIATA's positive impacts likely to continue after the end of the five-year strategic period?**

- 5.1 Have there been any unintended consequences of PIATA on donors and AGRA or its partners?
- 5.2 What are the main obstacles and/or opportunities for country or regional partners to expand their role or take on the role that AGRA has advanced, especially in the policy space?
- 5.3 What are the opportunities for AGRA to improve the sustainability of its partners, including changes in AGRA's approach to better create pathways for domestic or regional partners/actors to successfully become more self-reliant in the future?
- 5.4 What are the external threats to existing and anticipated future positive impacts?

**EQ6: How effective has AGRA been in establishing a unique service-offering in partnerships with governments?**

- 6.1 How effective has AGRA been in influencing government policy and decision making regarding inclusive agricultural transformation?
- 6.2 What are governments' and partners' perceptions of AGRA as a thought leader and as addressing the most critical needs of government?
- 6.3 How responsive is AGRA support to government needs and windows of opportunity?
- 6.4 How can AGRA balance being responsive to government with maintaining a clear strategic direction?
- 6.5 How effective has AGRA been in strengthening government capabilities?
- 6.6 How effective has AGRA been in facilitating systems development (including consortia development) at the country level, and in an inclusive manner?

**EQ7: How effective has AGRA been in forming strategic partnerships at the continental, regional and country level?**

- 7.1 What new partnerships has AGRA built/strengthened (in private, public, civil society or other sectors) since the launch of its new strategy?
- 7.2 What have been partners' experiences of working with AGRA?
- 7.3 What should AGRA prioritise across its partnership opportunities and how?
- 7.4 How effectively is AGRA leveraging the technical and/or financial resources of its partners at country, regional and continental levels?
- 7.5 What factors are enabling/constraining AGRA's ability to form effective partnerships?

**EQ8: How well is the decentralisation process progressing and what has been its impact on delivery?**

- 8.1 How effective is the relationship between HQ level and the divisions, and between HQ and regional heads and country teams?
- 8.2 What has been the effect of having country and regional teams on delivery?

**EQ9: To what extent has AGRA been able to develop the capabilities and culture required to enable the integrated delivery model?**

- 9.1 To what extent has AGRA created a shared identity and culture in support of the new strategy? Where has progress been made?

### Annex 5: Evaluation matrix

Below is the full EM to guide the ET through the following phases of the MTE. As noted in the main report, the EQs and EQ sub-questions relate mainly to those in the TORs. Pointers are areas that the ET will look into in relation to the sub-questions. The pointers were developed to respond to expectations of the MTE by AGRA and the RPs and will act as aids to the ET.

The **objective numbers (Obj)** relate to those outlined in Section 2.2 of the main report (Framework) and are:

- Objective 1: Assess what progress AGRA is making against its 2017–21 strategy.
- Objective 2: Assess how well the organisation reforms AGRA initiated in support of its 2017–21 strategy are progressing.
- Objective 3: Assess the extent to which PIATA is leading partners to work differently in support of the shared vision and result framework.

The module numbers relate to those discussed in Chapter 3 of the report and are as follows: (1) country, (2) organisational, and (3) regional and continental levels.

EQ no.	Evaluation questions	Sub-evaluation questions	Pointers	Obj	Module(s)	Data sources and methods	Data analysis
1	What progress has AGRA made against its five-year strategy to achieve inclusive agricultural transformation?	1.1 What are the outputs-to-date and progress toward intermediate outcomes at country, regional and continental levels?		1	2,3	Desk review of monitoring information and AGRA strategy and country implementation strategies	Comparing actual versus target reach and outputs
		1.2 Based on current trajectories, is AGRA on track to deliver the objectives in its five-year strategy in relation to inclusive agricultural transformation?		1	2,3	Online survey for PIATA grantees and partners KIs and focus groups with PIATA, grantees and partners	Timeliness to analyse pace of work Qualitative analysis of KIs, focus groups and online survey to distil key results and themes

EQ no.	Evaluation questions	Sub-evaluation questions	Pointers	Obj	Module(s)	Data sources and methods	Data analysis
		<p><b>1.3</b> Are there any practices/interventions that should be accelerated/scaled up or stopped or new practices/interventions introduced to enable the achievement of the strategy for inclusive agricultural transformation?</p> <p><b>1.4</b> What are the main external threats to existing and anticipated progress?</p> <p><b>1.5</b> How well is AGRA's new integrated delivery model working and what has its impact been on results?</p>	<p>Are there variations in progress between countries and the three thematic areas (P&amp;SC, systems development and partnerships) and why?</p> <p>How well is AGRA adapting its delivery model to the needs of different countries and stakeholders? How well is AGRA integrating its three thematic areas across operational layers from HQ through to farmer level? What has been the impact of this on delivery and results? How well is AGRA integrating cross-cutting</p>	1	1,2,3	<p>Kilis with AGRA partners and grantees</p> <p>Desk review including of operational plans and reports Kilis with AGRA and grantees</p> <p>Document review Kilis Country visits</p>	<p>Qualitative analysis of Kilis to identify patterns and themes</p> <p>Qualitative analysis of documents and Kilis to identify patterns and themes</p>

EQ no.	Evaluation questions	Sub-evaluation questions	Pointers	Obj	Module(s)	Data sources and methods	Data analysis
			<p>tools and approaches (including gender) across operational layers from HQ through to farmer level?                      What has been the impact of this on delivery and results?                      What are the main enablers and barriers to the successful integrated approach?                      How effective has the process of rolling out the overarching strategy, plans and MEL framework been (to sub-strategies at the divisional, unit, continental, regional, country level)?                      Have sub-strategies/plans evolved to adapt to context and learning?                      What has been the role of evidence in this?                      What are the main gaps/key levers to advancing the implementation of the strategy and operational plans?</p>				

EQ no.	Evaluation questions	Sub-evaluation questions	Pointers	Obj	Module(s)	Data sources and methods	Data analysis
2	How can AGRA optimise its delivery model to accelerate impact?	2.1 How fit and appropriate is AGRA's delivery model with regard to PIATA strategy and country operational plans?	What can be learned from AGRA giving grants to private sector consortia and governments under the new strategy?	1	1,2,3	Kilis and focus groups with RPs in PIATA, grantees and partners	Review/comparison of AGRA delivery model with strategy and plans to identify alignment and disconnect  Qualitative analysis of Kilis to identify patterns and themes
		2.2 How successful has AGRA been in Integrating tools, approaches and programming across operational layers (from HQ to farm-level engagement)?		1	1,2,3		
		2.3 What are the gaps and/key levers in advancing implementation of strategy and operational plans?		1	2		
		2.4 To what extent has AGRA's approach catalysed investments from others?		1	1,2,3		
3	How effectively does AGRA monitor progress and inclusivity of work and take corrective measures taken if required?	3.1 How are gaps or threats to inclusive progress identified?		2	1,2,3	Review of AGRA Management Information System, M&E strategy and Indicator Reference guide, risk management and mitigation approaches  Kilis with AGRA management and M&E staff	Mapping of leadership decision-making processes and use of force field analysis to distil key enablers and blockers of evidence use  In-depth analysis of sample of areas where corrective measures taken based on
		3.2 To what extent has data, strategic insights and lessons learned inform leadership decision making at country, regional and HQ levels?		2	1,2,3		

EQ no.	Evaluation questions	Sub-evaluation questions	Pointers	Obj	Module(s)	Data sources and methods	Data analysis
		<p><b>3.3</b> To what extent are corrective measures implemented effectively?</p>	<p>To what extent has an embedded M&amp;E and strategy team enabled evidence-based adaptation and learning?</p>	2	1,2,3		M&E data
4	<p>What has been the effect of the new partnership engagement and funding model – working through a shared results framework versus individual donor initiatives?</p>	<p><b>4.1</b> What has been the impact of PIATA on AGRA's strategic thinking and progress in driving more integrated and inclusive programming?</p>		3	1	<p>Desk review of partnership agreements, minutes of meetings and reports Kilis with AGRA national, regional office partners and donors  Workshop with senior management at AGRA HQ</p>	<p>Qualitative analysis of Kilis to distil patterns and themes Timeline analysis and force field analysis to assess the evolution of PIATA and factors influencing progress</p>
		<p><b>4.2</b> To what extent is the new model cohesive with the existing governance structure?</p>		3	1		
		<p><b>4.3</b> To what extent has involvement in the PIATA Advisory Committee and CAC influenced the thinking/actions of resource partners, especially with regard to reducing fragmentation of donor activities?</p>		3	1,2		
		<p><b>4.4</b> What effect is PIATA having on donors and AGRA's ways of working?</p>	<p>How do different actors in partnership respond when challenges surface? Mutual accountability</p>	2	1,2		
		<p><b>4.5</b> What has been the experience of grantees</p>	<p>What has been the effect of working through a</p>	3	1.2		

EQ no.	Evaluation questions	Sub-evaluation questions	Pointers	Obj	Module(s)	Data sources and methods	Data analysis
		and other non-PIATA partners <i>vis-à-vis</i> the new partnership model?	shared RF? Has this led to any changed behaviors or practices in donors or AGRA?				
		4.6 To what extent has the new model set up AGRA for securing a diverse, sustainable funding stream?	To what extent has PIATA helped AGRA improve sustainability of its country and regional partners to become more self-reliant in the future?	3	1,2,3		
		To what extent has PIATA been able to leverage interest and investment from other stakeholders/players (private sector, donors)?		3	1,2	Review of AGRA Management Information System, M&E strategy and Indicator Reference guide, risk management and mitigation approaches	Mapping of leadership decision-making processes and use of force field analysis to distill key enablers and blockers of evidence use
5	To what extent are PIATA's positive impacts likely to continue after the end of the five-year strategic period?	5.1 Have there been any unintended consequences of PIATA on donors and AGRA or its partners?  5.2 What are the main obstacles and/or opportunities for country or regional partners to expand their role or take on the role that AGRA has advanced, especially in the policy space?		3	1,3	Klis with AGRA management and M&E staff	In-depth analysis of sample of areas where corrective measures taken based on M&E data
		5.3 What are the opportunities for AGRA to	Is AGRA, while supporting what partner govts want to	3	1,2,3		

EQ no.	Evaluation questions	Sub-evaluation questions	Pointers	Obj	Module(s)	Data sources and methods	Data analysis
		<p>improve the sustainability of its partners, including changes in AGRA's approach to better create pathways for domestic or regional partners/factors to successfully become more self-reliant in the future?</p> <p>5.4 What are the external threats to existing and anticipated future positive impacts?</p>	<p>accomplish, also aiding the capacity development of government stakeholders to do this without AGRA? How is AGRA supporting private sectors/grantees? Are they facilitating them or taking actions for them?</p>	3	2,3	<p>Kils with AGRA senior management, government officials and partners</p>	<p>Qualitative analysis of Kils to distil emerging themes</p>
6	<p>How effective has AGRA been in establishing a unique service-offering in partnerships with governments?</p>	<p>6.1 How effective has AGRA been in influencing government policy and decision making regarding inclusive agricultural transformation?</p> <p>6.2 What are governments and partners' perceptions of AGRA as a thought leader and as addressing the most critical needs of government?</p> <p>6.3 How responsive is AGRA support to government needs and windows of opportunity?</p>	<p>What factors have enabled/constrained this? (examples/case studies)</p>	1	2	<p>Kils with government officials and AGRA staff Desk review of policy briefs, regulations and related implementation documentation</p> <p>Kils with government officials and partners Online survey</p>	<p>Overall analysis of engagement and success influencing government policy at country level, plus more in-depth and detailed analysis of a limited number of 'influencing case studies' to test contribution claims</p> <p>Qualitative analysis of Kils and survey results to distil emerging themes/results</p>
				1	2	<p>Kils with AGRA leadership and government officials Online survey</p>	<p>Qualitative analysis of Kils and survey results to distil emerging themes/results</p>

EQ no.	Evaluation questions	Sub-evaluation questions	Pointers	Obj	Module(s)	Data sources and methods	Data analysis
		<p><b>6.4</b> How can AGRA balance being responsive to government with maintaining a clear strategic direction?</p>		1	2	Kilis with AGRA leadership and government officials	Qualitative analysis of emerging themes
		<p><b>6.5</b> How effective has AGRA been in strengthening government capabilities?</p>	<p>What factors have enabled/constrained this? (examples/ case studies)</p>	1	2	Desk review of country reports. Kilis with government staff and AGRA staff	Qualitative analysis of emerging themes
		<p><b>6.6</b> How effective has AGRA been in facilitating systems development (including consortia development) at the country level regarding IAT?</p>		1	2	Document review Kilis with grantees, RPs in-country, government	Qualitative analysis of emerging themes
7	How effective has AGRA been in forming strategic partnerships at the continental, regional and country level?	<p><b>7.1</b> What new partnerships has AGRA built/strengthened (in private, public, civil society or other sectors) since the launch of its new strategy?</p>		3	2,3	Kilis with AGRA regional office and regional and continental partners	Use of the partnership assessment framework to map and assess the strength of the different partnerships being established at country level
		<p><b>7.2</b> What have been partners' experiences of working with AGRA?</p>		1	2,3	Kilis with AGRA regional office and regional and continental partners	Qualitative analysis of Kilis to identify patterns and themes
		<p><b>7.3</b> What should AGRA prioritise across its partnership opportunities and how?</p>		1	3	Kilis with members of CAC and PAC and with AGRA Board members	

EQ no.	Evaluation questions	Sub-evaluation questions	Pointers	Obj	Module(s)	Data sources and methods	Data analysis
		7.4 How effectively is AGRA leveraging the technical and/or financial resources of its partners at country, regional and continental levels?				KIs with partnership team at AGRA HQ KIs with RPs	
		7.5 What factors are enabling/constraining AGRA's ability to form effective partnerships?		1	1,2,3		
8	How well is the decentralisation process progressing and what has been its impact on delivery?	8.1 How effective is the relationship between HQ level and the divisions, and between HQ and regional heads and country teams?  8.2 What has been the effect of having country and regional teams on delivery?	To what extent do regional heads and country teams have the necessary resources, capacities and delegated authority to deliver on their plans?  Are lines of accountability and responsibility clear between HQ, regional heads and country teams?	2	1,2,3	Document review KIs Workshop with senior management at AGRA HQ	Qualitative analysis of KIs to identify patterns and themes
9	To what extent has AGRA been able to develop the capabilities and culture required to enable the integrated delivery model?	9.1 To what extent has AGRA created a shared identity and culture in support of the new strategy? Where has progress been made?	Are AGRA staff equipped with skills to implement its delivery model?  What problem was the integrated approach taken to delivery in country designed to resolve in AGRA?  What are the main strengths and gaps in	2	1,2	KIs with HR and those responsible for training new staff in AGRA KIs with AGRA staff at HQ and country levels	Qualitative analysis of KIs to identify patterns and themes

EQ no.	Evaluation questions	Sub-evaluation questions	Pointers	Obj	Module(s)	Data sources and methods	Data analysis
			<p>AGRA's delivery of the integrated approach?                      What is AGRAs unique service-offering/value proposition and its shared culture and what progress has there been in relation to these?                      How has the unique service-offering and shared identity and culture helped AGRA achieve its objectives?</p>				

## Annex 6: List of documents reviewed

### Country module

#### **Burkina Faso**

- AGRA Burkina Faso, 2019. Burkina Faso – Operational Plan, updated 2019
- AGRA Burkina Faso, 2019. Grant Status Report, May 2019
- AGRA Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso – Operational Plan
- AGRA, 2018. “AGRA Partnerships – Strategic alliances mobilize inclusive agricultural investments to scale AGRA’s impact”, presentation to the Board, December 2018
- AGRA, 2018. Consortia Performance Report, October 2018
- AGRA, 2019. “AGRA 2019 Mid-Year Report. Annex 1: Country Progress Report”, submitted to PIATA Partners 15th August 2019.
- AGRA, 2019. “Program for Development & Innovation QMR Status Report, July 2019”

#### **Ethiopia**

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- AGRA Ethiopia. Ethiopia – Operational Plan
- AGRA, 2018. “AGRA Partnerships – Strategic alliances mobilize inclusive agricultural investments to scale AGRA’s impact”, presentation to the Board, December 2018
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- AGRA Ethiopia, 2019. Grant Status Report, May 2019

#### **Ghana**

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- 3rd PIATA Advisory Committee Meeting. Notes on PIATA Advisory Committee Meeting. Accra, Ghana. 30th November – 1st December, 2018.
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- AGRA, 2019. “AGRA 2019 Mid-Year Progress Report Covering the Period January – June 2019”, submitted to PIATA Partners 15th August 2019.
- AGRA 2019, “Mid-Year Report. Annex 1: Country Progress Report”, submitted to PIATA Partners 15th August 2019.
- AGRA 2019, “Mid-Year Report. Annex 2: M&E Report”, submitted to PIATA Partners 15th August 2019.
- AGRA Ghana, 2019. Grant Status Report, May 2019
- AGRA Ghana, 2019. Portfolio and Partner Mapping
- AGRA Ghana, 2018. Operational Plan
- AGRA Ghana, 2019. Operational Plan 2019
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- AGRA, 2019. “AGRA Strategy Implementation in Ghana (2017-2019): A write-up for the MTR Mission” (9th-13th September, 2019).
- AGRA Support to State Capability Unit: What we do. PPT
- AGRA, 2019. “Report on AGRA Pipeline Development Retreat”. Draft.
- Ghana Progress to date, 2018. “Report to Management Committee FY 2018, quarter 4”.
- Ghana Progress to date (2019). “Report to Management Committee FY 2019, quarter 2”.
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PIATA Country Advisory Committee, Ghana. Minutes. Accra, Ghana. 30th April 2019.  
AGRA, 2019. "Program for Development & Innovation QMR Status Report, July 2019".  
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### **Kenya**

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AGRA Kenya. Kenya - Operational Plan  
AGRA, 2018. "AGRA Partnerships – Strategic alliances mobilize inclusive agricultural investments to scale AGRA's impact", presentation to the Board, December 2018  
AGRA, 2019. "AGRA 2019 Mid-Year Report. Annex 1: Country Progress Report", submitted to PIATA Partners 15th August 2019.  
AGRA, 2019. "Program for Development & Innovation QMR Status Report, July 2019"  
AGRA, 2018. Consortia Performance Report, October 2018  
AGRA Kenya, 2019. Grant Status Report, May 2019

### **Malawi**

AGRA Malawi, 2019. Malawi - Grant Status Report, May 2019  
AGRA Malawi, 2019. Malawi Operational Plan  
AGRA Malawi, 2019. Malawi Operational Plan 2019  
AGRA, 2019. "AGRA 2019 Mid-Year Report. Annex 1: Country Progress Report", submitted to PIATA Partners 15th August 2019.  
AGRA, 2019. "AGRA Grant Narrative Report 2019. Policy Reform Advocacy for Malawi's Agriculture Input Systems."  
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AGRA, 2019. "Report on AGRA Pipeline Development Retreat." Draft.  
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Farmers Union of Malawi (FUM). "Finalization Technical Review: Reforms in the Agricultural Sector". Second Review of the Draft Seed Bill 2019.  
Farmers Union of Malawi (FUM). The National Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Strategy: "Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Within Reach." Rapid Assessment of the Policy, Regulatory and Institutional Structures that Anchor the National Extension Policy and Develop Recommendations to Guide the Development and Finalization of the Extension Strategy to Guide Implementation.  
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The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). The CAADP Biennial Review – Measuring Progress and Keeping Accountability in Agriculture. 2019 <https://www.nepad.org/publication/caadp-biennial-review-measuring-progress-and-keeping-accountability-agriculture>

### **Mali**

AGRA, 2017. "Transformative Agriculture for Small Farmers" or "Sene Tonon:" "Enhancing Crop Production and Access to Profitable Markets for Sorghum, Millet and Cowpea Smallholder Farmers in the Region of Segou, Mali." Project Proposal.  
AGRA, 2017. Koulikoro Inclusive and Competitive Agricultural Market Systems for Smallholders (KICAMS). Technical Proposal.

AGRA Half Year 2018 Report. Covering the Period 1 January 2018 – 30 June 2018. Report to PIATA partners.

AGRA Mali Portfolio and Partner Mapping

AGRA Mali Progress to date (2018). Report to Management Committee FY 2018. February 2019.

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AGRA. Sikasso Consortium Project Proposal: Improving Smallholder Farmers' Incomes and Food Security Through Enhancing Productivity and Market Access of Maize, Sorghum and Cow Pea Value Chains in Sikasso Region of Mali.

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Goal-1: Roll-out progress report for Q2 (GST-1: Mali & Burkina; GST-2: Ghana & Nigeria. Quarterly Management Review Meeting, Nairobi, 20th July 2017.

### **Mozambique**

AGRA Mozambique, 2019. Grant Status Report, May 2019

AGRA Mozambique, 2019. Mozambique - Operational Plan, updated 2019

AGRA Mozambique. Operational Plan

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AGRA, 2019. "Program for Development & Innovation QMR Status Report, July 2019"

Consortia Performance Report, October 2018

### **Nigeria**

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AGRA Nigeria, 2019. Operational Plan, updated 2019

AGRA Nigeria. Operational Plan

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### **Rwanda**

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AGRA Rwanda. Operational Plan

AGRA, 2019. "AGRA 2019 Mid-Year Report. Annex 1: Country Progress Report", submitted to PIATA Partners 15th August 2019.

AGRA, 2019. "Program for Development & Innovation QMR Status Report, July 2019"

Consortia Performance Report, October 2018

### **Tanzania**

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AGRA Tanzania, 2019. Grant Status Report, May 2019  
AGRA Tanzania, 2019. Operational Plan, updated 2019  
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AGRA, 2018. "AGRA 2018 Mid-Year Report. Annex 1: Country Reports. Report to PIATA partners".  
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Consortia Performance Report October 2018

### **Uganda**

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USAID Uganda-AGRA buy-in concept note, draft 27 August 2019

### **Organisational module**

#### **AGRA**

AGRA, 2016. AGRA Change Management Plan Phase 1 Terms of Reference  
AGRA, 2017. 2017 AGRA Goals and Scorecard, November 2017.  
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AGRA, 2019. AGRA Quarterly Management Review (QMR) 2 FY2019 Discussion and Summary Action Items.  
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AGRA, 2019. Finance Update. 23 July 2019.  
AGRA, 2019. Finance Update. 23 July 2019.  
AGRA, 2019. Ghana Progress to date (2019) Report to Management Committee FY 2019, Q2 2019, July 2019.  
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AGRA, 2019. Grants Committee, Meeting notes, August 30, 2019.

AGRA, 2019. Internal Audit Unit: Strategy Implementation Audit, February 2019.  
AGRA, 2019. Policy, State Capability and Regional Food Trade Division: Performance against targets. QMR 2, July 22, 2019.  
AGRA, 2019. Program Development & Innovation (PDI): Agricultural Systems Development & Delivery Platforms (Consortia). QMR, May 2019.  
AGRA. '7. MTR Queries Grants Responses'  
AGRA. Grants Governance and management entities – Grants Manual Extract.  
PIATA, 2017. 1st PIATA Advisory Committee Meeting minutes, December 2017.  
PIATA, 2018. 2nd PIATA Advisory Committee Meeting minutes, April 2018.  
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PIATA, 2018. PIATA Charter, 26 March 2017  
PIATA, 2019. 4th PIATA Advisory Committee, Meeting minutes, May 2019  
PIATA, 2018. Mid-Year Program Progress, January – June 2019.

### **Regional and continental module**

AGRA, 2018. AGRA Partnerships – Strategic alliances mobilize inclusive agricultural investments to scale AGRA's impact, presentation to the Board, December 2018  
AGRA, 2019. Agribusiness Deal Room to 2020 African Green Revolution Forum (AGRF), 3-6 September 2019, Accra, Ghana  
AGRA, 2019. Partnerships Unit QMR quarter 2, July 2019  
AGRA, 2019. The Agribusiness Deal Room at the 2019 African Green Revolution Forum (AGRF)  
AGRA, 2019. The Youth Agri-preneurship Development Program (YADIS) Factsheet  
Letter of Intent between UPL and Alliance for a Green Revolution (AGRA) on 8<sup>th</sup> May 2019

## Annex 7: List of interviewees

### Country module

#### **Burkina Faso**

AGRA, Country Manager, 06.09.19

#### **Ethiopia**

AGRA, Country Manager, 05.09.19

#### **Ghana**

AGRA, Associate Programme Officer (APO), Inclusive Programme, 09.09.19

AGRA, Grants Officer, 09.09.19

AGRA, Interim Country Manager, 09.09.19

AGRA, M&E Officer, 09.09.19

AGRA, Policy Officer, 09-10.09.19

AGRA, Programme Officer (PO), Fertilisers, 09.09.19

AGRA, PO, Extension, 09.09.19

AGRA, Regional Manager, 12.09.19

AMC Consulting Ltd., Adviser, PFJ, 11.09.19

BMGF, Director, 11.09.19

CSD, Senior Agricultural Officer, 20.09.19

DAES, Director, 12.09.19

DAES, Director, Extension, 12.09.19

DFID, Livelihoods and Climate Adviser, 12.09.19

GIRSAL, CEO, 10.09.19

IFAD, Junior Professional Officer (JPO), West and Central Africa Division, 12.09.19

KFW, Senior Local Expert, 12.09.19

MLGRD, Deputy Minister, 13.09.19

NRCC, Chief Director, 01.10.19

NRCC, Regional Planning Officer, 01.10.19

Parliament, Member of Parliament, 09.09.19

PFJ, Lead, Fertiliser Flagship, 10.09.19

PFJ Secretariat, Head, 10.09.19

PFJ Secretariat, Communications Expert, 10.09.19

PPMED, Director, 10.09.19

PPMED, Deputy Director, 09.09.19

PPRSD, Director and 4 staff members, 12.09.19

RCD, Chief Director, 01.10.19

RCD, Regional Planning Officer (RPO), 01.10.19

RDA, Regional Director of Agriculture, Savannah Region, 01.10.19

RDA, Regional Director of Agriculture, Northern Region, 01.10.19

RDA, Rice Coordinator, MoFA/JICA, 01.10.19

RDA, Regional Agriculture Engineer, 01.10.19

SARI, Director, 02.10.19

SARI, Research Scientist, Maize Breeder, 02.10.19

Savelugu Municipal Assembly (SMA), Municipal Director of Agriculture, 02.10.19

SMA, Municipal Coordinating Director (MCD), 02.10.19

SMA, Municipal Chief Executive, 02.10.19

Walewale Municipal Assembly (WMA), MCD, 04.10.19

WMA, Deputy MCD, 04.10.19

WMA, Municipal Planning Officer, 04.10.19

WMA, Municipal Crop Officer, 04.10.19

**Kenya**

AGRA, Country Manager, 03.09.19

**Malawi**

AGRA, APOs (2), 23.09.19

AGRA, Country Manager, 25.09.19

AGRA, Driver and Administrative Assistant, 23.09.19

AGRA, Regional Head, 23.09.19

AFAP, Malawi country programmes manager, and team members, 24.09.19

DAPS, AGRA Project Coordinator, 24.09.19

DAPS, M&E Officer, 24.09.19

DARS, Director, 25.09.19

DLRC, Head of Department, 24.09.19

FUM, Director, Programme Development and Learning, 24.09.19

Global Seeds, CEO, 23.09.19

Global Seed, Finance Manager, 23.09.19

MUSECO, CEO, 23.09.19

NPC, Board Chairperson, 23.09.19

RUMARK CEO and team member, 25.09.19

World Bank, Agriculture Specialists (2), 26.09.19

**Mali** (date of interviews between 23-27 September 2019)

AGRA, APOs (2)

AGRA, Country manager

AGRA, Finance Administrator

AGRA, Grants Officer

AGRA, Programme Coordinator

AGRA, PO, State Capability

AGRA WA Regional Team, Communications

AGRA WA Regional Team, Distribution & Agro-dealer Development

AGRA WA Regional Team, M&E Manager

AGRA WA Regional Team, M&E Officer

AGRA WA Regional Team, Programme Officer, Inclusive Finance

AGRA WA Regional Team, Programme Officer, Markets

AGRA WA Regional Team, Programme Officer, Soil Fertiliser and Fertiliser Systems

KICAMS Consortium, Agro Dealer Shop Owner, 25.09.19

KICAMS Consortium, CBAs, 25.09.19

KICAMS Consortium, Mayor, Banku Commune, 25.09.19

Koulikoro Consortium, AMASSA Afrique Verte, 25.09.19

Koulikoro Consortium, AMDD, 25.09.19

Koulikoro Consortium General Secretary, Toguna Industries, 25.09.19

Koulikoro Consortium, IER, 25.09.19

Koulikoro Consortium, Manager, 25.09.19

Koulikoro Consortium, Managing Director, 25.09.19

Koulikoro Consortium, Mission Sahel, 25.09.19

Koulikoro Consortium, Partnerships Manager, 25.09.19

Koulikoro Consortium, Accountability, 25.09.19

MoA, Chief of Planning, M&E Unit of CPS, 26.09.19

MoA, Chief, Planning and Analysis Unit, 26.09.19

MoA, Director, DNA, 26.09.19  
MoA, Focal Point for Segou and KICAMS, 24.09.19  
MoA, Project Manager, ICS-SAT, 26.09.19  
MoA, Regional Director of Agriculture, 24.09.19  
USAID (three staff members, 26.09.19

### **Mozambique**

AGRA, Country Manager, 05.09.19

### **Nigeria**

AGRA, Country Manager, 05.09.19

### **Rwanda**

AGRA, Country Manager, 06.09.19

### **Tanzania**

AGRA, APOs (2), 09–11.09.19  
AGRA, Country Manager, 09–10.09.19  
AGRA, PO, Policy and Advocacy, 09.09.19  
AGRA, Regional Head of M&E, 11.09.19  
Agro-dealers (2), 13.09.19  
Alpha Agrovet, Agro-dealer Hub  
BRITEN, CEO, 09–11.09.19  
BRITEN, Head of Programmes, 09–11.09.19  
DAICO, Ludewa DC, 11.09.19  
DAICO, Njombe DC, 11.09.19  
DFID, Staff member, 09.09.19  
USAID, staff member, 09.09.19  
AMCO, 11.09.19  
Mteweke Agro-dealer Hub, General Manager, 10–12.09.19  
Mteweke Agro-dealer Hub, Assistant Director, 10–12.09.19  
PO-RALG, Principal Agriculture Officer, 12.09.19  
RAS Iringa, Principal Agriculture Officer, 10.09.19  
RAS Njombe, Principal Agriculture Officer, 11.09.19  
Silverlands Tanzania Ltd., Managing Director, 10.09.19  
Super-Seki, Owner, 10.09.19  
TAPBDS, 11.09.19  
VBAs (2), 12.09.19  
Ward Agricultural Extension Officer, 11.09.2019

### **Uganda**

AGRA, Country manager, 04.09.19

## **Organisational module**

### **AGRA**

AGRA, Chief of International Cooperation and Strategic Initiatives, 08.08.19  
AGRA, Chief of Staff and Strategy, 08.08.19  
AGRA, Chief Operating Officer, 08.08.19  
AGRA, Country Support & Delivery, 08.08.19  
AGRA, Director, Human Resources and Admin, 14.08.19  
AGRA, Head of AGRF, 12.08.19

AGRA, Head of Development Cooperation, 09.08.19  
AGRA, Head of M&E and KM, 10.08.19  
AGRA, Head of Partnerships, 09.08.19  
AGRA, Head of Policy and Advocacy, 09.08.19  
AGRA, Head of State Capability, 08.08.19  
AGRA, President, 11.10.19  
AGRA, VP Programme Development and Innovation, 09.08.19

**Regional and continental module**

AGRA, Head of Partnerships Unit, 15.10.19

**Others**

Board members (5)  
PAC members (6)  
Bellwethers (9)  
Resilience Office, AGRA Nairobi

## Annex 8: Results of online survey of grantees


### General information

The online survey has been sent via email to 186 grantees in all eleven countries where AGRA is operating. The survey was open for 10 days and generated 74 responses. One response was taken out due to the fact that the responses did not appear coherent and the respondent spent very little time answering, giving few responses, hence, there is a risk that the answers generate biases in the overall results.

### Geographic distribution of respondents

#### Where are you located?


- Number of respondents: 69



### Types of grants

#### What type of grant was your grant specified as?


- Number of respondents: 57



NB: Grantees that are part of a consortium might specify themselves as being under a Partnership grant, rather than as a Systems development grant.

**Duration of grants (in years)**


- Number of respondents: 56
- Min: One year; Max: 5
- Average: 2.5 years



The five-year grant is a Policy and State Capability grant in Nigeria.

**Time between proposal and grant award (in months)**

- Number of respondents: 36
- Average: 7 months




The countries where time between proposal and grant award is >10 months, are:

Uganda (1x), Burkina Faso (2x), Tanzania (2x), Mali, Mozambique, Ghana (3x). Most of them qualify themselves as partnership grants (8x), the other two are systems development grants.

**Time between grant award and grant disbursement (in months)**

- Number of respondents: 40


- Average: 3 months



The three cases where disbursement took longer than 10 months: 2 of them already waited longer than 10 months for their grant approval (Mali and Mozambique).

**What is the approved budget for your grant?**


- Number of respondents: 44



The grants with a value above US\$1 million are in Burkina Faso (3x), Ethiopia (1x) and Mozambique (1x).

**What was the original budget submitted in your proposal?**

- Number of respondents: 29




Three of the >US\$1 million grants have applied for that sum (two did not reply), five applied for US\$500,000–US\$1 million.

***If your approved granted budget is different from your originally submitted budget, what was the reason for the deviation? (open ended)***

<b>Budget constraints and budget review</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>budget constraint.</b></li> <li>- <b>budget cut.</b></li> <li>- <b>DD.</b></li> <li>- <b>DUE TO BUDGET REVIEW.</b></li> <li>- <b>insufficient donor funds to for the project.</b></li> <li>- <b>Not Sure. But reason seemed to be about what was available funds for activity.</b></li> <li>- <b>The reason was that AGRA cannot give Grant with budget above US\$1 million and AGRA is under restructure.</b></li> </ul>
<b>Change in focus of grant/ reduction in targets</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Number of farmers to be reached determined the overall budget.</li> <li>- Our first demand was focused on production and market with a little part of finance. But after several month of discussion about our proposal, the main topic of the project was re-oriented be an "access to finance project" for producers' organization and SME.</li> <li>- The approved budget is not different from the submitted budget.</li> <li>- The budget was not different at all. I believe when it comes different has reasons such as changing on the targets, etc.</li> <li>- The constraint of the number of beneficiaries that caps the budget.</li> <li>- The grant was reduced to specific functions.</li> <li>- The reason was that AGRA cannot give Grant with budget above US\$1 million and AGRA is under restructure.</li> <li>- The reasons were our activities were covering more than 4 crops from the proposal note. Also, it is important to precise that the approved budget cover the 3 consortiums in which we are involved.</li> <li>- The seed production component was removed from the budget and integrated into the seed companies.</li> <li>- Funds for vehicle was removed from the point of award of the grant.</li> </ul>

**Based on current progress, what is the likelihood that you will achieve your overall objectives within the duration of the grant? (scale 1-10)**

- Number of respondents: 47
- Average: 8



**What influences the likelihood that you will achieve your overall objectives within the duration of your grant? (open answers)**

<b>Sufficient resources</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- We have all the resources we need.</li> <li>- A number of factors including disbursement of funds in time by AGRA.</li> <li>- Implementation of the activities and the funds disbursement schedule are well respected.</li> <li>- The restructuring of the grant instalment disbursements that allows for timely project activities that are dependent on rainfall and demos.</li> <li>- Timely disbursement of the grant.</li> <li>- Timely release of funds and the diligence of consortium member.</li> <li>- We did not receive the funds earlier during the first year of implementation. Therefore, to catch up the gaps of seed production, we focus our priority in the seed production by allocating more budget to that activity.</li> <li>- We have the desired inputs for better performance, including timely disbursement of funds, full project team, and government and other partners support.</li> </ul>
<b>Project planning and delivery</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A number of factors including effective project delivery process, ownership of the process by the target actors and beneficiaries, continued innovative approaches in the implementation process.</li> <li>- Administrative procedures</li> <li>- Due to the delay of implementation of the project and tight schedule of government officials i.e. project taskforce, some of objectives will be achieved beyond duration of the grant. But ESRF has requested for no-cost extension for accomplishing pending activities.</li> <li>- Good planning.</li> <li>- Later start of the project implementation.</li> <li>- We have clarity of scope with clear objectives, targets, indicators that can be achieved within the duration of the project.</li> </ul>


<p><b>Partnership/ Collaboration</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Based on the achievement in the first year of the project, the overall objectives can be achieved by the end of the project. The necessary partnerships have been established to help in achieving the project objectives.</li> <li>- Collaborations with consortium partners.</li> <li>- Existing spirit of teamwork with consortium members, communities/ farmers and the government- local government authorities.</li> <li>- Good relationship with Government, local leaders, farmers and clear explanation of the project to all actors and direct and indirect beneficiaries.</li> <li>- Overall cooperation we get from the local government and farmers.</li> <li>- The key influences are partnership and consortium model which includes agri-input network development and market systems. It is all related to clear objectives and realistic targets.</li> <li>- We actually over-achieved the overall objectives and this was done by working together with the other consortium hand in hand.</li> <li>- We just begin our first grant with AGRA and our engagement to active the objective of the project is strong. The producer’s organizations and SME support of the project is motivated. Our team is also professional.</li> </ul>
<p><b>External factors</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Improvement of EAC SPS Protocol ratification 2. Removal of taxes on Post harvest technology 3. Development of agricultural crop insurance policy scheme 4. Harmonization of Malabo and ASDP indicators as well as country performance template for BRR.</li> <li>- Government willingness to design the Fertilizers, Extension and Agricultural Finance Policies.</li> <li>- Natural calamities and late disbursements of funds.</li> <li>- Security context.</li> <li>- Structured market system working very well.</li> <li>- The availability of target groups and the pertinence of the intervention.</li> <li>- The market for agricultural products.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Other factors</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Beneficiary’s awareness.</li> <li>- Farmers interest to learn about new technologies that will improve their production is one very positive factor. However, issues in the design in relation to motivation for people’s willingness to sign up and remain committed to be village-based advisors; unattractiveness of baby seed/input packs to many farmers may delay/affect the level of achievement.</li> <li>- Reach out to more farmers.</li> <li>- The downsizing of activities to what project can support.</li> <li>- The key influences are partnership and consortium model which includes agri-input network development and market systems. It is all related to clear objectives and realistic targets.</li> <li>- The level of progress that has been made so far.</li> <li>- The market for agricultural products.</li> <li>- The restructuring of the grant installment disbursements that allows for timely project activities that are dependent on rainfall and demos.</li> <li>- The shelling machine provided is support our local sourcing activities and we are planning to buy a dryer from the provided funds which will also improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the work.</li> <li>- The task is huge and the time (3 years) is short.</li> <li>- Timely disbursement of the grant.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Timely release of funds and the diligence of consortium member.</li><li>- We actually over-achieved the overall objectives and this was done by working together with the other consortium hand in hand.</li><li>- We are determined to make it happen in order to achieve organizational set goals.</li><li>- We are on course to even exceed the target.</li><li>- Affordable insurance product for only small holder farmers.</li><li>- Achieved crop and soil specific blend in some location within the country.</li></ul>
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### Consortium


#### ***Are you a member of a consortium?***

- Number of respondents: 53
- Yes: 38; No: 15




#### ***How many members does your consortium have?***

- Number of respondents:33
- Average: 5



**What percentage of the overall grant from the consortium is your grant?**


- Number of respondents: 25
- Average: 34%



**Satisfaction with**

**Grant application process (scale 1-10)**

- Number of respondents: 32
- Average: 7.5




**Comments:**

<p><b>Delays</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A lot of delay in fund transfers. Example: two transfers in four quarters</li> <li>- cumbersome and unnecessary delays</li> <li>- It took a long time for grant to be processed and approved</li> <li>- It takes long time to approve</li> <li>- Takes too long a time for approval. The grant committee fail to consider the raining or farming seasons for the crop which have a significant influence on the success of the project</li> <li>- The time frame from submission to award and release of funds were too long. The award and funds release were delayed and project take off was late</li> <li>- Too much time.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Required input</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- it was a bit tedious</li> <li>- It was quite laborious especially working as a consortium</li> <li>- Wage, working condition, benefits have to improve</li> </ul>
<p><b>Good support</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- AGRA gave guidelines on application process.</li> <li>- AGRA has supported the submission of proposals by advising and following up on the success of applications.</li> <li>- Appreciate on the support we get from Program and Grant units</li> <li>- The co-creation and technical support received from AGRA made the process much easier.</li> <li>- The grant application process is highly consultative that leads to improvement and sharpening of project indicators and the overall proposal.</li> <li>- The process has been quick and responses on time from AGRA team</li> </ul>
<p><b>Process</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Clear and easy to apply</li> <li>- It was a competitive process and the selection was based on the quality of the concept note</li> <li>- Process was not initially clear as to whether it was competitive or not. Ultimately, partners came together to finalize the proposal after developing separate organizational proposals.</li> <li>- The approach is innovative by gathering different partners in a consortium which is a framework where they can share experiences and information about the activities.</li> <li>- The process is participatory, and hence takes into consideration all factors in the ground.</li> <li>- The process is well clear and guidelines are given prior to proposal writing</li> </ul>

**Type of support received from AGRA (scale 1-10)**

- Number of respondents: 31
- Average: 7.7




**Comments:**

<p><b>Training</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- AGRA has provided excellent support at all levels for improved accountability and training.</li> <li>- AGRA is always available to help clarify any questions or concerns we raise. They provide needed training and support when it comes to reporting and use of AMIS.</li> <li>- AGRA programs, grants and M&amp;E teams did very good orientation and onboarding for the project. They also facilitated timely restructuring of the grant installment disbursements that led to successful execution of project activities. The different teams in AGRA work well to provide support to us a grantee.</li> <li>- AGRA tries to support grantee to achieve the goal by providing training and advice</li> </ul>
<p><b>Proposal</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Supported the development of the proposal</li> <li>- The PO working with (Ones Karuho) was very supportive and he understood the direction we wanted to take. So, he provided the needed support for a better and more aligned (with PIATA overall objectives and goal) proposal.</li> <li>- Proposal elaboration support and coordinating information among consortium members.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Technical support</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Consolidation of seed production facilities in our research station</li> <li>- From the beginning, the approach was not well understood but after a year of implementation the partners in the different consortiums have learned a lot in terms of capacity building for seed production and farmers and markets information sharing on seed value chains.</li> <li>- In most cases, program officer has been on driving seat to ensure challenges are resolved on time</li> <li>- It has come in a good time in the history of Ghana to support us produce good quality seeds for farmers which has intend given them good yields</li> <li>- Support for Policy advocacy</li> <li>- We have received all technical and financial support required to effectively implement the project.</li> </ul>

<b>Country office</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Country manager was very supportive</li> <li>- They are every cooperative</li> <li>- Timely response on any issue raised</li> <li>- We really received and stronger support from Agra Burkina team</li> </ul>
<b>Others</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Delay in Disbursement of funds</li> <li>- I do not know what the rules and AGRA interventions are based on country and farmers assisted or in poor countries</li> <li>- Very satisfied</li> </ul>

**Grant performance to date (scale 1-10)**

- Number of respondents: 39
- Average: 7.2




**Comments:**

<b>Progress</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- It is within the time schedule.</li> <li>- Almost all the indicators in the KPI were green during the previous reporting period (September 2019) and external audit by KPMG has rated our performance has good.</li> <li>- For the first year, it was difficult to achieve our target because we did not get funds in the first 3 quarters in 2018. But in the second year, our expectations are above our target if any other external factor does not intervene.</li> <li>- Project activities are on course to achieve stated objectives.</li> <li>- So far, the performance is good and we hope we will achieve the excellent level.</li> <li>- Some activities did not start yet because of paperwork, but they will certainly be done soon.</li> <li>- Successful.</li> <li>- The grant is at 50% delivery level and well on track based on the project work plan and budget and results on the ground are clearly evident.</li> </ul>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The key planned activities for current period were successful achieved.</li> <li>- We received NCE to finalise the remaining activities and the grant.</li> <li>- With the remaining time, ANSAF will be able to exhaust all the resources allocated for this project.</li> <li>- We are in the 2 quarter of the implementations.</li> <li>- We just started our grant.</li> </ul>
<b>Problems</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- We are not 100% due to late project kick off due to the delay in the proposal approval. Our proposal was to start August at latest but we only kicked off in October. therefore, we missed the 2017/2018 production season. We only captured the commercialization season. So, it did not allow the project to fully assist the farmers and achieve the year 1 targets.</li> <li>- The grant is being implemented as a pre-finance project which shouldn't be the case. AGRA delays in releasing funds for the quarter. Funds are always released at the end of the quarter, even dough reports will be submitted and approved on time, funds always delay. This affect the pace of the project. And one cannot implement if one cannot pre-finance.</li> <li>- Some targets do not fit the reality (overestimate); The target product market is bad; Monitoring and evaluation tools vary too much; Instability in structuring grantees.</li> <li>- outstanding deliverables.</li> </ul>
<b>Outcomes</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- It has improved the seed industry in Ghana.</li> </ul>

**Government Institutions**

- Number of respondents: 42
- Yes: 11; No: 31



**Extent to which:**

***AGRA initiatives have built capacity in your area of work (scale 1-10)***

- Number of respondents: 7
- Average: 7.3




**Comments:**

- Reaching out to the unserved and underserved smallholder farmers with financial services.
- Supported capacity building programs.
- Working with partners who are from different background like research, NGOs, Seed Companies and Extension Services.

**AGRA is a thought leader (scale 1-10):**

- Number of respondents: 6
- Average: 6.5




**Comments:**

- AGRA initiatives aligned well with SELF Microfinance Fund mandate.
- Yes, because it supports research for solving farmers and improving efficiency in systems.

**AGRA addresses the most critical needs of government (scale 1-10):**


- Number of respondents: 6
- Average: 6.7



- AGRA has been working with my institution for several years in developing new crop varieties. As first institution of agricultural research our critical needs have been addressed by AGRA in creating and developing quality and high yields crop varieties.
- Yes, especially on financial inclusion targeting small holder farmers

**AGRA is responsive to support emerging windows of opportunity (scale 1-10)**

- Number of respondents: 9
- Average: 7.4



**Comments:**

- For emerging windows of opportunity, we can cite the risk sharing partnership where farmers and financial institutions are share the risk in finding capital.
- SELF Microfinance Fund would wish to see that AGRA continue with the support not only to small holder farmers but also to Micro and Small Entrepreneurs (MSMEs). SELF business model was wholesale lending to financial intermediaries but now the government has directed that we open window for retail lending to MSMEs. This is a new area which SELF will need to partner with others like AGRA as this grant comes to an end.
- Yes, AGRA works on real time issues in my country from research to policy

### What do you like the most about your work with AGRA?

<b>Consortia</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The approach of consortium which can be useful for the government and other partners.</li> </ul>
<b>Support</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- AGRA support on addressing financial needs to small holder farmers. Regular meetings to address challenges and lessons learnt</li> <li>- The partnership and support from staff to implement project</li> <li>- Technical staff are very supportive</li> <li>- Project Staff in AGRA are available to assist when needed and collaboration among partners is allowed</li> <li>- Review meetings that help to ensure partners are on track and assistance in reporting in AMIS</li> <li>- The openness and support of AGRA staff</li> <li>- The level of AGRA involvement in project implementation governance which makes AGRA informed and aware of implementation challenges and therefore the opportunity to jointly find solutions that will work</li> <li>- Their keen interest in interventions get down to the smallholder farmers</li> <li>- The most distinct characteristic of AGRA unlike other partners is the technical support during proposal development, the co-creation process. This ensures engagement and alignment with the overall program goals and objectives. The other important aspect is the regular disbursement of funds that enables continuity of the implementation.</li> <li>- AGRA staff members are easily accessible and available on short notice to advise and keeping track of projects and program objectives.</li> <li>- Openness and promptness in responding to questions, but working as partners and not just as a recipient of AGRA grant</li> <li>- Technical assistance from AGRA is always available. Others include Joint planning, Monitoring and evaluation</li> <li>- Teamwork, problem solving and mutual understanding</li> <li>- How we can discuss and achieve the objectives of the project together. The support of Agra specialist and the connexion with other opportunities.</li> <li>- We have the partnership with other relevant institutions. The quick response of the AGRA technical support</li> <li>- The permanent assistance from AGRA officials on the project implementation</li> <li>- AGRA has been very supportive.</li> <li>- The team at AGRA is highly qualified, engaging and dynamic in the support they provide. They are also very responsive to requests made by us a grantee.</li> <li>- Grant, support and encouragement</li> <li>- Dedicated AGRA teams who are always read to support us whenever we need clarity.</li> </ul>
<b>Partnership</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Continue collaboration and partnership</li> <li>- Work implement together as a team, AGRA team flow through and provides all necessary support in field and in terms of tools needed for reports. Also, AGRA is focused on supporting the systems and development programs to work smoothly</li> <li>- Teamwork</li> </ul>
<b>AGRA's approach</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Their willingness to help both start-ups and multinational organizations</li> <li>- Working with a consortium</li> <li>- Supporting the Government to reformulate agricultural policies that are responsive to the needs of the farmers transformation in an innovative ways manner based on new technologies</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The interaction with grantees, working strategies, training and reporting through an online platform</li> <li>- Their ability to intervene in different value chains by strengthening small farmers, developing seed production systems. Potentiation, development and market strengthening of agricultural inputs and products. Also, the support for technology breakdown in agriculture.</li> <li>- We are addressing the key issue jeopardizing our seed system</li> <li>- It supports many areas of our Institutional strategic plan, vision and mission on policy development and capacity building of policy practitioners</li> <li>- The multi stakeholder approach to deliver impact and the direct interaction with beneficiaries</li> <li>- AGRA has been at the center of many of the improvements taking place in agriculture sector in Ghana. Through their work, we have developed important competencies, technologies, and partnerships, and have positioned us to catalyze and sustain an inclusive agricultural transformation that will uplift farm livelihoods and secure adequate, nutritious food for the continent’s population.</li> </ul>
<b>Others</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Aggressiveness and results oriented</li> <li>- Consortium team work, increased learning on project monitoring, data collection and report</li> <li>- Availability of AGRA Country Office</li> <li>- Rigor in the delivery of deliverables and the creation of exchange frameworks to better achieve the objectives set</li> <li>- Reporting system (AMIS)</li> <li>- That the transfers are not late</li> <li>- Easy contact and quick feedback.</li> </ul>

**What could AGRA do to make your interventions more effective?**

<b>Grant disbursement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Funds reception in due time.</li> <li>- Timely award and disbursement of funds for project take off</li> <li>- That the transfers are not late</li> <li>- Provide requesting funds on time.</li> <li>- early disbursement of fund</li> <li>- Release funds on time and consider farming seasons of crops in question</li> <li>- Improve the time of funds disbursement for activities, provide more funds to agribusiness sector/ networking and capacity building at most</li> <li>- Delay of payment</li> <li>- Timely Disbursement</li> </ul>
<b>Size and length of grant</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- We received only 8.6% of the overall budget while we are in charge of very essential aspects of the project</li> <li>- budgets are often a bit tight regarding the ambitious goals</li> <li>- AGRA must increase number of years of intervention: 3 years in agriculture (at least in Mozambique) means 2 seasons – not enough to achieve consolidated results, mainly when introducing a new methodology, technology or practice to farmers. The least number of years could be 4, which would account for 3 agriculture seasons.</li> <li>- Increase the investments</li> <li>- AGRA could provide funding for longer period at least 3 years to private sector companies like ours including increasing the amount of funding for interventions that are considered to be a public good undertaken by private sector companies.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To extend the period of implementation taking into account the late start</li> <li>- More Fund, Linking with CSA</li> </ul>
<b>Training and support</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- More frequent reflection sessions with partners over challenges; be more realistic with outreach targets and be less prescriptive.</li> <li>- To continue providing technical support and setting aside some financial support for joint planning, monitoring and evaluation with the local authorities.</li> <li>- Given technical support and trainer our staff on Agra procedures.</li> <li>- Continued engagement and technical support provided on any consultative matters</li> <li>- Capacity building and sharing experiences with other government beneficiaries including visiting the sites were successful stories can be learned through observations on the field.</li> <li>- More support to farmers to produce more quantity and quality maize and soybean, - Support in different equipment required to lower down the cost of production the fortified foods and increase local sourcing</li> <li>- Provide a training on report writing to the project staff</li> <li>- There should be constant training for grantees to offer the needed support to ensure project targets are be worked on.</li> <li>- Continue to support Ghanaian seed producers to produce good quality seeds for farmers which will transform into achieving food sufficiency in the country</li> <li>- Continue to be available whenever we need clarity. Provide training for specific activities regarding use of tools.</li> <li>- Extend support to different existing actors and partners. Support the various actors in management and accountability training.</li> <li>- AGRA support has stimulated demand for pre- and post-harvest financial services; as program ends in two months from now SELF will need more support to meet demand.</li> <li>- AGRA support is still vital to influence policy change and thus needs to extend its support to research institutions for research and capacity building of policy actors</li> <li>- Supporting Technically and Financially</li> <li>- Extend support for improved livelihood of smallholders at least 6 years for impact assessment</li> </ul>
<b>Approach</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Strengthen partnership with government to promote effectiveness in delivering project objectives</li> <li>- AGRA should scale up the policy project covering 6 Counties to the 12 proposed counties if the project results will be sustainable. We have submitted an upscaling proposal in consultation with the Project Officer.</li> <li>- In future, when signing partnership agreement, involving government departments, funding management could be a challenge as ANSAF may not have direct influence on how such resources are spent and some delays on reporting may emerge. Such problems could be solved by ensuring every institution receiving grant manages its resources and directly accountable to AGRA</li> <li>- AGRA should concentrate more on investments in systems and capacity building for farmers towards higher value commercialized farming and support structured trading systems and agriculture financing to bolster smallholder farmers' resilience.</li> </ul>
<b>Nothing further</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The all we need from AGRA has been provided</li> <li>- So far so good</li> </ul>
<b>Other</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Forging well-crafted and responsive work tools conform to deliverables. The monitoring and evaluation tools vary constantly</li> </ul>

## Annex 9: Itad ethical principles

This Statement of Ethical Principles sets a standard to which our evaluation team will adhere to. The evaluation team members will operate in accordance with international human rights conventions and covenants to which the United Kingdom is a signatory, regardless of local country standards. The evaluation team takes responsibility for identifying the need for and securing any necessary ethics approval for the work they are undertaking. This may include other stakeholder institutions with formal ethics approval systems. The conduct of all those working on the evaluation is characterised by the following general principles and values:

### **Principle 1: Independence and impartiality of the researchers**

Itad evaluators are independent and impartial. Any conflicts of interest or partiality will be made explicit and raised with Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation as soon as they arise, alongside steps taken for mitigation.

### **Principle 2: Avoiding Harm**

Itad evaluators will ensure that the basic human rights of individuals and groups with whom they interact are protected. This is particularly important with regard to vulnerable people.

It should be noted that the team does not expect to interact with vulnerable people during the course of this contract.

### **Principle 3: Child protection**

The team will follow the code of conduct established by Save the Children (2003) which covers awareness of child abuse, minimizing risks to children, reporting and responding where concerns arise about possible abuse. Team members will obtain informed consent from parents or caregivers and from children themselves. Children will not be required to participate even if their parents' consent.

It should be noted that the evaluation team does not expect to interact with children during the course of this contract.

### **Principle 4: Treatment of Participants**

The evaluation team is aware of differences in culture, local customs, religious beliefs and practices, personal interaction and gender roles, disability, age and ethnicity, and will be mindful of the potential implications of these differences when planning, carrying out and reporting on evaluations.

### **Principle 5: Voluntary participation**

Participation in research and evaluation will be voluntary and free from external pressure. Information will not be withheld from prospective participants that might affect their willingness to participate. All participants have a right to withdraw from research/ evaluation and withdraw any data concerning them at any point without fear of penalty.

### **Principle 6: Informed consent**

The evaluation team will inform participants how information and data obtained will be used, processed, shared, disposed of, prior to obtaining consent.

### **Principle 7: Ensuring confidentiality**

The evaluation team will respect people's right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. They will also inform participants about the scope and limits of confidentiality where these exist.

### **Principle 8: Data security**

Itad takes its approach to information security and GDPR very seriously, ensuring all personal or sensitive information is adequately protected to industry recognised standards. Itad are certified with the government backed CyberEssentials scheme. This is based on international best practice, is risk-based and includes aspects such as physical security, staff awareness, data backup and GDPR. Itad Ltd is registered with the Information Commissioner in the UK as a 'data controller' in accordance with the provisions of the European General Data Protection Regulation and Data Protection Act.

### **Principle 9: Sharing of findings**

Itad evaluators are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/ or oral presentation of study limitations, findings and recommendations.

### **References**

DFID evaluation ethics:

[https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/67483/dfid-ethics-prcpls-rsrch-eval.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67483/dfid-ethics-prcpls-rsrch-eval.pdf)

Young Lives: <http://www.younglives.org.uk/what-we-do/research-methods/ethics>

UK Data Archive: <http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/create-manage/consent-ethics>

ESRC Ethics Framework: <http://www.esrc.ac.uk/about-esrc/information/research-ethics.aspx> and <http://www.ethicsguidebook.ac.uk>

## Annex 10: AGRA MTE – interview checklist, regional heads

This is included to indicate how the ET held to ethical principles for example in terms of explaining the purpose of the interview and respecting the interviewee’s anonymity.

Key Informant Name	
Key Informant Title and contact details	
Interviewer	
Date/Location	
Interview/File #	

### Introduction:

I/we are part of the team contracted by BMGF to carry out a mid term evaluation of AGRAs 2017-2021 Strategy and PIATAs support to that. The evaluation is a formative process evaluation, in that we are looking very much at the processes AGRA has set underway to undertake their new integrated country-oriented approach. Through seven key evaluation questions we are looking at how AGRAs delivery model is working, progress AGRA has made against its strategy, how the monitoring it does feeds back into learning and change and how effective AGRA is in establishing a unique service-offering and in forming strategic partnerships. In relation to PIATA we are looking at how the new partnership engagement and funding model, working through a shared results framework, is working. We are interested in looking at how PIATA impacts on AGRAs strategic thinking and ways of working and vice versa, and we want to explore whether the new model of funding through PIATA can pave the way for AGRA to secure a diverse and sustainable funding stream.

We started work on this assignment in July and submitted our final inception report on 22 August. We have a home-based team carrying out desk review, and in addition four senior evaluators are visiting four countries for case study work. The countries are Tanzania, Ghana, Malawi and Mali and in each country the team is being joined by a national consultant. Our analysis and synthesis phase starts in early October and our final report is due early December. After due process of review and consultation among the partners, a version of the final report and supporting materials will be made available to the public—both for transparency and to provide value to the broader development community. (Note to interviewee, what goes to the public will be edited to remove any specific issues concerning AGRA as an organization especially those that relate to findings from the organizational module that could have implications for AGRA in the development space especially with potential funding partners).

I/we respect your right to anonymity so anything you say will not be directly attributed to you. Also, if at any stage during the interview there is anything you prefer for us not to record then just say.

(Then start with intros and checking how much time the interviewee/s have. If short, then quickly prioritise which questions to focus on (and there may be some that can better be asked by e-mail later)

### Start-up questions:

- How long have you been working with AGRA and in what capacities? (Confirm the countries they are covering). And ask the first two questions that are listed under Decentralisation copied below
- What is the role of the Regional Head? What are you responsible for and accountable for?
- What is the nature of the relationship between Regional Heads and country teams, and between Regional Heads and other Divisions and Units?

### 1. Strategy-setting: (EQ2)

- Is there a regional strategy and if so how was it set? How top-down versus bottom-up was the process [probe for the role of AGRA HQ, and country teams]? How effective was the process [e.g. in terms of

creating regional strategies that are aligned with the overall AGRA objectives but that take into account regional variation]?

## **2. Results against the 5-year strategy: (EQ1)**

- What are the main strategic objectives for Region X? What are some of the key initiatives [at the regional level, not within individual countries]?
- What are the key targets for Region X? What progress has been made against targets to date?
- Have there been any substantive changes in the operating environment at the regional-level that have made it harder or easier for AGRA to achieve its targets?

## **3. Delivery model (EQ2):**

- How well is the integrated delivery model reflected in the regional strategies / operational plans? To what extent is this integrated model contributing to better results at the regional level [probe for examples]?
- Which AGRA-level tools, approaches, and programmes are most relevant for Region X? What has been the experience of integrating these at the regional-level?

## **4. Decentralisation (EQ8):**

- What is the role of the Regional Heads? What are you responsible for and accountable for? (asked at start of interview)
- What is the nature of the relationship between Regional Heads and country teams, and between Regional Heads and other Divisions and Units? (asked at start of interview)
- How effective are these relationships in terms of: communication flow and knowledge sharing, clarity of responsibility and accountability, value-addition and synergies? Have you encountered any problems [e.g. in terms of additional layers of bureaucracy, lack of clarity in responsibilities etc.]?
- What types of activities / interventions are delivered at a regional level rather than at a country-level, and how has this improved delivery? To what extent does the existence of regional strategies and heads improve the coherence and efficiency of delivery [e.g. probe for examples of regional strategies / units removing duplication or inconsistencies at the country-level]?
- Do you have any role in ensuring that the AGRA Country teams you support are addressing cross-cutting themes including inclusivity (women and youth empowerment) and resilience?
- How could the decentralisation process be improved? Has the right balance been struck between centralisation and decentralisation? What support do you get from the Head office in terms of linking with bodies such as CAADP, NEPAD, FARA, AU and AfDB operating at the continental level and in terms of sharing experiences in this with other Regional Heads?

## **5. Monitoring progress and adapting (EQ3):**

- What is the process for identifying and managing regional-level underperformance against targets / milestones? How effective is it?
- What is the process for generating and sharing lessons at the regional level (both between countries in a given region, and across regions) [probe for examples]? How effective is it?
- To what extent has data, strategic insights, and lessons learned, informed decision-making and implementation at the regional-level [probe for examples]?

## **6. Partnerships (EQ7):**

- What regional partnerships has AGRA formed in Region X (disaggregated by type)?

- Which key organisations have you sought to partner with at the regional level( e.g. the Regional Economic Communities and the regional research and development bodies (such as ASARECA, or large donor funded programmes operating on a regional basis, or PS seed companies with a regional focus etc.). Are there any key organisations at the regional-level that AGRA has struggled to form a partnership with? Why?
  - What is the process for identifying and prioritising partnership opportunities? What exclusion / selection / prioritisation criteria are used? How effective is the process?
  - What is the approach to catalysing investment from regional actors in Region X? How effective has this been – how much investment has been leveraged, from whom, and what are the trends over time? Has the approach proven more effective with certain types of actors [e.g. private sector vs regional multilateral bodies]?
  - How has AGRA built its internal capacity to deliver effective partnerships at the regional-level [e.g. staff guidance and training, creating regional heads]? How effective has this been?
  - What constraints (internal / external) does AGRA face in forming effective partnerships in Region X?
- 7. Sustainability [i.e. the continuation of impact beyond the lifetime of intervention] (EQ5)**
- Which regional partnerships are showing encouraging emerging signs of sustainability [probe for evidence]? Which partnerships are showing fewer signs of sustainability? What factors explain the difference? Is there any variation across types of partners (e.g. private sector vs governmental)? [Probe in particular partners engaged in policy / advocacy]

## Annex 11: Methods and tools

### Steckler and Linnan guide

**Fidelity** is the extent to which an intervention was implemented as planned, i.e. actual activities versus implementation plan/strategy for the specified time period? At the organisational level this could look at the interventions PIATA employed to catalyse investments from others or implementation of initiatives to better create regional partners. Sources include progress reports.

**Dose** relates to two components: completeness and satisfaction.

**Completeness** is the amount or number of units of each intervention delivered (quantities of agricultural inputs delivered *vis-à-vis* expected crop production/yield) or provided (average number of extension visits or training provided to farmers against workplan). Data sources include KIIs, extension service records/reports and input distribution records.

**Satisfaction** relates to partners' or beneficiaries' satisfaction with an intervention including interactions with staff and other partners. This may include government officials' satisfaction rating of PIATA's capacity building interventions or staff and grantees' perception and satisfaction with the implementation and performance of the new partnership model. Data can be collected through KIIs and online surveys.

**Receptivity** looks at the extent to which participants actively engage or are receptive to recommended resources, e.g. the adoption of new crop varieties. These data can be collected through KIIs with extension workers and agro-dealers, FGDs with representative farmer communities and monitoring data.

**Reach** refers to the proportion of intended beneficiaries that participate in the intervention, including barriers to access often relating to gender, roles, ethnicity, ability, age, sexual orientation and language. We solicit evidence from desk reviews, AMIS monitoring data and KIIs to explore the proportion of farmers reached directly and indirectly by AGRA as well as institutions reached by type.

**Adaptation** looks at whether changes have been made to implementation to fit context and increase chances of success. We will explore how PIATA has been monitored and if or how learning has been generated and adopted into programming.

### Data collection

The evaluation data collection and analysis tools are summarised below:

**Online survey:** The evaluation will set up an online survey targeted at PIATA grantees and partners to collate evidence on perceptions and satisfaction rating on select indicators.

**Key informant interviews:** A series of KIIs will be conducted with PIATA and its partners from the country to HQ level. The sampling frame for KIIs will be identified in consultation with in-country Resource Partners and AGRA teams.

**Bellwethers:** Key informants who have insights into particular issues such as operational effectiveness of the PIATA new partnership engagement and funding model or AGRA's influence on government policy adoption and implementation, but who are not decision makers in themselves – are asked to reflect on PIATA's model, partnerships and policy influence. Bellwethers not only identify general trends and attitudes but can also highlight approaches that could be counterproductive to progress. They may also have knowledge on placement of issues important to PIATA on policy agenda.

**Focus groups:** In the four case study countries, we will conduct focus groups with select beneficiaries and grantees such as farmer representatives or AGRA staff. Our sampling of participants will ensure voices of women and marginalised groups are represented.

**Timeline analysis** can be employed to capture the evolution of governance structures or responsiveness of an intervention to windows of opportunities; for example, fit and timeliness of AGRA business practices

*vis-à-vis* government demand and windows of opportunity. We will also look at the effectiveness of the PIATA funding and partnership model including changes at different levels (country, regional, continental) in practice, shifts in interactions and implementation of strategies to attract new streams of funding.

**Force field analysis** provides a framework for looking at the factors that are either driving or hindering movement towards a goal. The tool can be used to foster a rich discussion on the forces (persons, attitudes, customs, institutions) seeking to promote change and on the other hand forces working against it. For example, contextual factors influencing AGRA's ability to influence policy and decision making, AGRA's effectiveness as a thought leader and obstacles/opportunities for domestic and regional actors to expand the role that AGRA has advanced in the policy space.

**Partnership assessment scales:** Measure the extent to which good partnership enablers exist using a set of composite indicators. The scales provide a structure for assessing the effectiveness of partnerships across different levels (country, regional/continental and organisational) and types (donor funding, private sector and government partnerships). The ET will assess AGRA's progress through composite indicators made up of AGRA's pre-defined enablers of partnership building.

## Annex 12: The process followed to co-create recommendations.

As indicated in the inception report, recommendations were to be co-created. To this end, the evaluation team (ET) followed a number of steps as detailed below:

a) The evaluation team reviewed the findings across all the objectives and identified four areas which need serious consideration, in that a range of findings were relevant to each of these areas, as indicated in the table below:

*Annex Table 1: Findings informing area of recommendations<sup>93</sup>*

Recommendation area	Related Findings
Strategy	11 findings
Decentralisation	8 findings
MEL	7 findings
Grants	6 findings

b) The evaluation team reviewed the range of findings related to each area and developed four top-line recommendations as indicated in the box below:

*Annex Box 1: Top-line recommendations*

**Strategy:** AGRA should review its objectives against its vision, goals, time and resources for the strategic plans and determine what they can realistically focus on and scale.

**Decentralization:** With decentralization as a key deliverable for 2020, AGRA should empower and increase accountability of country teams in country planning cycles, developing regional and country strategies, with appropriate levels of quality assurance.

**MEL:** AGRA should revise its MEL system to better define who needs what information, when and why, to improve quality of programming and decision making.

**Grants:** For non-competitive grants, AGRA to improve quality of design and efficiency of management.

c) The ET then considered prompts, based on their understanding of the findings and potential sub-recommendations for each area (see end of this annex).

d) The ET facilitated group work for each area. Work on the strategy area was split between two groups: Policy and State Capability and Systems and Partnerships. This resulted in a total of five areas of recommendations, two related to Strategy, followed by decentralization, MEL and grants. Groups had the option to develop or add their own sub-questions/prompts; which the P&S group did.

e) Each group reported back in plenary after which there was a Q&A session.

f) The AGRA team later reviewed the outputs to identify key areas for recommendations.

g) Recommendations around the four areas were shared with resource partners (RPs) who also had an opportunity to comment.

h) Following this the evaluation team drew on the outputs to draft the first part of the recommendations section of the report and then, in the second part, added additional recommendations.

### Prompts for group work co-creating recommendations between ET and AGRA, 20.11.19

#### A. Strategy

**Top line: At the strategy level, AGRA should review its objectives against its vision, goals, time and resources for 2017–2021 strategic plans and look at what to realistically focus on.**

<sup>93</sup> Note that this table concerns the findings as they stood when the co-creation of recommendations workshop was held. Findings evolved as a result of the workshop and subsequent rounds of comments on the main report. Annex 15 indicates how the final findings informed conclusions and in turn recommendations.

### Questions across the thematic areas

How can AGRA capitalise its Unique Service Offering as Convenor at the continental level, catalyst and/or broker at the country level?

How can AGRA with PIATA mobilize resources for strategy implementation?

### Questions related to each thematic area

#### B. Policy and Advocacy

In each country, what does success look like in policy and advocacy at the end of 2021?

How can AGRA identify and prioritize the most effective systems bottle necks to focus on in the remainder of the strategic period.

- Including working with other PIATA partners.
- Working across other state and non- state departments.

#### *State Capability*

In each country, what does success look like in state capability at the end of 2021?

- Technical Assistance.
- National agriculture investment plans.
- Flagships.

How can AGRA prioritize to maximize potential of envisaged results by 2021?

#### **Systems Development**

In each country, what does success look like in systems development, at the end of 2021?

- Sustainability of success.

In each country, which are the weakest areas in the value chain that AGRA can focus on?

How can AGRA learn good practice from across Africa in designing and implementing the integrated delivery model? (M4P, value chain diagnostics)

- Guidance notes
- Training materials
- Tool kits
- Frameworks

#### **Partnerships**

In each country, what does success look like in partnerships at the end of 2021?

#### C. Decentralization

**Top line: With decentralization as a key deliverable for 2020, AGRA should increase the level of empowerment and accountability of country teams in terms of the country planning-budgeting-review cycle, developing regional and country strategies, with appropriate levels of quality assurance.**

How can AGRA strengthen its country planning cycle including processes such as budgeting, linkages between the themes and relationships with the partnership teams?

Given the existing budget and limits on head count, how can AGRA balance between existing competencies and increased autonomy for country teams?

What quality control mechanisms need to be put in place by headquarters (HQ) and regional offices to support increased autonomy over planning cycles and associated budgets.

What should the objectives and core functions of regional teams be?

- Regional partnerships.
- Relationship with country teams and HQ.
- Grant making process (Charter).

D. MEL and Knowledge Management

**Top line: AGRA should review its Monitoring Evaluation and Learning system to improve the measurement of strategic outcomes, quality of programming and to support decision making.**

What are the key questions AGRA regional partnerships and board need answered periodically and how can that information be generated?

How can AGRA better understand and monitor the quality of its work across the three themes on an ongoing basis?

How can AGRA test the assumptions set out in its ToC and nested ToCs at the country and thematic levels?

How can AGRA improve learning between countries and themes?

How can AGRA effectively communicate its unique service offering (USO) as catalyst in working with governments?

E. Grant management:

**Top line: For non-competitive grants, AGRA should Improve the quality of grant design and efficiency of grant management.**

How can AGRA improve the quality of grant design?

- Proposal guidance and oversight.
- Criteria for selection.
- Timeliness for awarding.
- Streamlining of reporting.

How can AGRA improve grant reporting in terms of:

- Reducing fragmentation of reporting from individual consortium members?
- Comparing results across the value chain?
- Frequency of reporting (competent/trusted grantees)

### Annex 13: Evidence trail between findings, conclusions and recommendations.

There are 32 main findings in the report in total. These are numbered chronologically within each main finding box at the end of each finding. There are 10 conclusions, again these are numbered at the end of each conclusion from C1 to C10. The first five recommendations were co-created and the other five independent recommendations from the ET.

This annex indicates how the findings informed the conclusions and how the conclusions informed the recommendations. First all the findings in the report are listed and numbered from 1-32. Second the 10 conclusions are listed. Last, a table is provided which indicates which findings informed which conclusions which in turn informed which recommendations. Objectives are also indicated. Summary evidence from this table is included in the main report.

The ET, in agreement with AGRA, chose to focus on a few key priority areas for drawing up recommendations. Those areas were those that had the highest number of findings informing each recommendation and wherever possible from more than one objective. Whilst many other recommendations could be drawn from various findings in the report, ET experience indicates that long lists of recommendations are rarely acted on. It should also be noted that the additional recommendations developed by the ET resulted from their reflecting on findings as a whole across all the objectives.

#### a. Findings (numbered)

#### Objective 1: AGRA's progress in delivering its 2017–2021 strategy

##### 2.1.1 Policy and advocacy

1. AGRA has made considerable progress in the area of Policy and Advocacy, particularly given the short duration and political economic challenges in the geographies in which it is operating. (1)
2. AGRA, as a unique African body, is perceived to have more legitimacy to reach governments than other development partners, creating opportunities for effective advocacy. It has firmly established its Unique Service Offering as broker, catalyst and convenor. (2)
3. Observed results and future progress in the Policy and Advocacy space could be affected by internal challenges related to late start-up, short duration of grants, inadequate programme quality assurance and limited staff capacities. (3)

##### 2.1.2 State Capability

1. AGRA is responsive to government needs and windows of opportunity. (4)
2. AGRA balances being responsive to government with maintaining a strategic direction insofar as its budget allows. (5)
3. In relation to State Capability, AGRA is supporting NAIPs in all 11 countries and flagships in 7 countries, though progress has generally been slow and design inadequate in some places. (6)
4. The area of State Capability is prone to similar threats to Policy and Advocacy plus additional ones relating to immaturity of grants. (7)

##### 2.1.3 Systems Development

1. AGRA's progress against the 2017-2021 strategy in the SD space has generally been slower than anticipated. (8)
2. Based on two consortia reviewed, issues were identified with the design of AGRA's SD interventions, including a lack of conceptual clarity; incomplete systems diagnostics at sub-national/consortia level; and inadequate sustainability, scale and inclusion strategies. (9)

3. Most of the farmer-level results achieved to date appear to be unsustainable as they result from either the direct delivery of products and services to farmers or models with questionable incentive structures. (10)

#### **2.1.4 Partnerships**

1. There is a lack of clarity regarding the Partnerships theme, both within AGRA (particularly at the country level) and among some stakeholders and RPs. (11)
2. Memoranda of understanding and letters of intent have been signed between AGRA and private sector partners, realising investment of over \$50 million. These cannot yet be termed 'strategic' private sector partnerships as they are still in their early stages. (12)

### **Objective 2: How well the organisational reforms AGRA initiated in support of its 2017–2021 Strategy are progressing**

#### **i. How AGRA can optimise its delivery model to accelerate impact (EQ2)**

1. Changes to the type of support associated with AGRA's delivery model are reflected in the country operational plans, but shortfalls in the COPs create challenges to achieving inclusive agricultural transformation. (13)
2. Divisions at HQ are working together in establishing links between them in support of the integrated delivery model, with variable success. (14)
3. The tools and approaches developed by AGRA are mostly adequate but vary in their coverage at strategic level and quality at country level. (15)
4. AGRA has successfully secured \$262.5 million for flagships. It has also mobilised funds through grants. (16)

#### **2.2.2. AGRAs effectiveness in monitoring progress and inclusivity of work and in taking corrective measures if required (EQ3)**

1. AGRA has an efficient management information system (AMIS) but the data it generates is not in a form that can usefully inform decision-making. (17)
2. While there are some opportunities for learning at grantee and country level, the monitoring system gives minimal scope for learning/sharing at HQ, Board and PAC levels. (18)
3. The MEL process is constrained by there being too much and too frequent reporting at all levels and a lack of clarity on what information is needed to inform decision-making. (19)
4. Mechanisms exist for identifying and addressing gaps or threats to inclusive progress, but these are constrained by lack of evidence, particularly in relation to evidence and insights on inclusivity. (20)

#### **2.2.3 How well is the decentralisation process progressing and what has been its impact on delivery? (EQ8)**

1. AGRA's performance on the decentralisation process at HQ and country levels is mixed. HQ divisions are in the early stages of reconfiguring their objectives, services, guidance products and performance standards in support of regional and country teams. (21)
2. Financial arrangements sometimes contradict the spirit of decentralisation, with implications for relationships between countries and HQ and compromising in-country performance. (22)
3. The current grant management process is not aligned with a decentralised AGRA and, combined with the types and scale of grants being provided, is creating negative impacts on delivery, and potentially on AGRA's reputation, despite good support of grantees by AGRA staff at all levels. (23)

4. Having country teams has provided AGRA with greater visibility at country level, and regional teams are supporting and complementing their capacity in their areas of expertise. However, more needs to be done to ensure effective delivery. (24)

#### **2.2.4 To what extent has AGRA been able to develop the capabilities and culture required to enable the delivery model? (EQ9)**

1. AGRA has committed, professional and experienced staff, something that contributes to its reputation. However, this experience does not always stretch to the new functions that staff have in the three thematic areas and countries. (25)
2. Many AGRA country teams are understaffed and overworked – there is evidence that they do not feel valued or supported by the organisations. (26)

#### **Objective 3: The extent to which PIATA is leading partners to work differently in support of the shared results framework**

1. The PIATA MOU and Charter indicate that PAC should have both advisory and accountability functions. This is confusing in that accountability of AGRA is to its Board. However, interviews with both PAC members and AGRA staff indicated that they were clear about the fit of PIATA with AGRA governance. (27)
2. RPs have a shared vision for AGRA. The PAC working groups have had an impact on AGRA's strategic thinking, though this is limited by the minimal sharing of challenges or lessons learnt by AGRA with the PAC. (28)
3. Despite good collaboration in elaboration of the shared RF, it still has some shortfalls, and donor-specific reporting remains necessary alongside the harmonised reporting systems to the Board and to PIATA. (29)
4. Involvement in PAC has led to some degree of RP collaboration beyond AGRA. (30)
7. The relevance of the CACs, other than for accountability to AGRA donors at the country level, is questionable. Nevertheless, country managers are agile in identifying the best use of a CAC in their countries alongside existing fora. (31)
8. While the PIATA Charter indicates that RPs will collaborate to mobilise additional resources to be used in furtherance of the shared vision and RF, the envisaged amount of resources has not yet been secured and there are challenges in securing additional funding at the country level. (32)

#### **b. Conclusions**

##### **Objective 1: AGRA's progress in delivering its 2017–2021 strategy**

Policy and Advocacy: AGRA has made potentially lasting and sustainable progress as a catalyst, broker and a convener, and is likely to meet its strategic objectives in Policy and Advocacy (C1)

State Capability: AGRA is likely to set in motion actions in relation to state capability that will catalyse agricultural transformation, but their potential for sustainability could be compromised by both internal and external threats (C2).

Systems Development: AGRA's work on SD is behind target and the sustainability of its current achievements in the long term limited, mainly due to inadequacies in design and implementation. These include a lack of conceptual clarity; inadequate or incomplete systems diagnostics; and an inadequate articulation of the sustainability, scale, and inclusion strategies (C3).

Partnerships: AGRA's work under the partnerships theme (focusing on the connections being made with agribusinesses e.g. through the Deal Room) is nascent and encouraging – it requires strong follow-through and greater understanding within AGRA between divisions regarding the potential of such deals. Its objectives may be reached to some extent by the end of the Strategy period (C4).

## **Objective 2: How well the organisational reforms AGRA initiated in support of its 2017–2021 strategy are progressing**

The revised delivery model is, in some ways, promoting a more integrated and supportive set of functional relationships among HQ divisions and their support to country teams (C5).

There is limited evidence to suggest that AGRA is a learning organisation (C6).

AGRA is making good progress in decentralisation though this is still underway and its results are at present mixed (C7).

Skills and capacities to implement the three thematic areas equally well still need to be considered as does the organisational culture (C8)

## **Objective 3: The extent to which PIATA is leading partners to work differently in support of the shared results framework**

The shared RF has led to greater alignment in support by RPs to AGRA: RPs are supporting one common framework and are beginning to collaborate beyond AGRA. However, there remain challenges at the operational level, given the five-year period for its implementation (C9).

The PIATA MOU and Charter do not clearly distinguish between AGRA and PIATA and new members are not included. It is early days, but CACs are yet to become fully effective (C10).

## **Recommendations**

1. Policy and State Capability: AGRA should consider streamlining efforts to focus on implementation of policies, addressing macro reforms and tackling system bottlenecks in priority areas, drawing on its USO, complementary work, partnerships and alliances.
2. Systems Development and Partnerships: AGRA should build capacity of staff in SD; give more emphasis to systems diagnostics at consortia/sub-national level for any remaining grants; measure, document and share lessons learnt about, and successes in, SD and use this as a potential evidence for scaling; and focus on linkages with private sector off-takers and processors within its integrated delivery.
3. Decentralisation: With decentralisation as a key deliverable for 2020, AGRA should increase the level of empowerment and accountability of country teams in terms of the country planning-budgeting-review cycle, developing regional and country strategies with appropriate levels of QA.
4. MEL: AGRA should review its MEL system to improve the measurement of strategic outcomes and quality of programming and to support decision-making.
5. Grants: For non-competitive grants, AGRA should improve the quality of grant design and efficiency of grant management.
6. AGRA would benefit from reconsidering and strengthening its intervention logic.
7. AGRA and its RPs should revisit their mutual accountability in relation to learning and cultivate a positive culture for this.
8. AGRA should take a strategic and tailored approach in terms of country and regional interventions during the remaining strategy period.
9. AGRA should revisit its integrated (systems development) delivery model.
10. The PAC should reflect on and update the PIATA MOU and Charter, the nature of reporting required and how best to nurture the CACs.

Annex Table 2: Findings upon which each conclusion and recommendation are based on.

<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Conclusions/findings informing recommendations</b>	<b>Findings informing conclusions</b>
1 re Policy and State Capability. <i>Informed by two conclusions and ten findings across two objectives.</i>	C1 re Policy and Advocacy	Five: 1,2,3, (Objective 1) & 17, 18 (Objective 2)
	C2 re State Capability	Seven: 4, 5, 6 (Objective 1) & 17, 18,19,20 (Objective 2)
2 re Systems Development and Partnerships. <i>Informed by two conclusions and nine findings across two objectives.</i>	C3 re Systems Development	Six: 8, 9, 10 (Objective 1) & 13, 15, 20 (Objective 2)
	C4 re Partnerships	Six: 10, 11, 12 (Objective 1) & 13, 14, 15 (Objective 2)
3 re Decentralisation <i>Informed by two conclusions and seven findings from one objective.</i>	C7 re Decentralisation	Four: 21, 22, 23, 24 (Objective 2)
	C5 re revised delivery model	Three: 13, 14, 15 (Objective 2)
4 re MEL <i>Informed by two conclusions and seven findings across two objectives.</i>	C6	Four: 17, 18, 19, 20 (Objective 2)
		One: 28 (Objective 3)
	C5	Two: 13, 15 (Objective 2)
5 re Grants <i>Informed by three conclusions and eight findings across all three objectives</i>	C5	Two: 13, 15
	C6	Four: 17, 18, 19, 20
	C7	One: 23
		One: 3 (Objective 1)
6 re Intervention logic <i>Informed by multiple findings across Objectives 1 and 2</i>	All 8 conclusions	Multiple findings related to progress (Objective 1) and process (Objective 2)
7 re learning and mutual accountability <i>Informed by two conclusions and ten findings across two objectives</i>	C6	Four: 17, 18, 19, 20 (Objective 2)
	C8	Four: 25,26,27, 28 (Objective 2)
		Two: 27, 28 (Objective 3)
8 re approach to interventions going forward <i>Informed by multiple findings across Objectives 1 and 2</i>	All 8 conclusions	Multiple findings related to progress (Objective 1) and process (Objective 2)
9 re the systems development delivery model <i>Informed by four conclusions and 10 findings across two objectives</i>	C3	Three: 8, 9, 10 (Objective 1)
	C4	One: 11 (Objective 1)
	C6	Four: 17,18,19,20 (Objective 2)
	C8	Two: 25, 26 (Objective 2)
10 re revisiting the PIATA MOU and Charter <i>Informed by two conclusions and six findings across one objective</i>	C9	Three: 28, 29, 30
	C10	Three: 27, 31, 32

## Annex 14: Agricultural policy, legislative, regulatory and administrative practice reforms AGRA is working on, grantee, status and post-win early impacts

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
Burkina Faso	1	Facilitate updating, passage and enactment of the draft bill on the code of agro-forestry-pastoral investments, fish and wildlife (also known as "Agricultural Sector Investment Code")	Direction Générale pour la Promotion de l'Economie Rurale (DGER), Ministère de L'Agriculture Et Des Aménagements Hydrauliques	August 1, 2015 to November 30, 2018	The Agricultural investment Code Law passed by the National Assembly at its ordinary meeting on May 17, 2018 and promulgated by the President on June 19, 2018	Bylaws approved by Cabinet of the Ministry of Agriculture (Director General, Advisors) on Thursday 11 July 2019. Sensitizing stakeholder about the bylaws, disseminating bylaws; following up with farmers and traders about how they can apply to benefit from the law; and communicating with embassies of Burkina Faso all over the world to inform investors of the opportunities.
	2	Facilitate updating and approval of (i) a strategy for a Warehouse Receipt System (WRS) for agricultural products and facilitate updating, passage and enactment of (ii) law and regulations for a WRS for agricultural products	Direction Générale pour la Promotion de l'Economie Rurale (DGER), Ministère de L'Agriculture Et Des Aménagements Hydrauliques  Commissioned technical expert: BGB Meridien	August 1, 2015 to November 30, 2018  February 22, 2017 to November 24, 2017	Warehouse Receipt System strategy approved by the Cabinet Council of Agriculture Minister in May 2018; approved by National Commission for Planning and Development on 10 January, 2019	African development Bank (ADB) developed project "the Development of the Agricultural Bank Creation Support Project" with components on <i>warranty</i> and agricultural insurance. This project will contribute to implement the strategy.
	3	Putting in place agricultural marketing regulations to improve and prioritize the sourcing and use of domestic agricultural staple products (Public procurement)	Direction Générale pour la Promotion de l'Economie Rurale (DGER), Ministère de L'Agriculture Et Des Aménagements Hydrauliques  Commissioned technical expert: BGB Meridien	August 1, 2015 to November 30, 2018  February 22, 2017 to November 24, 2017	Decree 2017-002/PM/SG/DGEF on "measures relating to the consumption of local foodstuffs by public organizations" was signed on	Sensitization meetings with stakeholders increase February, May and September 2018 to sensitize them and enhance their capacity to participate in public procurement and scale up with the World Food Program, Purchase for

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
			Commissioned technical expert: Initiatives Conseil International (ICI)  Commissioned technical expert: BGB Meridien	2017  March 1, 2017 to November 24, 2017	13 January 2017. The Prime Minister's Office signed agricultural marketing regulations and issued a ministerial order on 13 January 2017 introducing strong measures to support commercialization and consumption of local products particularly agricultural products by mandating public institutions to procure local agricultural products before buying similar imported products.	progress (P4P) in the country. In early April 2019, six FOs were selected to join the Purchas for Progress (P4P) to provide about 16,000 tons to World Food Program to renew the (SONAGES) <sup>94</sup> National Security Stock.
	4	Facilitate updating, passage and amendment of Seed Act and regulations to domesticate ECOWAS harmonized Seed Laws and regulations	Direction Générale pour la Promotion de l'Economie Rurale (DGER), Ministère de L'Agriculture Et Des Aménagements Hydrauliques  Commissioned technical expert: Initiatives Conseil International (ICI)  Commissioned technical expert: BGB Meridien	August 1, 2015 to November 30, 2018  February 22, 2017 to November 24, 2017  March 1, 2017 to November 24, 2017	Direction Générale des Production Végétales (DGPV) prepared during January-June 2016 a waybill of compliance of the national laws and decrees with those of the ECOWAS on seeds. Reform stuck.	Development of the MOA's new organizational chart to set up 9 seed testing laboratories to bring the total to 13.
	5	Facilitate updating, passage and amendment of Fertilizer Act and regulations to domesticate harmonized ECOWAS fertilizer regulations	Direction Générale pour la Promotion de l'Economie Rurale (DGER), Ministère de L'Agriculture Et Des Aménagements	August 1, 2015 to November 30, 2018  February 22, 2017	Direction Générale des Production Végétales (DGPV) prepared during January-June 2016 a waybill of compliance with those of the ECOWAS on	Fertilizer Inspection Manual and the ECOWAS Fertilizer Analysis Manual adapted to technical, legislative and administrative realities and made available to fertilizer inspectors and

<sup>94</sup> In French: La Société nationale de gestion du stock de sécurité alimentaire.

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
			Hydrauliques Commissioned technical expert: Initiatives Conseil International (ICI) Commissioned technical expert: Meridien	to November 24, 2017 March 1, 2017 to November 24, 2017	fertilizers: legislative texts prepared and adopted: Decree: Order No. 2016-131/MAAH/CAB; Decree No. 2017-1131/PRES/PM/MIINEFID/MAAH; Joint Order No. 2018-004/MAAH/MIINEFID	laboratory technicians responsible for fertilizer analysis Awareness sessions and information workshops Appointment of inspectors and taking an oath before the competent courts in 2018
	6	Implementation of the Agricultural Sector Investment Code	New investment Concept Note stage in 2019	2019	Post win MIRA Agricultural Sector Investment Code	
	7	Control the quality of fertilizer sold by the agro-dealers (DGPV) Law No. 026-2007 / AN of 20 November 2007 establishing a fertilizer control in Burkina Faso and Regulation C / REG.13 / 12/12 on quality control of fertilizers in the ECOWAS region.	Direction Générale des Production Végétales (DGPV) Restructured grant Scaling Up Maize and Cowpea Value Chains for Improved Incomes and Food Security for Smallholder Farmers in Cascades and Hauts Bassins Regions of Burkina Faso	11 April 2018 to 31 March 2021	Post win MIRA	
	8	Control the quality of seeds on field: Control the quality of fertilizer sold by the agro-dealers (DGPV) Analyse and certify seed on laboratory	Direction Générale des Production Végétales (DGPV) Restructured grant Scaling Up Maize and Cowpea Value Chains for Improved Incomes and Food Security for Smallholder Farmers in Cascades and Hauts Bassins Regions of Burkina Faso	11 April 2018 to 31 March 2021 1 July 2018 to 30 September 2019	Post win MIRA	
	9	Acceleration of the process of harmonization and dissemination of the	Market Matters (The African seed Index TASAI) Consultancy to harmonize national seed law with the	At contracting stage with the	Post win MIRA	

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
		seed regulations in Burkina Faso	UEMOA-ECOWAS-CILSS regulation; -Reread the implementing texts (Decrees and Orders) of the Harmonized Law; -Propose a mechanism for seed quality control in the field; -Upgrade the five (5) laboratories of the National Seed Service; -Strengthen capacity of seed Inspectors and Auxiliary Inspectors on the harmonized regulation; -Strengthen the capacity of seed analysts on harmonized technical standards for seed analysis in the laboratory.	procurement unit		
<b>Ethiopia</b>	<b>10</b>	Develop and approve a National Seed Policy	Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency Ethiopia Seed Association Commissioned technical expert Bright Development Management Consultancy Service.  Commissioned technical expert: Fikre Markos.  African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF)	1 January 2018 to 31 December 2019 May 15, 2016 to October 15, 2018 13 October 2017 to 3 March 2018  18 April 2017 to 31 of October 2017  25 February 2018 to June 2019	In February 2019 the Ministry of Agriculture Top Management approved and signed off the draft National Seed Policy for submission to the Council of Ministers for review and approval. By 1 October 2019 seed policy will be presented to the Council of Ministers and/or Parliament over the following few weeks.	The draft National Seed Policy has triggered the drafting of amendment of Seed Act.
	<b>11</b>	Develop and approve Directive/Guidelines for streamlining of policy processes and procedures under which cereals export restrictions are	Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency Commissioned technical expert: BKP Development.	August 1, 2016 to February 7, 2019 6 February 2017	Lifting export ban publicly announced on 15 February 2017 by the State Minister for Trade at the 4th National	

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
	12	Develop and approve comprehensive contract farming legal framework that supports agro-processing and value addition	Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency Commissioned technical expert: New Market Lab (NML)	August 1, 2016 to February 7, 2019 30 January 2017 to 16 May 2017	Cooperatives Bazar and Symposium In March 2019 final draft Proclamation approved by the State Minister of Agriculture and in June 2019 approved by State Minister for Livestock Sector and State Minister for Agricultural Input-Out Marketing and submitted to the Legal Counsel of the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers. By 1 October 2019 legislation on contract farming was to be presented to the Council of Ministers and/or Parliament over the following few weeks.	The Contract Farming Proclamation is going to be enacted at the national level has encouraged some regions( provinces) to develop their own legislation governing contract farming arrangement in their respective regions, i.e. when both a producer and a contractor are established in one region
	13	Revisit import duties and domestic taxes on agricultural machinery spare parts, irrigation/drainage equipment, and animal feed ingredients and compound feeds and reduce their burden on this sector	Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency Commissioned technical expert: SEGEL	August 1, 2016 to February 7, 2019 10 February 2017 to early June 2017	In December 2017 the Agricultural Transformation Council chaired by the Prime Minister in its meeting in December 2017 made a decision to remove duty and taxes on agricultural mechanization, irrigation and drainage equipment, and animal feed. In early May 2019 Ministry of Finance (MoF) removed customs duty on selected agricultural mechanization, irrigation/drainage equipment, and animal feed equipment and technologies.	Since the decision to remove duty and taxes has been published in the media, private sector actors (both local and international) has been reached out to us to find out exact list of equipment and technologies that has been exempted from duty and taxes. The private sector actors are positioning themselves to import these equipment and technologies as soon as the Customs Commission starts enforcing the policy decision. .
	14	Exemption from duty and domestic taxes of pesticides and veterinary drug	Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency	2018 Post-win import duties and	Veterinary drug and pesticides technologies and	Same as above.

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
		technologies and equipment	Commissioned technical expert: BKP	domestic taxes on agricultural machinery spare parts, irrigation/drainage equipment, and animal feed ingredients and compound feeds	equipment exempted in October 2019 from duty and domestic taxes that the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture agreed duty be removed.	
	15	Development and adoption of Ministerial Directives (Regulations) to operationalize the New Plant Breeders Rights Proclamation (Proclamation No. 1068/2017)	Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency Ethiopia Seed Association	November 1, 2018 to October 31, 2020 May 15, 2016 to October 15, 2018	ATA commissioned team of local experts was to draft Ministerial Directives and Council of Ministers Regulation to operationalize the Plant Breeders' Rights Proclamation.	
	16	Development of National Agricultural Trade Policy (NATP)	Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency Commissioned technical expert: BKP	1 January 2018 to 31 December 2019	Zero draft report submitted by consultant (BKP) on June 3, 2019. Final report including a final National Agricultural Trade Policy text integrated with that of a National Committee on National Trade Policy was submitted on July 1, 2019. After starting to implement the National Agricultural Trade Policy, Ministry of Trade and Industry established a National Committee to draft a National Trade Policy (NTP) which is under way.	
	17	Drafting, approval and passage of new	Ethiopian Agricultural	August 1, 2016 to	During the last week of	The content of the draft Seed Act is

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
		Seed Proclamation text (that is going to replace the one that has been in since 2013)	Transformation Agency	February 7, 2019	September 2019 draft Proclamation was circulated to MoA Management including the Minister. The Management approved the draft and then submitted it to the Council of Ministers. By 1 October 2019 text was to be presented to the MoA Management for a final review and sign off and subsequently submitted to the Council of Ministers for a review and approval, and finally to the Parliament for passage.	informed and influenced by the National Seed Policy which has got provisions that provide for more private sector participation in the seed value chain and is consistent with the COMESA Seed Trade Harmonization Regulation.
	18	Identification and prioritization of policy and regulatory reforms for the next 10 years to transform the agriculture sector as a whole as well as to contribute to addressing the macro-economic imbalances by increasing the participation of the private sector in the economy	Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA-embedded Coordinator played key role in Technical Committee tasked by the Ministry of Agriculture)	2019 Post win MIRA reforms	In October 2019 the Ministry of Agriculture was requested by the National Planning and Economic Development Commission, which coordinates sectoral reforms of the new Economic Policy of the Government, to produce a summary of agriculture sector reform workplan for the next three years, life of the new Economic Policy.	The Government's decision to embark on the identification and prioritization of agriculture sector policy and regulatory reforms has generated momentum to get the on-going AGRA supported policy reforms to the finish line.
<b>Ghana</b>	19	Approval, passage and gazetting of Seeds (certification and Standards) Regulations, 2018	Policy, Planning and Budget Directorate, Ministry of Food and Agriculture  Commissioned technical expert: CDC International Consulting/Internal Advisory Group	August 1, 2015 to December 31, 2018  13 February 2017 to 27 December 2017  11 August 2017 to	Seed Regulations laid in Parliament on 20 November 2018 came into force on 18 December 2018.	Some aspects of Regulations were being implemented prior to passage and still in force after passage: seed certification, variety testing, release and registration of seeds, conditions and procedures for inspecting seed fields, inspecting and grading, field inspection, rules and standards for certifying various seed.

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
	20	Ratification and gazetting of the harmonized ECOWAS seed regulation	Commissioned technical expert: Estelle Applah Legislative Counsel (EALC)  Market Matters (The African seed Index TASAI)  Policy, Planning and Budget Directorate, Ministry of Food and Agriculture  Commissioned technical expert: Commissioned technical expert: CDC International Consulting/Internal Advisory Group  Commissioned technical expert: Estelle Applah Legislative Counsel (EALC)	22 December 2017  1 July 2018 to 30 September 2019  August 1, 2015 to December 31, 2018  13 February 2017 to 27 December 2017  11 August 2017 to 22 December 2017	In July 2016 Parliament ratified ECOWAS harmonized seed regulations	The ECOWAS Seed Regulations are being implemented; Seed sector stakeholders selected sensitized; rules and manuals governing variety release, plant protection and marketing of seeds for ECOWAS adopted; import of seeds from Burkina Faso and Nigeria to support Food and Job's Campaign the Campaign in 2017 and 2018
	21	Ratification and gazetting of the harmonized ECOWAS fertilizer regulation	Policy, Planning and Budget Directorate, Ministry of Food and Agriculture  Commissioned technical expert: CDC International Consulting/Internal Advisory Group Commissioned technical expert: Estelle Applah Legislative Counsel (EALC)	August 1, 2015 to December 31, 2018  13 February 2017 to 27 December 2017	In July 2016 Parliament ratified harmonized ECOWAS fertilizer regulations	ECOWAS fertilizer Regulation is being implemented; Fertilizer inspectors appointed and trained using the Fertilizer Inspectors Manual; national fertilizer testing laboratory designated; other public & private laboratories designated that carry out nutrient analysis
	22	Development and approval of electronic data base for improving the efficiency of the fertilizer subsidy programme	Policy, Planning and Budget Directorate, Ministry of Food and	August 1, 2015 to December 31, 2018	In September 2018 MoFA had accepted the need for biometric registration to help	By end of April 2019 384,000 farmers were registered electronically.

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
	23	Development and approval of policy, Act and regulations on High Quality Cassava Flour-based composite flour (HQCF) for use in bakery and pastry industries in Ghana	Agriculture Commissioned technical expert: CDC International Consulting/Internal Advisory Group Commissioned technical expert: Estelle Appiah Legislative Counsel (EALC)	13 February 2017 to 27 December 2017 11 August 2017 to 22 December 2017 August 1, 2015 to December 31, 2018 13 February 2017 to 27 December 2017 11 August 2017 to 22 December 2017	target farmers for input subsidy  Reform stuck at concept note stage of the policy	
	24	Developing national policy and technical regulation for aflatoxin control in food and feed	Science and Technology Policy Research Institute (CSIR-STEPRI) Legislative Counsel (EALC)	5 October 2018 to 4 April 2021	National Policy and Action Plan for Aflatoxin Control in Food and Feed drafted and validated by stakeholders on 14 and 15 October 2019.	
	25	Enabling policy and legislative reform for development of Ghana Agricultural Insurance Policy and Amendment of Act 724 for the provision of Agricultural Insurance in Ghana	National Insurance Commission	November 1, 2018 through October 31, 2020	The draft of the Ghana Agricultural Insurance Policy and the Amendments to incorporate Agricultural Insurance into the New Bill submitted to the sector ministry. The sector ministry reviewed the bill and forwarded to the Economic Management Team. The final	

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
					draft provisions reviewed by the Technical Committee. Validation of the Agricultural insurance policy from 31st October to November 1st, 2019.	
	26	Review of Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP II) and development of a Successor Agriculture Policy	Policy Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate, Ministry of Food and Agriculture	1 September 2019 to 31 July 2020		
<b>Nigeria</b>	<b>27</b>	Facilitate updating, passage and enactment of the National Agricultural Seed Council Bill (2015) 2018	Seed Entrepreneurs Association of Nigeria The Nigeria Agribusiness Group National Programme for Food Security (NPF5), Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESSG) Commissioned technical expert: African Centre for Shared Development Capacity Building (ACSDCB) (Professor Olu Ajakaiye) Commissioned technical expert: Professor Yemi Akinseye-George YAG Market Matters (The African seed Index TASAI)	February 15, 2016 to February 14, 2019 July 1, 2015 to November 30, 2018 January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018 17 September 2018 to 16 July 2020 10 December 2016 to 27 October 2017 5 December 2016 to 31 October 2017 1 July 2018 to 30 September 2019	Seed Bill reconsidered and passed by Senate on 17 April 2019 and to by the President on 24 June 2019.	The law is providing legal backing for official testing, certification, sales, importation, exportation and use of seeds in the country. This enabled National Agricultural Seed Council is piloting smart, tamper proof and enhanced security certification tags and replace the old seed certification tags to ensure that farmers have access to quality seeds. The law prevents business without accreditation of the NASC, importation or exportation of seeds of any form without NASC approval, false labeling and selling of seeds in open containers.

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
	28	Facilitate updating, passage and enactment of the National Fertilizer Bill, 2017 (Fertilizer Quality Control Bill)	The Fertilizer Producers and Suppliers Association of Nigeria The Nigeria Agribusiness Group National Programme for Food Security (NPF5), Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG)	May 15, 2016 to November 14, 2018 July 1, 2015 to November 30, 2018 January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018 17 September 2018 to 16 July 2020	President signed bill into law on 16 October 2019.	The Act provides the legal foundations to ensure quality fertilizers are sold to farmers, thereby increasing productivity, production and profitability.
	29	Developing, drafting and enactment of institutional arrangements to reach millions of smallholder farmers with improved, consistent and affordable agricultural inputs (soil and crop specific fertilizer blends)	The Fertilizer Producers and Suppliers Association of Nigeria The Nigeria Agribusiness Group Commissioned technical expert: African Centre for Shared Development Capacity Building (ACSDCB) (Professor Olu Ajakaiye) Commissioned technical expert: Professor Yemi Akinseye-George (YAG)	May 15, 2016 to November 14, 2018 July 1, 2015 to November 30, 2018 10 December 2016 to 27 October 2017 5 December 2016 to 31 October 2017	The Presidential Fertilizer Initiative inaugurated by the President in November 2016	In 2017 consumption moved by 63% to 1.56 million tons and dropped by about 12% to 1.43 million tons in 2018. The significance of this consumption was that it was done without a subsidy which was a key thrust for this policy and a key item identified as "problem policy" under the FEPSAN-MIRA project. IFDC conducted a desk survey of functional blending plant and discovered that over 30 blending plants are now functioning in the country. This was attributable to the PFI program. PFI triggered the revival of moribund blending plants and also saw the sector open up to new blending

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
						investments especially in 2018. This can be seen from the IFDC plant register for 2019 compared to that for 2017. Currently, because of the PFI, blending is no longer soil specific but based on blanket recommendation of 20-10-10
	30	Developing, drafting and enactment of institutional arrangements to reach millions of smallholder farmers with improved, consistent and affordable agricultural inputs (certified seeds of improved varieties and hybrids)	Seed Entrepreneurs Association of Nigeria  The Nigeria Agribusiness Group  Commissioned technical expert: African Centre for Shared Development Capacity Building (ACSDCB) (Professor Olu Ajakaiye)  Commissioned technical expert: Professor Yemi Akinseye-George YAG)	February 15, 2016 to February 14, 2019  July 1, 2015 to November 30, 2018  10 December 2016 to 27 October 2017  5 December 2016 to 31 October 2017	New Deal for Maize Transformation in Nigeria with Acting President 6-7 June 2017	As per the Anchor Borrowers Programme SEEDAN wrote a proposal on the 7 February 2019 to the Central Bank of Nigeria to create a sustainable seed production and buy-back system through leveraging on the existing ABP model/structure for rice and maize grains as well as NIRSAL's Interest Drawback and guarantee. This initiative was broadened during the last week of April 2019 to put in place a Presidential Seed Initiative which would be similar to the Presidential Fertilizer Initiative. SEEDAN advocated in late August for implementation of the PSI as one of the programs of the new Government through the Minister of Agriculture.
	31	Development, validation and approval of institutional arrangements for commodity market price stabilization mechanisms	The Nigeria Agribusiness Group  National Programme for Food Security (NPFS), Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development  Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG)	July 1, 2015 to November 30, 2018  January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018  17 September 2018 to 16 July 2020	Reform stuck	
	32	Delivery of varieties of high performance to farmers in Nigeria through the	National Agricultural Seeds Council (NASC)	September 20, 2018 to December 19, 2019		

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
	<b>33</b>	development and enactment of Plant Variety Protection law (PVPP) Development, drafting validation and pushing approval of regulations to operationalize the National Agricultural Seeds Bill once assented to by the President and the Fertilizer Quality Control Bill once passed by the Senate and assented by the President	The African Fertilizer and Agribusiness Partnership Commissioned technical expert: Professor Yemi Akinseye-George and Partners	10 November 2018 to 9 November 2021 25 February 2019 to 15 August 2019	Draft regulations developed and 15 focus group sessions were held with 56 participants from 41 organizations to validate regulations. These sessions revealed a unanimous demand for a regulatory system, and a general lack of awareness of the draft regulation	
	<b>34</b>	Strengthening Fertilizer Systems Partnerships for Production of Balanced Fertilizer Blends in Niger and Kaduna State~ Nigeria"	National Programme for Food Security The Institute for Agricultural Research The Fertilizer Producers and Suppliers Association of Nigeria	March 20, 2019 to March 19, 2022 March 20, 2019 to March 19, 2022 1 April 2019 to 19 March 2022		
<b>Tanzania</b>	<b>35</b>	Improve access by private seed companies to publicly protected pre-basic and basic seeds	Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of Agriculture Tanzania Seed Trade association Commissioned technical expert: Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) Commissioned technical expert: Nexlaw Advocates African Agricultural	July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2019 February 15, 2016 to February 14, 2019 7 October 2016 to 15 August 2017 20 February 2017 to 20 September 2017 25 February 2018	The Minister of Agriculture signed the Government Circular on Authorization of New Varieties of Plants, 2016 on 9 January 2017 and officially gazetted industry to start implementation on 20 January 2017	Eight companies: Six seed companies entered into contract with Tanzania Agricultural Research Institute using the reviewed Ministerial Circular setting procedures for accessing government-protected varieties from 2013/14, 2015/16 to 2016/17, 2018/19 and two seed companies entered into contract from 2017/18 to 2020/21. Access to germplasm of 33 varieties and hybrids,

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
	36	Barriers to registration of new fertilizer products arising from requirement of 3 seasons of testing and payment of testing fee of \$10,000 for each season	Technology Foundation (AATF) Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of Agriculture Fertilizer Society of Tanzania Commissioned technical expert: Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) Commissioned technical expert: Nexlaw Advocates	July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2019 February 15, 2016 to January 31, 2019 7 October 2016 to 15 August 2017 20 February 2017 to 20 September 2017	The Minister of Agriculture signed the new Fertilizer Regulations 2017 on 10 February 2017 and gazette these on 17 February 2017.	Reforms are being implemented effectively and resulted in an increase of fertilizers registered and commercialized and better choices for farmers.
	37	Improve the delivery of fertilizers	Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of Agriculture Fertilizer Society of Tanzania Commissioned technical expert: Nexlaw Advocates Commissioned technical expert: Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) Commissioned technical expert: Nexlaw Advocates Agricultural Non-State Actors Forum (ANSAF)	July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2019 February 15, 2016 to January 31, 2019 7 October 2016 to 15 August 2017 20 February 2017 to 20 September 2017 1 December 2018 to 30 November 2020	Government re-introduced National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme (NAIVS) in 2015/2016 and put in place an improved version incorporating recommendations of fertilizer subsidy voucher scheme to replace local government appointment of agro-dealers to redeem vouchers to input suppliers appointing own agents to distribute and sell inputs.	Minister of Agriculture signed the Fertilizer Bulk Procurement Regulation on 10 February 2017 to reduce farm gate prices of fertilizers and was gazetted on 17 February 2017. The introduction of bulk procurement regulations introduced new challenges. During the 2018/2019 cropping season, the Minister of Agriculture used the power granted by the fertilizer bulk procurement regulations to allow parallel importation on request. YARA and Premium were given this privilege during the 2018/2019 cropping season. The companies applied again for the 2019/2020 season.
	38	Ease, efficiency, and institutional arrangement in the management of issuance of grain export permit system	Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of Agriculture	July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2019	The Minister of Agriculture lifted the export ban and made the official	Farmgate prices for cereals for farmers improving.

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
			Commissioned technical expert: Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) Commissioned technical expert: Nexlaw Advocates	7 October 2016 to 15 August 2017 20 February 2017 to 20 September 2017	announcement about this decision in his 2018 budget speech on 15 May 2018.	
	39	Development of an umbrella contract farming legislation to address gap in contract farming laws	Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of Agriculture Commissioned technical expert: Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) Commissioned technical expert: Nexlaw Advocates	July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2019 7 October 2016 to 15 August 2017 20 February 2017 to 20 September 2017	The Management of the Ministry of Agriculture met on 19 April 2019 and endorsed formulating the bill as part of Agricultural Act, 2019.	
	40	Removal of duty and taxes on hermetic storage inputs	Commissioned technical expert: Talanta International Agricultural Non-State Actors Forum (ANSAAF)	6 March 2018 to 27 April 2018 1 December 2018 to 30 November 2020	Commissioned a study to assess the reform impact assessment (RIA) for the removal of VAT charged on hermetic storage inputs. Findings and recommendations to fiscal committee for tax reforms of the Ministry of Finance in February 2019 and members of parliament drawn from the budget, agriculture and trade committees on the 28 June 2019.	
	41	Establishing a mechanism to monitor and regulate food crop commodity exports	Economic and Social Research Foundation	1 October 2018 to 30 September 2019	Field work for data collection and consultation are complete, report prepared, presented and discussed with	

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
	42	Review and formulation of the National Agriculture Policy; Development of the Agriculture Sector Strategy; and Development of the Agriculture Act	Commissioned technical expert: Economic and Social Research Foundation	2019 Post win	the government task force. Draft report for Food Balance Sheet was presented to Task Force on August 20, 2019 in Dodoma	
Rwanda	43	<p>Enhancing coordination of seed sector actors, quality control, policy and regulation to ensure sustainable timely delivery of improved seeds to farmers in Rwanda</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plant Variety Protection office established</li> <li>Procedures and guidelines for private sector access to breeder seed or other EGS developed by public sector (RAB); germplasm stored in the national gene bank and genetic material imported by public sector for research purposes developed</li> <li>National Variety Release Committee (NVRC) secretariat established and procedure developed and operationalized</li> <li>National Seed Certification Agency procedures set up and certification services operationalized</li> <li>Procedures for the accreditation of private seed company and third parties for the performance of certification activities developed and implemented</li> <li>Implementation of seed road map</li> <li>Noncompliant legal instruments</li> </ul>	<p>Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources</p> <p>Market Matters (The African seed Index TASAI)</p>	<p>10 July 2019 to 31 December 2021</p> <p>1 July 2018 to 30 September 2019</p>		

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>under seeds (and fertilizer) reviewed for harmonization with COMESA and EAC</li> <li>Awareness on seeds regulations by agriculture value chain actor</li> <li>Capacity of seed value chain champions built in policy and regulations</li> </ul>				
	44	<p>Operationalize policies and regulations related to fertilizers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Noncompliant legal instruments under (seeds and) fertilizer reviewed for harmonization with COMESA and EAC</li> <li>Procedures for registering pesticide/fertilizer products (reduce time) and organic fertilizers established</li> <li>Regulations that determine prohibited practices in pesticides/fertilizers established</li> </ul>	Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources	1 Sept 2019 to 28 Feb 2021		
	45	<p>Operationalize policies and regulations related to agricultural mechanization</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Statutory requirements for tractor dealers to provide tractor after-market services and parts established</li> <li>Law and procedures for tractor type approvals developed</li> <li>National regulations that require tractors to be equipped with fixed roll over and falling object protective structures developed</li> </ul>	Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources	1 Sept 2019 to 28 Feb 2021		
	46	<p>Operationalize policies and regulations related to agricultural markets</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Electronic system of phytosanitary certificates applications and issuance complete and integrated into present</li> </ul>	Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources	1 Sept 2019 to 28 Feb 2021		

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>system</li> <li>Procedures and information list of regulated quarantine pests updated and published</li> </ul>				
<b>Uganda</b>	<b>47</b>	Supporting agricultural finance policy and regulatory reforms in agriculture	Uganda Agribusiness Alliance	15 June 2018 to Sept 2020	Policy approved by Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPEd) and submitted to Cabinet for approval. Official documents (cabinet memo, RIA) prepared and submitted to cabinet. Development partners provided input.	Policy work to date attracted attention of Uganda Agricultural Development Bank to develop a strategy. Banks to commit to increase private sector credit to agriculture; Initiative for Smallholder Finance to develop agriculture finance policy in developing countries; and FAO to develop agriculture finance for the youth.
	<b>48</b>	Fall armyworm control through assisting efficiency of pesticides availability on the market and biological control of pesticides		2019	Assessing efficiency of pesticides available on the market to control Fall Army worm Biological control	Farmers increasing awareness of efficacy and toxicity of pesticides available on the market and how to use pesticides
	<b>49</b>	Strengthening inspection and seed certification (ICT-enabled Seed Quality Management System in place and operationalized by industry actors)	Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and Fisheries Department of Crop Inspection and Certification National Seed Certification Service African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF)	2019 25 February 2018 to June 2019	Standard Operating Procedures drafted	Increasing the production of quality Early Generation Seed (EGS) from National Agricultural Research Organization (NARO) and reduction in counterfeit seeds through accreditation with OECD and ISTA
	<b>50</b>	Support to the National Fertilizer Platform of Uganda (which is chaired by the Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and Fisheries) to implement quality control measures which will include self-regulation by the private sector	The African Fertilizer and Agribusiness Partnership	10 November 2018 to 9 November 2021	Public-private partnerships for fertilizer formed	There is a reduction in counterfeit and fake fertilizer and improvement in quality of fertilizers
<b>Kenya</b>	<b>51</b>	Seeds: Review and update of the Plant Protection Act, Cap 324 and regulations	Directorate of Agricultural Policy Research and	December 1, 2018 to	Areas for Cap 424 Act amendments/review	

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
		for its operationalization to address current challenges in plant health (phytosanitary, quarantine) for seeds	Regulations State Department of Agricultural Research and State Department for Crops Development Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Irrigation Market Matters (The African seed Index TASAI)	November 30, 2021  1 July 2018 to 30 September 2019	identified, and scope of regulations defined	
	52	Fertilizers: Development, validation and approval of regulations to effect the recent amendments to implement the Fertilizers and Animal Foodstuff (Amendment) Act No. 20 of 2015	Directorate of Agricultural Policy Research and Regulations State Department of Agricultural Research and State Department for Crops Development Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Irrigation The African Fertilizer and Agribusiness Partnership	December 1, 2018 to November 30, 2021  10 November 2018 to 9 November 2021	One workshop done and initial draft report on the operationalization of the Act finalized and presented to Ministry of Agriculture.	
	53	Agricultural marketing: Drive the Warehousing Receipt Systems reform through final stages of legislation and making of regulations to operationalize the Act	Directorate of Agricultural Policy Research and Regulations State Department of Agricultural Research and State Department for Crops Development Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Irrigation	December 1, 2018 to November 30, 2021	President assented into law in June 2019 Draft Warehousing Receipt Systems regulations developed. Draft regulations validated with Intergovernmental Secretariat-Sector Technical Working Group (IGS-SWAG). 5 Regional validation workshops held to validate draft regulations at county and national levels	The Warehouse Receipts Systems Bill, 2018 is providing a legal framework for the development and regulation of a warehouse receipt system for agricultural commodities and the establishment of WRS Council. This includes legal recognition of the WH Receipt as an instrument of title (ownership) and providing for their issuance, negotiation, replacement, registration, and liens to enable financing by the Banking sector,

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
	54	Agricultural finance and insurance: Approval and passage of Agricultural Crop Insurance Policy and Law and regulations for implementation	Directorate of Agricultural Policy Research and Regulations State Department of Agricultural Research and State Department for Crops Development Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Irrigation	December 1, 2018 to November 30, 2021	Draft crop insurance policy developed	
	55	Development, validation and approval of a legal and regulatory framework to operationalize the National Agricultural Mechanization Policy 2017.	Directorate of Agricultural Policy Research and Regulations State Department of Agricultural Research and State Department for Crops Development Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Irrigation	December 1, 2018 to November 30, 2021	Policy ready for adoption by Cabinet. Bill and draft regulations not yet developed	
	56	Development and approval of regulations to operationalize the National Irrigation Policy and National Irrigation Bill once it is enacted into law	Directorate of Agricultural Policy Research and Regulations State Department of Agricultural Research and State Department for Crops Development Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Irrigation	December 1, 2018 to November 30, 2021	Policy Passed by Cabinet Act and in force. Draft Regulations and strategy not yet developed	
	57	Develop an integrated potato value chain by linking farmers to markets, increasing production of certified seed, adoption of good agronomic practices and address any policy constraints that impede private sector investment into the sector in support government's vision of having a functional and efficient private sector led potato sub-sector	National Potato Council of Kenya	August 1, 2017- July 31, 2019	The National Assembly passed Irish potato packaging and marketing regulations of 2019 in May 2019 and gazetted them in April 2019. Counties putting in place implementation mechanisms. KEPHIS reviewed Kenya seed potato standard and KEPHIS	Enforcement of regulations to regulate the potato sub-sector is resulting in competitive trade practices and increasing share of consumer price for farmers

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
Mali	58	Identification and reform of key policy challenges in seeds systems.	Ministry of Agriculture Planning and Statistics Unit of the Rural Development Sector (CPS/SDR - Cellule de Plannification et des Statisticques du Secteur de Development Rural) strengthen institutional capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture to drive agriculture sector transformation in the country.	1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019  1 July 2018 to 30 September 2019	seed strategy	
	59	Identification and reform of key policy challenges in fertilizer systems	Market Matters (The African seed Index TASAI)  Ministry of Agriculture Planning and Statistics Unit of the Rural Development Sector (CPS/SDR - Cellule de Plannification et des Statisticques du Secteur de Development Rural) strengthen institutional capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture to drive agriculture sector transformation in the country.	1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019		
Malawi	60	Fertilizer policy act and regulations	The Department of Agricultural Planning Services (DAPS) Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Water Development  Farmers Union of Malawi	1 October 2018 to 30 September 2020  15 September 2018 to 14 September 2019	The Cabinet paper that summarizes the National Fertilizer Policy (NFP) drafted and submitted to the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC). The OPC approved the document and submitted it	

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
	61	Seed policy, law and regulations	The African Fertilizer and Agribusiness Partnership  The Department of Agricultural Planning Services (DAPS) Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Water Development  Farmers Union of Malawi  Market Matters (The African seed Index TASAI)	10 November 2018 to 9 November 2021  1 October 2018 to 30 September 2020  15 September 2018 to 14 September 2019  1 July 2018 to 30 September 2019	with the National Fertilizer Policy (NFP) to the Cabinet.  Seed Bill with the Ministry of Justice Office & Constitutional Affairs. The bill is almost ready awaiting approvals from Solicitor General and Attorney General.	
	62	Regulations for control of goods act (cereals export)	The Department of Agricultural Planning Services (DAPS) Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Water Development	1 October 2018 to 30 September 2020		
<b>Mozambique</b>	63	Seed policy, law and regulations	National Director of Planning and International Cooperation Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security  African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF)	1 December 2018 to 31 November 2021  25 February 2018 to June 2019		
	64	Fertilizer policy, law and regulations	National Director of Planning and International Cooperation Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security  The African Fertilizer and Agribusiness Partnership	1 December 2018 to 31 November 2021  10 November 2018 to 9 November 2021		
	65	Agrarian extension ICT regulations	National Director of	1 December 2018		

Country/ Region	No.	Reform	Grantee (s)	Start/end date	Policy wins	Post-win: early impacts
		approved	Planning and International Cooperation Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security	to 31 November 2021		
	66	Agricultural Finance Master Plan	National Director of Planning and International Cooperation Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security	1 December 2018 to 31 November 2021		
EAC	67	EAC harmonized seed act	EAC Secretariat	1 August 2018 to 31 July 2021		
	68	EAC harmonized fertilizer act	EAC Secretariat	1 August 2018 to 31 July 2021		

Annex 15: Output data on programme development and innovation – October 2019<sup>95</sup>

Output indicator	LOA Target (2021)		Target	2018	Actual	Target	2019	Actual
<b>PO 1. Strengthened agricultural input systems, technology development and supply chain</b>								
Number of seed varieties and other technologies commercialized	Total	144	32		29	35		19
	Seeds	115	27		24	27		14
	Fertilizer blends	21	3		5	7		2
	Other	8	2		0	1		3
Quantity (MT) of improved seeds of focus crops produced by enterprises supported by AGRA		149,500 (105,163)	27,146 (44,599)		32,317	40,839 (52,384)		54,066
Quantity (MT) of seeds sold as a result of AGRA support		104,479	22,962 (31,415)		25,945	34,733 (35,362)		45,030
Number of fertilizer blends developed as a result of AGRA support		35 (18)	4 (4)		10 (37)	12 (4)		28
Amount (MT) of fertilizer sold by enterprises supported by AGRA		(102,425)	(15,475)		36,911	(38,625)		29,203
<b>PO 2. Increased adoption of Agriculture productivity enhancing technologies</b>								
Percent of farmers accessing extension services		85% of reach	30% of reach			50% of reach		
Number of extension service events completed: demonstration plots	Demo plots	40,788	7,988		11,183	14,312		53,478
	Field days	3,985	1,261		1,152	2,443		10,450
	Small packs	8,213,921	2,104,119		324,713	5,562,802		1,011,035
	Radio program	1,192	321		343	416		460
	Seed fairs	109	27		26	25		53
Number of Village Based Advisors trained and operational	Total	(21,938)	(4,635)		5,951	(8,963)		8,930
	Male				2,126			2,126
	Female				3,825			3,825
Number of farmers and other value chain actors participating in AGRA supported extension services		9,216,342 (6,215,685)	2,309,566 (867,197)		1,195,724	4,607,135 (2,470,907)		2,033,410

<sup>95</sup> This table was developed for the MTE by AGRA in October 2019 following the emerging findings workshop

Output indicator	LOA Target (2021)	Target	2018	Actual	Target	2019	Actual
<b>PO 3. Reduced post-harvest losses</b>							
Cubic meter of storage space developed or refurbished	156,876 (135,242)	17,476 (79,050)		62,529	102,612 (54,532)		40,181
Number of storage facilities developed/ refurbished	470 (688)	122 (303)		227	276 (340)		381
<b>PO 4. Increased agricultural employment and entrepreneurship</b>							
Number of new people employed by SMEs receiving AGRA support along the focus value chains	6,097 (6078)	1,384 (250)		1,249 (27)	2,685 (1,805)		(1,403)
Number of enterprises supported and operating along the focus value chains	Total 5,780 (4,363)	1758 (1,957)		7,097	2,889 (1,896)		2,529
	Seed Co.			25			4
	Financial Inst			30			3
	Aggregation			311			852
	Agro-dealers			6,579			1,453
	Off-takers			74			182
	Others			78			35
<b>PO 5. Increased use of structured markets</b>							
Number of farmers selling produce through structured trading facilities/arrangements	3,505,400 (2,549,371)	905,281 (571,478)		186,440	1,786,573 (1,063,417)		427,578
Quantity (MT) of crops sold through structured markets	5,188,280 (8,970,557)	933,408 (1,708,736)		149,087	2,263,327 (3,069,096)		920,807
Value (USD) of target crops sold through structured markets	1,000,758,510 (465,046,679)	208,782,863 (71,647,449)		40,610,832	462,569,084 (176,373,342)		205,637,855
Number of farmers accessing market information	1,932,190	342,638		11,519	850,225		22,176
<b>PO 6. Strengthened and expanded business development, financial and risk management services in agriculture value chain</b>							
Number of financial institutions providing financial services for farmers and SMEs in ag value chain	79 (33)	23 (5)		38	23 (23)		53
Number of financial products developed to provide financial services to small holder farmers with AGRA support	80 (26)	18 (2)		2	18 (16)		13
Value (USD) of loan leveraged as a result of AGRA investment	228,342,271 (131,054,545)	62,224,197 (20,463,636)		2,851,681	138,987,205 (39,790,909)		20,475,806

Output indicator	LOA Target (2021)	Target	2018 Actual	Target	2019 Actual
<b>PO 7. Reduced impact of agricultural volatility</b>					
Number of target seed varieties with distinct resilience traits commercialized with AGRA support for specific stress or shock situations	31	4	8	9	2
<b>CCPO 10. Increased women empowerment and livelihoods in agriculture</b>					
Number of women owned input and output market enterprises along the focus value chains supported	617	209	247	318	257
<b>CCPO 11. Increased youth empowerment and livelihoods in agriculture</b>					
Number of youth-owned enterprises supported along focus value chains	425	131	38	214	164
<b>CCPO 12. Strengthened capacity for farmers and other focus agricultural value chain actors</b>					
Number of training events held to build capacity of farmers and other value chain actors along focus value chains	16,498 (15,330)	3,754	5,462	7,251	9,802
Number of individuals who have received AGRA supported short-term agricultural sector training	1,556,732 (2,797,884)	724,994	775,979	1,272,151	1,776,906
Number of farmers reached with promoted interventions	Total	1,657,128	1,600,741	3,855,043	3,637,340
	Male		1,129,829		2,519,090
	Female		470,912		1,118,250

Annex Table 3: Additional measures for five countries from outcome surveys for Maize farmers

Indicator	Burkina Faso	Ghana	Nigeria	Tanzania	Rwanda
Adoption of improved crop varieties	88%	14%	41%	58%	48%
Adoption of inorganic fertilizers	87%	53%	99%	74%	68%
Adoption of post-harvest practices	33%	23%	40%	72%	53%
% of famers with access to extension	53%	31%	40%	43%	60%
% of farmers accessing formal financial services	32%	15%	71%	9%	56%
% of farmers with access to market information	0	1%	3%	0	21%
Average age of varieties in the field (years)	N/A	23.6	11.6	19.7	12.3

## Annex 16: New numbering and organisation of questions related to Objective 3

EQ#	EQ	Notes
4.1	What has been the impact of PIATA on AGRA's strategic thinking and progress in driving more integrated and inclusive programming?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Include in here part of 4.4: What effect is PIATA having on AGRAs way of working.</li> <li>• Also include in here the impact of the commitment to the shared RF by the donors on AGRAs strategic thinking and progress (presently under 4.5)</li> </ul>
4.2	(Was 4.3) To what extent has involvement in the PIATA Advisory Committee and Country Advisory Committee (CAC) influenced the thinking/actions of resource partners and other donors, especially with regard to reducing fragmentation of donor activities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Was 4.3</li> <li>• This includes part of 4.4: What effect is PIATA having on donors' ways of working.</li> <li>• Include in here findings regarding how commitment to the shared results framework has contributed to reducing fragmentation of donor activities or not (presently under 4.5)</li> </ul>
4.3	To what extent is the new model cohesive with the existing governance structure?	
4.4	Have there been any unintended consequences of PIATA on donors and AGRA or its partners?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Was 5.1</li> <li>• Could end up being included in 4.3 as much of the content of this will relate to 4.3</li> </ul>
4.5	To what extent has the new model set up AGRA for securing a diverse, sustainable funding stream?	
	What effect is PIATA having on donors' and AGRA's ways of working?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Was 4.4</li> <li>• Now subsumed into 4.1 and 4.2 above</li> </ul>
	What has been the experience of grantees and other non-PIATA partners <i>vis-à-vis</i> the new partnership model?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Was 4.5</li> <li>• Grantee experience does not fit under this question</li> <li>• Non-PIATA partners included in 4.2 above</li> </ul>

NB: These were originally EQ4 and EQ5.1 and have been renumbered.

